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I. INTRODUCTION
In a seeming blink of an eye, international bodies applying
international law have effectively become the arbiters of domestic
copyright law. World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute settlement
panels may now determine whether a nation's copyright law comports
with the newly adopted Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"),' and may authorize trade sanctions
upon a finding of non-compliance. 2 Of like import, the United
Nations' World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
increasingly serves as a favored venue for copyright industry and user
groups to further their legislative agendas. 3 Recent WIPO treaties
1. TRIPS came into effect on January 1, 1995, as part of the agreement that established
the WTO and substantially revamped the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33
IL.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MuLTuATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTs 6-19, 365-403 (GATT Secretariat ed.,
1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round].
2. TRIPS makes disputes over member state compliance subject to the new VITO dispute
settlement procedures. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 64 (stating that WTO dispute settlement
procedures "shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes" under TRIPS);
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 2, art. 22; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]
(outlining the new WTO dispute settlement procedures).
3. In December of 1996, for example, having failed to obtain Congressional enactment of
proposed legislation to expand the rights of digital content providers, the Clinton
Administration brought its proposals before a WIPO Diplomatic Conference, hoping to return to
Congress with a signed treaty as a near fait accompli. In part as a result of intense lobbying by
copyright user groups, the Conference largely rejected the U.S. proposals. For a riveting
account of the Conference, see generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997). See also Ralph Oman, Berne Revision: The Continuing Drama, 4
FORDHAM INTLEL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 139, 155-56 (1993) (noting interplay between
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have accordingly set the tone for proposed domestic legislation
designed to bring copyright law into the digital age.4
Given the ongoing integration of world communications and
markets for cultural expression, the continuing globalization of copy-
right law is inevitable. For that reason, the question of the future
direction and shape of international copyright law has become a mat-
ter of considerable and growing controversy.5 Most pointedly, to the
profound consternation of numerous commentators, 6 recent years
have seen a dramatic move to reconceptualize copyright in terms of
international trade. TRIPS epitomizes that move. It aims to ratchet
up worldwide copyright protection and enforcement in order to
remove barriers to copyright industry exports.7 United States and
copyright globalization and domestic legislation); J. H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights in DataF, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 112-13 (1997) (criticizing the
inordinate influence on international database protection initiatives of rights holders who are
generally well-represented at the international legislative level).
WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations. It administers intellectual property
treaties, serves as a forum for treaty drafting, conclusion, and revision, and provides technical
assistance for the drafting of domestic intellectual property legislation. For further information
concerning the WIPO and its activities, as well as for on-line copies of many of the WIPO
documents, see World Intellectual Property Organization, General Information on WIPO and
Intellectual Property (last modified Jan. 7, 1998) <http://www.wipo.org>.
4. A diplomatic conference held under WIPO auspices in December of 1996 resulted in
the adoption of two treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 LL.M. 65
[hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty], and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Dec. 20, 1996, 36 LL.M. 76 [hereinafter WIPO Performances Treaty]. Although neither treaty
has entered into force, they have spurred domestic legislation purporting to implement their
terms. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaty Implementation
Act of 1997, S. 1121, 105th Cong.; WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R. 2281,
105th Cong. (1997); Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S.
1146, 105th Cong.; European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, COM (97) 628 final (1997)
<http'//europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/intprop/intpropcopyen.pdf#xml> [hereinafter E.U.
Information Society Directive].
5. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAMD. J. TRANSNATVL L. 613, 620-33 (1996) (criticizing the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the
Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 352 (1997) (noting that
"the members of the fledgling World Trade Organization agree on little beyond the letter of the
TRIPS Agreement"); Samuelson, supra note 3, at 380-427 (describing the rancorous debate at
the WIPO's Diplomatic Conference in December of 1996).
6. See, e.g., Yves Gaubiac, A New International Dimension in Copyright: The Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 166 R.I.D.A. 2, 6-8 (1995) (noting that the "human
dimension7 underlying the traditional law of literary and artistic property is missing in TRIPS);
David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1412-19 (1995) (discussing the
possible conflicts between TRIPS's trade-oriented treatment and traditional United States
copyright values and policies).
7. See Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 456-63 (1997) (noting that TRIPS reflects the
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European Union officials have aggressively promoted the view of
cultural expression as a commodity of trade in other contexts as well.8
At the behest of their constituent producers and purveyors of sound
recordings, films, television programs, and software, they have
insisted that countries be required to minimize limitations on
copyright holder rights,9 arguably riding roughshod over venerable
copyright values and the public interest in the process.
This Article presents an alternative framework for copyright
globalization. It builds upon the argument, recently advanced by
myself and others, that copyright law serves fundamentally to
underwrite a democratic culture: By according creators of original
expression a set of exclusive rights to market their literary and
artistic works, copyright fosters the dissemination of knowledge,
supports a pluralist, nonstate communications media, and highlights
the value of individual contributions to public discourse.' 0  In this
view, copyright's constitutive, democratic purpose is both a primary
rationale for according authors proprietary rights in original
expression and the proper standard for delimiting those rights.
Copyright holder rights should be sufficiently robust to support copy-
right's democracy-enhancing functions, but not so broad and unbend-
ing as to chill expressive diversity and hinder the exchange of infor-
mation and ideas.
view that "inadequate protection of intellectual property rights constitutes an impediment to
international trade).
8. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 373 (noting that at the December 1996 WIPO
Diplomatic Conference, "U.S. negotiators worked with their European counterparts in pursuit of
high-protectionist norms that these delegations believed would enable their industries to
flourish in the growing global market for information products and services"). European Union
officials have advanced a similar trade-oriented view in copyright harmonization directives
designed to further market integration within the European Union. See generally Herman
Cohen Jehoram, The EC Copyright Directives, Economics, and Authors' Rights, 25 11C 821
(1994). However, the European Union has resisted the trade view of cultural expression in the
area of state support for indigenous cultural production. See infra notes 393-400 and
accompanying text.
9. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 97-113; Samuelson, supra note 3, at 373.
10. See, e.g., 1 PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHr § 1.14, at 1:42 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that
copyright promotes freedom of expression, an important component of successful democratic
governance); LYMAN RAY PATIERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USERS' RiGHTS 123-33 (1991) (arguing that copyright should be narrowly tailored to the
needs of a democratic citizenry); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 267-69 (1996)
(anchoring copyright in a Habermasian understanding of democratic discourse); David Ladd,
The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY 421, 427-29 (1983)
(arguing that copyright supports a cultural marketplace that fosters freedom); Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1135 (1990) (observing that copyright's
"underlying objectives parallel those of the [F]irst [Almendment7); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996) (viewing copyright as a
state measure designed to use market institutions to support a democratic civil society).
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That democratic paradigm, I will argue, offers a potentially
cogent counterweight to the view of cultural expression as a mere
item of international trade. Applied internationally, it would anchor
copyright in a vision of global democracy, not merely global markets.
While acknowledging the desirability of lessening trade barriers to
copyright exports, it would insist that nations be accorded consider-
able leeway, and perhaps even be required, to tailor their copyright
law in a manner that best enhances local democratic culture. As
such, the paradigm may serve as a benchmark for interpreting and
evaluating nations' domestic copyright laws and international copy-
right treaty obligations.
To be certain, the dichotomy between copyright-as-trade and
copyright-as-democracy is neither simple or unequivocal. It has been
suggested, in fact, that TRIPS unwittingly amounts to "freedom
imperialism":" By requiring authoritarian states and developing
countries to institute a full-fledged Western system of quasi-
proprietary copyright,12 TRIPS effectively unleashes copyright's
11. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 617-18 (maintaining that TRIPS may unwittingly
amount to "freedom imperialism"). In her brief but insightful article, Professor Hamilton leaves
open for later contemplation the difficult question of whether such imperialism is a good idea.
See id. at 618; see also David E. Sanger, Playing the Trade Card: U.S. Is Exporting Its Free
Market Values Through Global Commercial Agreements, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1
(concluding that the Clinton Administration views the WTO as a tool to force political change in
China and other countries).
12. TRIPS requires countries that wish to gain access to world markets under the GATT
to comply with the minimum standards for intellectual property protection set forth in TRIPS,
which are based on the level of protection generally in force in developed countries. See
Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SO0cY 121, 124 (1994)
(comparing the protection of intellectual property under TRIPS to the protection of intellectual
property under the WIPO Conventions); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of
Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INTL
LAw. 345, 366-73 (1995) (discussing the minimum standards contained in TRIPS which apply to
all WTO member countries). TRIPS blunts this requirement's impact on developing countries,
but does so to a very limited extent. First, developing countries are given more time to meet
TRIPS's minimum standards. See TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 66-67 (granting "least developed
country Members" of TRIPS a greater amount of time to implement the TRIPS provisions).
Second, TRIPS incorporates by reference the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, including the Appendix to that Convention, which
allows developing countries, in a narrow set of cases and under considerable procedural
restraints, to provide for the compulsory licensing of works that might not otherwise be
available to them. See id. art. 9(1) (incorporating the Berne Convention and Appendix); see also
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last
revised July 24, 1971, Protocol Regarding Developing Countries, art. 1(b), S. TREATY DOC. No.
99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (outlining the compulsory
licensing mechanism). Since that Appendix has been rarely used, however, TRIPS's importation
of the Appendix has more symbolic than practical import. See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for
Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAt L. 735, 763 (1996)
(positing that the "wholesale importation of the Appendix into the TRIPS
Agreement... appears simply to be a form of tokenism with no genuine possibility of yielding
221
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democratizing force, even if the Agreement's primary goal is the
furtherance of trade. But the trade/democracy dichotomy does have
significant import for international copyright relations nonetheless.
In particular, I will contend the notion that upward harmonization
under TRIPS will contribute to global democracy is seriously
misguided. Copyright's constitutive value for democratic development
depends heavily on local circumstances. Indeed, copyright may
sometimes impede democratization unless substantial limits are
placed on copyright holder rights.
Asserting copyright's democratic principles in the global arena
would thus entail a far more nuanced approach than TRIPS's appar-
ent insistence on maximalist global copyright protection. The demo-
cratic approach would maintain the ideal of a strong copyright, but
would allow for a liberal use of exceptions and limitations to copyright
holder rights designed to make authors' works more widely available
and to bolster indigenous media in nascent democracies. While still
providing remuneration for copyright holders, it would, in some local
circumstances, constrain copyright holder prerogatives to a far
greater extent than may have been initially contemplated under
TRIPS or even under the democratic copyright paradigm as applied in
the United States.
Part II of this Article lays the conceptual framework for this
nuanced approach by summarizing the principal tenets of what might
be termed the "democratic copyright school." It presents the
argument that, at least within the parameters of U.S. law and
experience, copyright serves fundamentally to promote democratic
governance by promoting the dissemination of information,
supporting independent media, and venerating individual self-
expression. Part II then briefly describes the U.S.-based copyright
model derived from this proposition, a model granting copyright
holders a set of exclusive rights broad enough to fund copyright's
constitutive agenda, but punctuated with limitations and exceptions
designed to provide a breathing space for educative and
transformative uses of existing cultural works.
Part III assesses the copyright paradigm's potential import in
the global arena. To that end, Section A briefly outlines the nature of
international copyright relations and how the democratic copyright
paradigm might apply to them. Section B then critically examines,
and affirms for purposes of this Article, the normative foundation for
material benefits to developing countries). For further discussion of the Berne Appendix, see
infra notes 429-34 and accompanying text.
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asserting copyright's democratic principles in the global arena, the
idea that democracy is a universal good. Section C asks whether,
within the context of various stages of democratic and economic
development, granting authors and their assigns a broad set of
exclusive rights to market expressive works actually contributes to a
democratic culture.
Part IV outlines the legal foundation for the democratic copy-
right paradigm's universal application. Paradigm proponents have
thus far worked within a legal tradition that is largely unique to the
United States. Their depiction and corresponding normative
demands of copyright law have drawn heavily upon the interplay
between U.S. copyright's incorporation of First Amendment values,
the Framers' understanding of copyright as instrumental to a "free
Constitution,"18 and the Constitution's explicit goal of promoting "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts"14 as the rationale for authorizing
Congress to accord authors exclusive, but limited, rights in their
original works. Given that these underpinnings are peculiar to U.S.
copyright jurisprudence, certainly in form if not entirely in substance,
a broader normative and legal foundation is required to assert the
democratic paradigm in the new global landscape.
Following that injunction, Part IV grounds the paradigm in the
"democratic entitlement," a set of international law norms concerning
democratic governance, political participation, and individual
autonomy.15 It concludes that core components of the democratic
entitlement, as well as the entitlement's "soft-law" periphery, would
provide a basis-even apart from any obligations imposed under
international copyright treaty-for an international legal norm of a
strong but limited copyright. It finds, however, that the limitations
on copyright owner prerogatives that the democratic entitlement
imposes are more concrete and justiciable than the entitlement re-
quirement that countries adopt a copyright law. Hence, congruently
with the paradigm's focus on local conditions, the democratic
entitlement would support the global adoption of a Western quasi-
proprietary copyright as more an aspirational goal than a cognizable
requirement of international law.
13. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 357 (quoting from President Washington's address to
Congress in support of the first federal copyright statute).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
Am. J. INTL L. 46 (1992) (describing the "democratic entitlement7 and its components).
223
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Part V applies the democratic copyright paradigm to four
currently controversial areas in international copyright relations.
Section A argues that WTO dispute settlement panels may and
should allow for democracy-enhancing limitations to copyright owner
rights in determining whether member states are in compliance with
TRIPS. Section B contends that the international copyright treaty
regime should provide for certain mandatory limits on copyright
owner prerogatives and that, in this sense, the recently adopted
WIPO Copyright Treaty does not go far enough in protecting the
public interest. Section C applies the democratic framework to the
controversy surrounding demands for a "cultural exemption" to free
trade regimes. Although this controversy is not a matter of copyright
law per se, it has far-reaching implications for copyright industries
and thus may fall within the province of TRIPS. This Section
contends that, given the importance for democratic governance of a
vibrant local sector of authors and communications media, countries
should be entitled to subsidize domestic production of cultural expres-
sion and erect barriers against the importation of foreign cultural
works to the extent necessary to support such a sector. Finally,
Section D examines the controversy concerning the international
versus national exhaustion of copyright owner distribution rights, an
issue at the heart of one of the two copyright cases that the United
States Supreme Court is scheduled to decide this term.16 It concludes
that copyright owners should generally be entitled to prevent
unauthorized imports of copies that have been lawfully made abroad
because the resultant possibility of price discrimination in
international markets would give copyright owners an incentive to
market expressive works in countries they might otherwise avoid. At
the same time, however, the paradigm would provide for compulsory
licenses for the production of export-restricted copies and translations
of expressive works in countries in which, despite the theoretical
possibility of price discrimination, the works are in fact not available
at reasonable cost.
16. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2406, 2407
(1997) (granting petition for a writ of certiorari). The other case involves the issue of whether
the assessment of statutory damages against a copyright infringer is a proper question for a
jury. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 30, 30 (1997) (granting peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari).
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II. A DEMOCRATIC COPYRIGHT
Copyright law accords authors a set of transferable, exclusive
rights in their works of original expression. The United States
Copyright Act (the "Act") enumerates five principal exclusive rights:
the rights to make copies of a work; to distribute those copies to the
public; to perform a work in public (which includes broadcasting); to
publicly display a work; and to make derivative versions of the work
(principally including translations, abridgments, and versions in other
media, such as motion picture versions of novels). 17 The Act also sets
certain limits on those rights: the rights are of limited duration
(currently the life of the author, plus fifty years);8 extend only to
literary form and not to basic ideas, processes, or facts;1s and are
subject to various exceptions, ranging from compulsory licenses for
specified uses (such as cover recordings of previously recorded songs20
and secondary transmissions of television broadcasts by cable sys-
tems21) to the doctrine of fair use, which enables courts, on a case-by-
case basis, to permit otherwise infringing uses that serve important
social purposes (such as scholarship, news reporting, or criticism) and
that do not unduly impair the market for the copyright holder's
work.22
Like any complex body of law, copyright represents an uneasy
accommodation of competing interests and theoretical premises.
However, copyright is particularly unstable, largely because of rapid
advances in the technology for creating, reproducing, and communi-
cating authors' works, which have in turn dramatically reconfigured,
and portend further upheaval in, the markets for those works.
Battles have erupted over issues such as whether copyright's duration
should be further extended,2 the extent to which copyright holders
should have exclusive control over creative reformulations of their
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995). The Act also provides for an exclusive right
to publicly perform sound recordings by means of a digital audio transmission. See id. § 106(6).
18. See id. § 302(a). The term of protection for anonymous works, pseudonymous works,
and works made for hire is 75 years from first publication or 100 years from creation, whichever
expires first. See id § 302(c).
19. See id. § 102(b).
20. See id §115.
21. See §111.
22. See i&L § 107.
23. The proposed Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997 would add an additional 20 years
to the present term. See Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997, S. 505, 105th Cong.; Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1997, H.R. 604, 105th Cong. (1997). For vehement opposition to this
proposed extension, see Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of Copyright, in GROWING PAINS:
ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATION AND SocIETY (Laura N. Gassaway ed., forthcoming 1998).
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works (now including digital manipulation and sampling),24 the extent
to which traditional limitations and exceptions to copyright holder
rights should carry over into the digital environment,25 and whether
copyright holders should be able, through shrink wrap licenses and
web site access agreements, to contract out of such limitations and
exceptions. 6 These and other deepening fault lines have in turn
engendered widespread debate over what are and should be
copyright's primary objectives.
A number of commentators, including this Author, have sought
to address these issues by placing copyright's role in fostering expres-
sive diversity and the dissemination of knowledge at the center of
copyright jurisprudence.27 Given the importance of these factors for a
democratic society, they have argued, copyright doctrine should be
evaluated primarily by how well it promotes them.28 Concerns such
24. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 376-82 (discussing the various attitudes toward
transformative uses); David Sanjek, "Don't Have to DJ No More": Sampling and the
"Autonomous" Creator, 10 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607, 612 (1992) (describing the use of
Musical Instrument Digital Interface Synthesizers, which take audio signals and convert them
into a string of computer digits that can be readily copied and manipulated).
25. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 10, at 273, 277 (opposing the extension of copyright to
digital "borrowing" and asserting that users of expression disseminated over digital networks
must be allowed "to do the same things they are able to do in a non-digitized environment");
Hamilton, supra note 5, at 623 (favoring application of a free use zone on the Global Information
Infrastructure); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,
40 (1994) (advocating the user's "right to read" and suggesting that the Copyright Act should be
amended to clarify that "an individual's ordinary reading, viewing, or listening to an authorized
copy of a work does not invade the copyright owner's rights"); Robert P. Merges, The End of
Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130-35 (1997) (suggesting that only the narrow distributive rationale
for fair use might survive in the digital environment); Netanel, supra note 10, at 371-76
(emphasizing that traditional limitations should not automatically carry over into the digital
environment).
26. See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of
Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1997) (favoring subservience of contract to copyright
limitations); Dennis Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22
DAYTON L. REv. 511 (1997) (asserting that mass market licenses should be preempted when
inconsistent with copyright limitations); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between
Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 1995 DUKE L.J. 479
(favoring contractual freedom within the bounds of antitrust and traditional contract doctrines).
27. See supra note 10 (listing these commentators). This democratic copyright paradigm
overlaps only partly with the view, advanced by a number of commentators, that copyright
holder rights must be limited by the First Amendment. See infra note 322 (listing those
commentators). The paradigm emphasizes that, when properly limited, copyright af5matively
serves First Amendment values and, indeed, that copyright's support for these values is
copyright law's fundamental rationale. The First Amendment-as-limit commentary, on the
other hand, places far less emphasis on copyright's constitutive role in our system of free
speech. Accordingly, it tends to view the First Amendment more as an external constraint on
copyright holder rights than as copyright's symbiotic counterpart.
28. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 10, at 131 (arguing that U.S. copyright law
should be interpreted by courts to reflect free-speech values in the U.S. Constitution); Leval,
supra note 10, at 1135 (advocating "disciplined focus on the utilitarian, public-enriching objec-
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as allocative efficiency or protecting authors' reputational interest in
their work should, in cases of conflict, give way to copyright's vital
role in promoting independent thought and the robust exchange of
ideas. Copyright doctrine should be tailored-and copyright owner
rights should be defined and delimited-in ways that best further
these constitutive goals.
Copyright, this view holds, underwrites a democratic culture in
three principal ways. First, copyright provides an incentive for the
production and dissemination of original expression. Like national
defense, crime prevention, and other so-called "public goods," creative
expression gives rise to the problem of nonexcludability, the inability
of the good's supplier to prevent nonpayors from enjoying the good's
benefits and thus to spread the costs of supply among the consuming
public.29 Copyright law offers a solution to that problem by according
authors a proprietary right in certain uses of their works. Armed
with an enforceable right to exclude, authors may recover their costs
by selling access to their works on the market.
In that manner, copyright spurs the creation and distribution
of literature, art, music, television and radio programming, films,
articles, and, increasingly, the welter of text, sounds, and images
transmitted over the Internet. Much of that expression presents
information or opinion on issues of political and social import. A far
greater portion, perhaps, seeks more to entertain than to enlighten,
but even in entertaining it may subtly, yet powerfully, subvert or
reinforce prevailing practices, ideologies, and stereotypes. In support-
ing the production and dissemination of original expression, therefore,
copyright serves as a vehicle for public education, a fount for public
debate, and a linchpin of participatory culture, all vital to a system of
governance predicated on citizen sovereignty and collective self-rule.30
Second, copyright supports a sector of expressive activity that
is relatively independent from the state.31 A proprietary right is not
the only conceivable solution to the public goods nonexcludability
tives of copyright"); Netanel, supra note 10, at 291 (urging that copyright be redirected "toward
its core understanding of public benefit, that of fortifying our democratic institutions by promot-
ing public education, self-reliant authorship, and robust debate").
29. See Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for
Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2645-49 (1994) (discussing intellectual property in
the framework of public goods).
30. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 347-51 (arguing that copyright fosters democratic
association, education, and public debate).
31. See Ladd, supra note 10, at 427-28 (stating that copyright supports and fosters innova-
tive, independent, expressive activity); Netanel, supra note 10, at 352-62 (arguing that copyright
undergirds an expressive sector independent from state and elite patronage).
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problem. Indeed, if we were only concerned with the supply of crea-
tive expression, we might well establish a system of massive state-
funded cultural production, just as the state provides our military and
police forces. Such a system would be unacceptable in a democratic
society, however. The extensive involvement of the state in the crea-
tion and dissemination of cultural works would be inimical to freedom
of expression. Even if undertaken by a benign, democratically elected
government, it would ultimately stifle critical autonomy and expres-
sive diversity.8 2
Copyright, therefore, serves not only to obtain a desired quan-
tity of creative expression. It also underwrites the conditions for
expressive activity required for a thriving democracy by enabling
authors and publishers to create and disseminate cultural works
without undue reliance on government patronage. To be certain,
some government funding of the cultural production may well en-
hance the democratic nature of public discourse by making available
certain types of expression that might be shunted aside in an un-
trammeled market.38 But overall, a strong, self-reliant, expressive
sector whose roots are outside the state constitutes an indispensable
ingredient of democratic governance. It is that expressive sec-
tor-both a guard against the abuse of state power and an independ-
ent, nongovernmental site for public discourse-which copyright helps
to support.
Finally, copyright may enhance democratic culture by high-
lighting the value of individual creativity. Like all law, copyright is
not simply a means for translating social policy into conduct-ordering
rules. Rather, copyright also plays a compositional role in our under-
standing of authorship and of the place of individual's expression
within our cultural and political matrix.s4 Modern copyright arose
from and continues to give legal expression to an Enlightenment
understanding of individual agency, rationality, and transformative
32. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 360 (positing that state intervention in the expressive
sector may be used to further political agendas and institutional goals); see also LUCAS A. POWE,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 108-61 (1987) (detailing repeated
political favoritism in the regulation of broadcast media by the FCC).
33. A recent study concluded, for example, that the majority of U.S. government subsidies
to radio broadcasting are allocated to stations without commercial competition in their format,
suggesting that such subsidies correct inefficient market underprovision. See STEVEN T. BERRY
& JOEL WALDFOGEL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, INC., PUBLIC RADIO IN THE
UNITED STATES: DOES IT CORRECT MARKET FAILURE OR CANNmAUZE COMMERCIAL STATIONS?
24-25 (1997).
34. For a highly illuminating discussion viewing law in general as an arena for contesting
identities, see Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1149 (1997).
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potency.3 5 By according protection to creators of original works of
authorship, rather than simply to publishers who reprint long-exist-
ing works, copyright underscores the value of fresh ideas and of indi-
vidual contributions to our public discourse. As such, it tends to un-
dermine cultural and political hierarchies. On a more basic level, in
recognizing the positive social contribution of an individual's
expressive autonomy and achievement, copyright reaffirms the worth
of the individual. In so doing, it lends support to a regime of personal
liberty, striking at the core of authoritarian government.
Yet, while copyright must be sufficiently robust to further its
democracy-enhancing goals, a copyright that is too broad in scope may
stifle the very expressive diversity and free flow of information that it
should be designed to encourage. 36 All authors draw upon existing
works in creating new ones. For that reason, a democratic copyright
must provide considerable leeway for creative transformations of
protected expression. At least to some extent, authors must be free to
adapt, reformulate, quote, refer to, and abstract from existing expres-
sion without having to obtain copyright owner permission. Absent
that breathing space, authors would be severely fettered in their
ability to participate in public discourse, whether by building upon
literary or artistic traditions, laying bare the contradictions in vener-
able cultural icons, or challenging prevailing modes of thought.37 Nor
may a democratic copyright subsume all nontransformative uses
within the ambit of copyright owners' exclusive rights. Exact repro-
ductions of existing works may sometimes add significant power and
authenticity to democratic debate, as in a recent case in which a
newspaper dramatized police department bias by reprinting a racist
fable from a police organization newsletter. 8 Requiring copyright
owner authorization for every instance of copying for classroom
instruction, research, or private study, let alone for reading, listening
to the radio, borrowing a book from the library, or Internet browsing,
35. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Enlightenment ideal of a
self-expressive, morally responsible, transformatively potent individual).
36. See PATrERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 10, at 128-31.
37. The Supreme Court recently afirmed that copyright's goal of promoting the progress
of science and the arts is "generally furthered by the creation of transformative works" and
emphasized that such works "lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing
space within the confines of copyright." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994).
38. See Belmore v. City Pages Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 676-80 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that
the newspaper's reproduction constituted a noninfringing fair use).
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may also place undue burdens on social dialogue and the
dissemination of knowledge.3 9
Exponents of copyright's constitutive role in promoting demo-
cratic culture have differed on the precise balance between copyright
owner prerogatives and public access to existing works that would
best support that objective. Paul Goldstein, for example, has posited
that a robust copyright, one in which copyright owners' exclusive
rights to original expression generally extends "into every corner
where consumers derive value from literary and artistic works,"
would best promote "political as well as cultural diversity."40 In his
view, the limited duration of those rights, the traditional precept that
copyright protection lies only in literary form and not in a work's
underlying ideas or facts, and the presence of a few narrowly defined
statutory exemptions amply satisfy the need to prevent copyright
owners from undermining copyright's democracy-enhancing goals.
41
Others who emphasize copyright law's democratic role are decidedly
less sanguine about the continued viability of copyright's traditional
JiMits. 42 They would more narrowly circumscribe copyright owner
control over expression, allowing more extensive free use of
copyrighted works.43
Whatever these differences in application, however, exponents
of a democratic copyright have espoused the same basic tenet:
Copyright law is instrumental to democratic governance, and copy-
right's constitutive ends require both adequate protection of copyright
owner rights and adequate limits on those rights. Copyright, in other
words, can and should effect a sufficient transfer of consumer surplus
39. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 10, at 268 (arguing that the incautious application of
copyright principles to cyberspace will jeopardize social dialogue and enhance the power of
copyright owners); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw Out the
Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 405 (noting a public interest
"in maintaining some approximation of our current cheap and simple access to copyrighted
works for research, scholarship and pleasure"). But see Netanel, supra note 10, at 373-74
(cautioning that to the extent widespread digital dissemination substantially displaces
traditional sources of copyright owner revenue, copyright should be extended to many digital
uses).
40. PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 236 (1994).
41. See id. at 224 (suggesting that more open-ended safety valves might be unnecessary in
the digital environment); see also Netanel, supra note 10, at 331 n.239, 332 n.240, 336 n.252
(distilling Professor Goldstein's understanding from a number of his writings).
42. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 10, at 304-05 (questioning the extent to which
copyright's internal limitations, as often applied, successfully "maintain an acceptable degree of
transformative expression").
43. See, e.g., PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 10, at 123-33 (arguing that copyright
protection should be narrowly construed); Elkin-Koren, supra note 10, at 267-94 (arguing
against extending an expansive set of copyright protections to cyberspace).
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to subsidize a robust, pluralist, and independent sector of authors and
publishers. However, copyright's "breathing space" for transformative
and educative uses must remain sufficiently broad in order not to
stifle social criticism and the free flow of information. 4
IIL PoLICY FOUNDATIONS: A DEMOCRATIC COPYRIGHT IN THE
GLOBAL ARENA
Proponents of the democratic copyright paradigm have
suggested that it may have universal force.45 Thus far, however, their
analysis has focused almost entirely on the workings of copyright in
the United States. As a result, it is by no means certain whether and
how copyright's democratic principles might actually be applied in the
global arena.
United States copyright law draws heavily upon a vision of
copyright's democratic efficacy grounded in the First Amendment and
the Constitution's Copyright Clause.46 In that view, copyright
generally serves as "the engine of free expression"47 by supporting a
market for original expression. This constitutionally inspired
understanding also contemplates a limited copyright, however.
Copyright holder rights must be narrowly drawn, lest they impose an
unacceptable burden on the "broad dissemination of ideas and
information... and the robust public debate essential to an
44. For this Author's application of that paradigm to a number of specific issues, see
Netanel, supra note 10, at 864-85.
45. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 40, at 236 (maintaining that strong international
copyright protection would "promote political and cultural diversity" the world over); Hamilton,
supra note 5, at 617-18 (suggesting that requiring authoritarian states to adopt Western
copyright imposes Western democratic ideals upon those states); Netanel, supra note 10, at 288-
89 (contending that "a robust copyright is a necessary (though not necessarily sufficient)
condition both for the creation and dissemination of [author's] expression and for its
independent and pluralist character"); Barbara Ringer, Two Hundred Years of American
Copyright Law, in AMERICAN BAR ASS*N, Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 118 (1977) (asserting that "[w]e know,
empirically, that strong copyright systems are characteristic of relatively free societies").
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitutions Copyright Clause authorizes Congress
to grant authors limited rights in their works in order to "promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts," an objective the Framers deemed essential to the preservation of a "free
Constitution." See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
47. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (affirming
that "the Framers intended copyright... to be the engine of free expression"); see also Leval,
supra note 10, at 1135 (noting that copyright law's underlying objectives "parallel those of the
First Amendment").
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enlightened citizenry."4 This vision of a strong but limited copyright
may ultimately prove compatible with broadly accepted
understandings of the importance of original expression and the free
flow of information for a democratic society. But to the extent it is
cast in the language and particular sensitivities of U.S. jurisprudence,
48. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly observed that the exclusive rights that Congress has accorded authors "are limited in
nature and must ultimately serve the public good." Fogerty v: Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526
(1994). Several courts have considered the threat to free speech posed by an unbridled
copyright. See Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 893 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Justice Douglas stated:
The arena of public debate would be quiet, indeed, if a politician could copyright his
speeches or a philosopher his treatises and thus obtain a monopoly on the ideas they
contained. We should not construe the copyright laws to conflict so patently with the
values that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
Id.; see also New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir.
1986) (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (stating that the imposition of a permanent injunction in the
copyright infringement action before the court would "diminish public knowledge" and thus
implicate First Amendment concerns). Courts that have considered the matter have held
almost universally that the copyright doctrines of fair use, the idea/expression dichotomy, and
limited duration sufficiently protect First Amendment values and thus obviate the need for a
First Amendment defense per se. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (explaining that
First Amendment protections are "already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas"); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d
1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982) ("No circuit that has considered the question... has ever held that the
First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation
embodied in the 'fair use' doctrine."); Sid & Marty Kroffl Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that an idea/expression dichotomy serves to
accommodate First Amendment concerns).
Venerable copyright limitations that incorporate First Amendment values include: (1)
copyright's limited term, see 1 MELVILLE B. NEAER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.10[c][1], at 1-82 (1997); (2) the rule that copyright protects only a works aesthetic form or
expression and not the ideas or facts that the work conveys, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); Alfred
C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the IdealExpression Dichotomy and Copyright in a
Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 395-97 (1989); (3) the discretion accorded
judges to fashion infringement remedies so as to allow continued dissemination of an infringing
work, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (stating that the
goals of copyright law are "not always best served by automatically granting i4junctive relief"
when parodists stray beyond "the bounds of fair use"); Leval, supra note 10, at 1132 (arguing
that a "copyright owner's interest may be adequately protected by an award of damages"); (4)
the fair use doctrine, which permits appropriation of otherwise protected expression in various
circumstances, including those in which a court determines, in effect, that the public interest in
access to a work strongly outweighs the copyright owner's interest in preventing or exacting a
price for that access, see Belmore v. City of Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 675-80 (D. Minn. 1995)
(holding as fair use a newspaper's unauthorized reproduction of a newsletter used to expose
perceived police racism); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding as fair use the copying of frames from the Zapruder film of the Kennedy
assassination on grounds of "public interest in having the fullest information available on the
murder of President Kennedy"); and (5) the Copyright Act's withholding of copyright protection
for works created by U.S. government employees within the scope of their employment, see 17
U.S.C. § 105 (1994); David Fewer, Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and
the Limits of Copyright in Canada, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 175, 197 (1997) (discussing the
use of the Crown copyright by the governments of Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom
to suppress publication of government documents).
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it will have little sway in a brave new world of global copyright
dominated by TRIPS. In addition, unlike the copyright law of most of
the world's countries, U.S. copyright operates within a longstanding
democratic system and highly advanced post-industrial economy,
replete with the world's largest mass media sector, a vast and varied
consumer market, and the explosive emergence of digital technology
for the production, replication, and distribution of authors' works.
Any conclusion about the paradigm's universal applicability must
thus depend upon further work assessing how and whether copyright
might contribute to democratic transition and development in a broad
array of political, social, and economic conditions.
With that task in mind, this Part addresses three matters that
are central to determining whether and how the democratic paradigm
might be applied internationally. Section A briefly outlines the
nature of current international copyright relations and suggests some
ways in which the paradigm might affect them. Section B affirms the
paradigm's underlying normative premise-that democracy is a
universal good-and provides a working definition for political
democracy. Section C examines whether copyright in fact contributes
to democratic transition, consolidation, and enhancement. It
concludes that a high level of copyright protection appears to be a
positive factor in democratic development in some circumstances, but
that in others it may be a negative factor. Applying the democratic
copyright paradigm in the global arena, therefore, belies blind
adherence to the principle of upward harmonization epitomized by
TRIPS. It requires, rather, that copyright holder rights be
differentially tailored to support democratic institutions under
various local circumstances.
The focus of this Part is on the paradigm's global application
as a matter of general policy. Part IV will present the basis in inter-
national law for the paradigm's global application, and Part V will
present some particular possibilities for that application.
A. International Copyright Relations
The battle over copyright's future has reverberated in interna-
tional fora as well as within the United States. Like the U.S.
Copyright Act, the copyright laws of other developed countries gener-
ally provide for a quasi-proprietary set of exclusive rights punctuated
by specified limitations to those rights. Even within this basic
Western model, however, there are significant national variations in
the precise nature of copyright holder rights and limitations and in
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the balance struck between them.49 Many developing countries,
moreover, have traditionally accorded significantly lesser degrees of
protection and, in some cases, no copyright protection whatsoever.O
Superimposed on this checkered fabric of domestic copyright
regimes are a number of multilateral copyright treaties. The world's
most venerable multilateral copyright treaty is the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,51 which is adminis-
tered by the WIPO, a specialized agency of the United Nations.52 In
addition to proscribing discriminatory treatment of qualified foreign
authors, 53 Berne sets forth minimum standards of protection, roughly
analogous to the set of exclusive rights available under U.S. law, that
must be accorded to those authors even if a country accords its own
authors lesser protection." Berne, however, has accommodated
49. See ADOLF DIETE, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 137-60 (1978)
(surveying variations in copyright holder rights and limitations to those rights in European
countries). In particular, limitations to copyright holder rights in many developed countries,
particularly civil law countries, are generally not nearly so open-ended as the U.S. doctrine of
fair use. See Institute for Information Law, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam,
Contracts and Copyright Exemptions 16-17 (1997), available at
<http'//www.imprimatur.alcs.co.ukfIMPFTP/except.pdf> [hereinafter Contracts and Copyright
Exemptions] (describing the fair use and fair dealing defenses as broad defenses generally
available only in common law countries, and noting that the U.S. fair use defense is somewhat
more open-ended than the fair dealing defense available in the United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand and Canada); E.U. Information Society Directive, supra note 4, art. 5(2) and (3)
(proposing a short, exhaustive list of specified exceptions and limitations to the reproduction
right that European Union countries will be permitted to recognize).
50. See ROBERT BURNETT, THE GLOBAL JUKEBOXM THE INTERNATIONAL MusIc INDUSTRY
88 (1996) (noting the extraordinarily high rate of sound recording piracy in developing
countries); Carlos Prima Braga, SECTOR ISSUES I: Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals;
Information; The Audio, Video, and Publishing Industries, in THE WORLD BANK,
STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 47, 55 (Wolfgang E. Siebeck ed., 1990) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING
PROTECTION] (noting the massive unauthorized copying of printed and audio-visual works in
developing countries); Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, Recent Trends in Copyright Legislation in
Developing Countries, 6 IIC 689, 692-96 (1982) (lauding a movement among some developing
countries to provide greater copyright protection).
51. See Berne Convention, supra note 12. For a highly authoritative and comprehensive
study of the Convention, see generally SAM RiCKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARYAND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 1 (i987).
52. See supra note 3 (discussing the WIPO).
53. The requirement of non-discrimination is referred to as the principle of "national
treatment." See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 5 (setting forth the principle of "national
treatment"). Berne prohibits discrimination only against foreign authors who are citizens or
residents of other Berne Union countries and against works published in those countries. See
id. art. 5(3).
54. Berne's minimum standards include exclusive rights, subject to various exceptions and
limitations, to make copies, adaptations, public performances, and public displays. See id. art.
9(1) (setting forth reproduction rights); id. art. 12 (discussing authors' rights to make adapta-
tions and alterations); id. art. 11 (giving authors the exclusive right to public performance of
dramatic and musical works); id. art. 11ter (granting authors an exclusive right to public reci-
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significant differences in application of those standards and, indeed,
enables developing countries to deviate from them in certain cases.55
Of significant concern to copyright industry exporters, Berne has also
lacked an effective means of calling signatory countries to account for
noncompliance with Berne requirements. 56 Nor does the Convention
provide any mechanism, short of permitting Berne Union members to
withhold copyright protection for non-Union authors, for pressuring
non-signatory countries to join the Berne Union or otherwise to bring
their copyright laws into conformity with Berne standards.57
TRIPS, which came into effect on January 1, 1995, as part of
the agreement that established the WTO,5s was designed to remedy
the perceived weaknesses in the Berne Convention and other
multilateral intellectual property treaties. TRIPS requires that WTO
member states comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne
Convention, except for those concerning moral rights59 However,
following what TRIPS negotiators commonly referred to as a "Berne
plus" approach, the Agreement also: (1) adds rights beyond those that
it incorporates from Berne; (2) appears to narrow the scope of
permissible limitations to copyright holder rights; and (3) requires
countries to make available effective remedies for copyright
enforcement. 60 By bringing copyright within the ambit of the WTO,
tation of literary works); id. arts. llbis(1), 14(1) (setting forth authors' rights in the public
display of literary and artistic works in television broadcasts and cinematographic works).
55. See Netanel, supra note 7, at 455-56 (discussing the considerable latitude enjoyed by
Berne Union members in the interpretation and application of Berne's minimum standards).
Berne's Appendix allows developing countries, in a narrow set of cases and under considerable
procedural restraints, to provide for the compulsory licensing of works that might not otherwise
be available to them. See RICKETSON, supra note 51, at 632-62 (discussing the compulsory li-
censing of works by developing countries).
56. See Cordray, supra note 12, at 135-36 (noting that the Berne Convention, unlike
TRIPS, lacks effective enforcement mechanisms). The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has
jurisdiction to hear disputes between Berne states concerning Berne's interpretation or applica-
tion. See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 33(1). However, no state has ever brought a
dispute regarding Berne before the ICJ. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral
Trading System in the Context of TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT & CoMP. L. REv. 661, 664 n.13
(1997) (citing Committee of Experts on the Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes Between
States, International Bureau of WIPO, 7th Sess., para. 50, at 13, WIPO Doc. No. SD/CE/Vfl8
(1995)).
57. Berne permits discriminatory treatment of works that were neither created by a
foreign author from Union countries nor first published in a Union country. See Berne
Convention, supra note 12, art. 5(3). However, for countries that import far more creative
works than they export, the threat of such discriminatory treatment provides little incentive to
join the Berne Union.
58. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1.
59. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (providing that, with the exception of moral rights,
WTO members "shall comply with Articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention").
60. See Netanel, supra note 7, at 454-55,459-61.
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TRIPS also provides a mechanism for international enforcement
through the imposition of trade sanctions against non-complying
countries.61  Finally, by requiring stringent, quasi-proprietary
copyright protection as a quid pro quo for WTO membership, TRIPS
creates a strong inducement for non-signatory countries to join an
international copyright regime based on the Western model. As of
this writing, indeed, over 130 countries adhere to TRIPS.62
Since TRIPS came into effect, the WIPO has sought to regain
its leading role in international copyright administration and har-
monization. In December 1996 the WIPO sponsored a diplomatic
conference, attended by representatives of some 140 countries, with a
principal objective of bringing world intellectual property law into the
digital age. The WIPO Copyright Treaty,68 adopted at the diplomatic
conference after considerable and often rancorous debate, would
require party states to provide digital content providers with greater
protection against Internet piracy.6 At the same time, the Copyright
Treaty represents a defeat for content providers who, hoping to
capitalize on the momentum for upward harmonization spurred by
TRIPS, sought to institute a worldwide regime of extensive
proprietary control over digital and non-digital content.65  The
Copyright Treaty gives explicit recognition to "the need to maintain a
balance between the rights of authors and the larger public
61. For a comprehensive analysis of the international enforcement mechanism of TRIPS,
see generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INTL L. 275(1997).
62. For a list of WTO members (each of which must adhere to TRIPS) and the date each
joined the Organization, see World Trade Organization, The Organization Members (last modi-
fied Oct. 22, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/about/members.htm> [hereinafter WTO Member List].
63. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4. The Copyright Treaty was initially drafted
as a protocol to the Berne Convention. As adopted, it is a separate treaty, albeit one that is
closely related to Berne. Like TRIPS, it takes Berne as its starting point, requiring party states
to comply with Berne's substantive provisions (although in this case without the exclusion of
moral rights). See id. art. 1(4) ("Contracting parties shall comply with Articles I to 21 and the
Appendix of the Berne Convention."). In addition, several of its provisions purport to clarify
various Berne standards. For further discussion of the relationship between the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the Berne Convention, see Netanel, supra note 7, at 465-70.
64. Treaty enhancements to "pre-digital" copyright include new rights to authorize online
transmissions, to protect the integrity of electronic rights management information, and to
prevent the facilitation of copyright infringement through the circumvention of technological
anti-copying devices. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8 (providing new rights to
authorize online transmissions); id. art. 11 (requiring nations adopting the treaty to provide
"adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies" against the circumvention of anti-
copying protection); id. art. 12 (requiring nations adopting the treaty to provide legal remedies
against persons who remove or alter any "electronic rights management information" without
authority).
65. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 370-434 (discussing efforts by some countries to in-
crease proprietary control over digital and non-digital content).
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interest,"66 and the Agreed Statements accompanying the Treaty
provide that both existing and new limitations on copyright owner
rights may be appropriate in the digital environment.67
Recent efforts at copyright harmonization, in sum, have
brought, along with a considerable measure of institutional and geo-
graphical rivalry, a renewed tension regarding the proper nature and
scope of the copyright protection that countries are and should be
required to implement. As applied in the global arena, the democratic
copyright paradigm may help to define that proper nature and scope.
More particularly, the paradigm might: (1) provide an independent
legal basis, over and above the provisions of multilateral copyright
treaties, for requiring states both to accord some minimum degree of
copyright protection and to impose certain limitations on copyright
owner rights; (2) serve as an interpretative framework for nations'
copyright treaty obligations; and (3) provide a basis for modifying
copyright treaty provisions that are arguably inconsistent with the
needs of a democratic copyright.
Before detailing how the paradigm might apply, however, it is
necessary first to address the threshold questions of whether the
paradigm's underlying normative premise-that the fostering of ex-
pressive diversity and democratic institutions is a good thing-holds
true in all societies, cultures, and stages of economic development,
and whether, as an empirical matter, copyright actually contributes to
the emergence and vitality of democratic institutions under various
local conditions. If the value of democratic governance is contingent
on particular circumstances or cultural precepts, the idea that copy-
right law should be tailored to support democratic institutions is, at
best, one of particular rather than global import. In turn, the extent
to which copyright actually contributes to democratic transition and
enhancement under various local conditions will provide a benchmark
for determining how the paradigm should apply under those
conditions.
66. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4, pmbl. 5.
67. See Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Statement Concerning
Article 10, WIPO Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. No. CRNR/DC/96 (1996), reprinted in J6rg
Reinbothe et al., The New WIPO Treaties: A First Rdsum,6, 19 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 171, 183
(1997) [hereinafter Agreed Statements] (stating that nations may "carry forward and
appropriately extend" existing copyright limitations into the digital environment, as well as
"devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital environment").
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B. The Universal Value of Democracy
The idea that democracy is a universal good is neither
straightforward nor uncontroversial. Even among those who purport
to rank democracy as a superior institutional arrangement for arriv-
ing at political decisions, there is no universally accepted understand-
ing of what it means.68 Theorists differ on the extent to which politi-
cal democracy requires direct public participation as opposed to deci-
sionmaking by entrusted elites and on the extent, if any, to which
majority rule must be encumbered by constitutional commitments
and the protection of prepolitical rights for individuals and minorities.
They also disagree on the degree to which political democracy re-
quires social and economic democracy.69
I will attempt here neither to reconcile opposing models of
democracy nor to proffer my own. Rather, I will rely upon, as a work-
ing definition of political democracy, the set of indicia advanced by
Robert Dahl as minimum requirements even for a rudimentary de-
68. There is an abundance (some would say, "an overabundance") of source material on
democratic theory. For a highly informative historical study of competing conceptions of democ-
racy, see generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 1996). For a useful anthology
of contemporary essays concerning a variety of fundamental questions in democratic theory, see
generally THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY (David Copp et al. eds., 1993). For an illuminating collection
of essays on democracy from a variety of theoretical, geographical, and cultural perspectives, see
generally PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY: NORTH, SOUTH, EAST, WEST (David Held ed., 1993)
[hereinafter PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY]; see also Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The
Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2009-20 (1997) (surveying
disagreement among political scientists about when a "transition" to democracy can be said to
have occurred).
69. The political democracy versus socioeconomic democracy axis raises issues such as: (1)
whether democracy is a mode of collective existence or merely a means for constituting and
constraining public authority; (2) whether a democratic government is one that protects private
property or redistributes wealth; and (3) whether a democratic society is synonymous with an
unhindered market or with state administration and worker participation in enterprise man-
agement. For the view that political democracy requires the state to be actively involved in
social welfare, see T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CrIZENSHnP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 89 (1973),
and Reginald Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry, 22 BROOK. J. INTL L. 495,
514-23 (1997). For the view that political democracy requires that the state generally refrain
from economic planning and resource distribution, see F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 26-
31,56-71, 119-33 (1976).
The lack of consensus on what constitutes democracy has plagued even American social
scientists working within a common framework of liberal, representative government. Their in-
ability to adduce a universally accepted definition of a fully-developed political democracy has
hampered their efforts to create an operative scale for measuring the extent to which a nation's
political system may properly be called democratic. See Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Democracy:
Conceptual and Measurement Traps, in ON MEASURING DEMOCRACY: ITS CONSEQUENCES AND
CONCOMrrANTS 3, 5, 16 (Alex Inkeles ed., 1991) [hereinafter ON MEASURING DEMOCRACY]
(noting the need for clarifying the meaning of political democracy in order to advance its meas-
urement, but conceding the impossibility of providing a universally accepted definition).
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mocracy.70 As Dahl and others have emphasized, these indicia meas-
ure only political democracy.71 Although social welfare and a roughly
egalitarian distribution of wealth might be salutary goals, and indeed
may well be critical factors both in facilitating transitions to demo-
cratic government and in strengthening the democratic process, 72 they
are not, under this basic definition, seen as components of democracy
per se.73 In contrast to the significant dissensus among contemporary
scholars regarding what is required for higher levels of
democratization, Dahl's minimum requirements have been widely
used as a baseline measurement for determining a polity's democratic
character.74
In his pioneering work on measuring democracy and assessing
the possibilities for transition from authoritarian to democratic re-
gimes, Dahl employed a minimalist conception of political democracy.
He set forth the necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, compo-
nents of democratic governance in political units the size of most of
the world's nation-states. 75 A key characteristic of democracy, Dahl
posited, is "the continuing responsiveness of the government to the
70. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMoCRAcY 10-11 (1982) [hereinafter-
DAHL, DILEMMAS] (discussing the attributes of democratic countries that make them unique
from other forms of government); ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND
OPPOSITION 1-9 (1971) [hereinafter DAHL, POLYARcrY] (listing the minimum requirements
needed for a democracy).
71. See Bollen, supra note 69, at 8-9 (distinguishing the concept of a "political democracy"
from such concepts as a "stable democracy" and a "social or economic democracy").
72. For a recent colloquy setting forth conflicting empirical evidence on whether income
inequality inhibits democratic development, see generally Kenneth A. Bollen & Robert W.
Jackman, Income Inequality and Democratization Revisited: Comment on Muller, 60 AM. SOC.
REV. 983 (1995) (stating that income inequality is not a significant factor in inhibiting demo-
cratic development); Edward N. Muller, Economic Determinants of Democracy, 60 AM. SOC. REV.
966 (1995) (arguing that income inequality is a significant factor in inhibiting democratic
development); and Edward N. Muller, Income Inequality and Democratization: Reply to Bollen
and Jackman, 60 AM. Soc. REV. 990 (1995) (replying to arguments that income inequality is not
a significant factor in inhibiting democratic development).
73. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITIcs 130-31, 333 (1989) (stating that
social welfare and an egalitarian distribution of wealth are not necessary components of his
definition of political democracy); DAHL, POLYARCHY, supra note 70, at 81-104 (same).
74. See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO
COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 51 (1995) (discussing Dahl's minimum requirements for
democratic governance); Bollen, supra note 69, at 6-8 (enumerating Dahl's specific
characteristics of political democracies); Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What
Democracy Is... and Is Not, J. DEMOCRACY, Summer 1991, at 75, 81 (discussing Dahi's
"procedural minimum" conditions for the existence of a modern political democracy).
75. See DAHL, POLYARCHY, supra note 70, at 1-9. In his study Dahl sought to reserve the
term "democracy" for ideal political systems that attain complete or near complete
responsiveness to all their citizens. He used the term "polyarchy" for real-world systems that
exhibit some of the characteristics of "democracy." See id. at 2, 8. Following most
commentators, I will use the term "full or complete democracy" for the ideal and simply
"democracy" or "democratic" for real-world systems.
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preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals."76 In order to
ensure that responsiveness, Dahl contended, citizens must have
unimpaired opportunities to formulate their preferences, signify their
preferences to their fellow citizens and to their government by indi-
vidual and collective action, and to have their preferences weighed
equally in the conduct of government, without discrimination as to
source.77 In turn, Dahl maintained, to secure those opportunities,
political democracies must meet the following minimal conditions:
1. Control over government decisions about policy is con-
stitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted
elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of
officials.
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in
the government....
5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger
of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined....
6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of
information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist
and are protected by law.
7. ... [C]itizens also have the right to form relatively independent
associations or organizations, including independent political
parties and interest groups.78
Dahl's seven "requirements for democracy" are composed not
only of procedural elements (including universal suffrage and eligibil-
ity for public office, free and fair elections, and state responsiveness to
citizen preferences), but also of individual liberties (including freedom
of assembly, freedom of expression, and the right of access to alterna-
tive sources of information).79 Dahl's indicia, however, are by no
means coterminous with a stereotypically liberal view of individual
76. DA-L, POLYARCHY, supra note 70, at 1. Philippe Schmitter & Terry Karl have prof-
fered a more detailed definition, which, as they further explain, basically comports with Dahrs:
"Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for
their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and
cooperation of their elected representatives." Schmitter & Karl, supra note 74, at 76.
77. See DAHL, POLYARCHY, supra note 70, at 2 (listing the conditions necessary for a gov-
ernment to remain responsive to the preferences of its citizens).
78. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 70, at 10-11.
79. Kenneth Bollen has described these, respectively, as guarantees of "popular
sovereignty (as represented in electoral processes)" and "political liberties." Kenneth A. Bollen,
Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. Soc. REV. 370, 375
(1980); see also Joseph E. Ryan, The Comparative Survey of Freedom-1994-95 Survey
Methodology, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLcrICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL
LIBERTmS 1994-95, at 672-77 (James Finn ed., 1995) (creating a dichotomy between civil
liberties, on one hand, and rights related to political process, on the other).
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rights as prepolitical entitlements and "negative liberties" against
state interference80 Rather, Dahl's set of individual liberties are
meant, in the context of measuring political democracy, to be instru-
mental to democratic procedures. Whether or not individuals can be
said to enjoy inherent, prepolitical human rights, elections cannot be
truly fair and free and the right to vote cannot be meaningfully exer-
cised without some measure of freedom of assembly, expression, and
access to alternative sources of information. It is incumbent, more-
over, even upon democratically elected regimes to preserve the possi-
bility of future democratic transition.8l Without respect for demo-
cratic freedoms and without citizen ability to form the institutions of
a relatively autonomous civil society, even regimes that initially gain
office by the ballot are likely to rule increasingly by autocratic decree
as they seek to consolidate their power.82
Accordingly, Dahl's requirements are meant to be generic to
any modern democracy.83 Their insistence on certain individual liber-
ties and relatively autonomous civil institutions derives from the
dictates of ongoing democratic process, not from the classical liberal
model of negative liberty and a minimalist state. They are no less
applicable to regimes that purport to eschew Western liberal notions
of prepolitical individual rights than to those that venerate such
rights.s
More troublesome is the claim that political democracy, even
as might be defined by Dahl's minimal and relatively general re-
quirements, is not a universal good. Critics argue that not only lib-
eral notions of negative liberty, but also a broader understanding of
political democracy and democratic freedoms, are culturally, histori-
cally, and economically contingent. Bhikhu Parekh asserts, for exam-
ple, that elections of the "western type" and "other liberal democratic
80. For a somewhat stereotyped view of Western liberal democracy, see Bhikhu Parekh,
The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy, in PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 68,
at 156, 156-57.
81. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INTL L.J. 1, 38-
68 (1995) (asserting that contemporary international law views democracy as a substantive
right that cannot be abrogated even by a democratically elected party running on a platform of
instituting an authoritarian regime).
82. For a cogent critique of such tyrannous democracies, see generally Fareed Zakaria,
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGNAFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22.
83. See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313,
318 (1997) (noting that "under the modern circumstances of political scale and social pluralism,
polyarchal institutions are necessary for realising fully an ideal of democracy, however that
ideal is specified").
84. See Schmitter & Karl, supra note 74, at 76 (arguing that democracy "does not consist
of one single set of institutions").
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institutions and practices" may "impose a crushing financial burden
on poor countries," "encourage the all too familiar forms of corrup-
tion," "generate artificial ideological rigidities [and] release powerful
aggressive impulses and channel them into dangerous and unaccus-
tomed directions."8 Similarly, Bilahari Kausikan, a leading exponent
of the Singapore school of "soft authoritarianism," has argued that:
[I]t cannot be blithely assumed... that more democracy and human rights will
inevitably lead to good government.... Good government may well require,
among other things, detention without trial to deal with military rebels or
religious and other extremists; curbs on press freedoms to avoid fanning racial
tensions or exacerbating social divisions; and draconian laws to break the
power of entrenched interests.86
Such critics have been met by responses of both Western and
non-Western authors, insisting that political democracy and demo-
cratic freedoms do have universal force, even if local conditions must
color their specific application to some extent.87 These responses tend
to insist either that human rights transcend cultural relativism, an
argument invoking philosophical fundamentals that are difficult to
prove,88 or that democracy has instrumental value for various
85. Parekh, supra note 80, at 171.
86. Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 24, 38 (1993). In
recent years Singaporean commentators have been particularly emphatic in arguing that the
civil and political liberties commonly associated with most forms of democracy are not of
universal value, but rather are culturally contingent. In addition to Kausikan's article, see also
Kishore Mahbubani, The Pacific Way, FOREIGN AmF., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 100-05 (1995) (arguing
that European culture wrongly assumes that Asian societies will eventually become "liberal,
democratic, and capitalist"), and Simon S. C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore
Example, 41 MCGiL L.J. 743, 749-60 (1996) (arguing that Asian countries' views on human
rights differ because of Asian culture).
87. See, e.g., Abdullah A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The
Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29, 35-
42 (1997) (discussing the universal validity of the concept of freedom of expression); Anne F.
Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for
Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JUiRIs. 42, 58 (1996) (presenting a virulent critique of the relativist
approach, but conceding that, some "[vlariations which take account of diversity are both
possible and desirable"); El-Obaid Ahmed El-Obaid and Kwandwo Appiagyei-Atua, Human
Rights in Africa-A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present, 41 MCGILL L.J. 819,
82347 (1996) (arguing that basic human rights did exist in the "traditional context" in Africa
even if this context did not precisely mirror Western democratic ideals); Ezetah, supra note 69,
at 496 (maintaining that "democracy must be accepted as a context-dependent idea that has a
core, unalterable universal standard"); Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia
Debate, 15 AUSTM. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 5-23 (1994) (discussing differences and similarities between
Asian perspectives on human rights and Western views of human rights); Aryeh Neier, Asia's
Unacceptable Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 42, 43 (1993) (positing that certain rights have
universal application, despite cultural differences between nations).
88. See Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q.
400, 402, 419 (1984) (rejecting a universalist conception based on the notion of immutable moral
precepts as dubious and unworkable and arguing for "relatively universal" human rights based
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universal goals, a set of empirical claims that have yet to be
definitively established.8 9 A further argument that is more useful for
our purposes is one that rests upon convention: Notwithstanding
isolated dissenters, the world community has increasingly embraced
political democracy and democratic freedoms as universal goals. With
the disintegration of totalitarian rule in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, and the spread of democracy in South America,
Africa, and Asia, open, multiparty, parliamentary democracy has fast
become a universal moral standard9° While a few authoritarian
regimes still resist this trend, the burden is clearly on them to justify
their deviation from the democratic norm, both to their own people
and to the community of nations.9'
Democracy's moral supremacy has been buttressed by the offi-
cial position of the world community, as expressed through the United
Nations and its organs, which clearly lies on the side of the universal-
ists. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which has
come widely to be viewed as expressive of customary international
law,92 states generally that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis
of the authority of government"93 and, in furtherance of that objective,
provides for electoral guarantees and political liberties that parallel
(and perhaps partly inform) Dahl's minimal requirements for demo-
on convention); Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25
VA. J. INT'L L. 869, 885-94 (1985) (advancing a moral critique of relativism but conceding that its
force "depends on intuitive acceptance of certain moral premises").
89. One such claim is that democracy promotes world peace because democratic nations
are unlikely to war against one another. For a collection of readings, pro and con, on whether
that empirical proposition stands true, see generally DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE
(Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1996). Additional goods that democracy is said to further include
peaceful transitions of power and improved problem-solving through pooling information and
collective deliberation. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 83, at 319-20 (making that claim).
Finally, the question of whether democratic government might be more conducive to economic
development than authoritarian government (and of whether and in what manner economic
development might support democratization) is one of continuing debate in the economic
literature. See generally DIETRICH RUESCHEM R ET AL., CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMOCRACY (1992) (discussing the relationship between capitalist development and democracy).
90. As one leading commentator has put it, "despite the legitimate differences that may
still characterize the idea of rights in different societies and regions of the world, it is hard to
deny that today a common denominator of human aspirations exists world-wide and that a
common floor of basic rights is now recognized under international law." Francesco Francioni,
An International Bill of Rights: Why It Matters, How It Can Be Used, 32 TEx. INTL L.J. 471,
472-73 (1997).
91. See Franck, supra note 15, at 48-49 (1992) (documenting an emerging consensus
among states that "only democracy validates governance").
92. See infra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptance of the norms
enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as part of customary international
law).
93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.
No. 51, art. 21(3), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
cratic government.94 More recently and more directly in response to
democracy's relativist critics, the 1993 Vienna Declaration, adopted
by the more than 100 states that participated in the U.N.-sponsored
Second World Conference on Human Rights, declared:
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the
duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms .... The
international community should support the strengthening and promoting of
democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the entire world.95
Accordingly, even putting aside potentially potent arguments
based in philosophical fundamentalism or democracy's purported
instrumental benefits, it is reasonable to consider democracy, at least
along the minimal contours that were outlined by Dahl, as a basic
universal good.96 Where copyright law may significantly further
democratic governance, it must be seen as a positive development, to
be encouraged and, if possible, implemented. To the extent that
copyright imposes speech restrictions without a commensurate benefit
for democratic governance, it should be curtailed. It is to those
empirical questions that we now turn.
C. Copyright and Democratic Development
At first glance, there appears to be a striking correlation
between copyright and political democracy. In the 1993-94 Freedom
House survey97-the last conducted before TRIPS required
94. See id. art. 19 (providing free speech rights); id. art. 20 (providing for freedom of
assembly); id. art. 21 (granting the right to take part in government and the right to universal
suffrage in periodic and genuine elections). On the possible connection between Article 27
(granting the right to participate in culture and authors' rights) and Dahl's minimal require-
ments, see infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
95. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, United Nations World Conference on
Human Rights, 22d mtg., arts. I(5), I(8), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 LL.M.
1661 [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
96. Within the scope of this Article I cannot further rehearse the arguments in favor of
democracy's universal force or present new ones. For further opinion on both sides of the
universal/cultural relativism debate, see HENRY J. STEINER & PHILLIP AITON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 166-255 (1996).
97. See FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF PoLrTCAL RIGHTS AND CnVIL
LIBERTIES 1993-1994, at 1 (James Finn ed., 1994) [hereinafter FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 1993-
1994]. The Freedom House Survey is a well-respected and widely relied upon annual survey of
democratic indicators, which closely parallel Dahl's minimum requirements for democratic
governance. The Survey styles itself as a comparative accounting of freedom, not democracy per
se, since even political systems that exhibit some elements of democracy may be still be repres-
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nondemocratic and democratic countries alike to comply with the
Berne Convention as a condition of joining the World Trade
OrganizationP8--all of the nineteen nations obtaining the highest
democratic rating had already adhered to both of the principal
international copyright conventions, the Berne Convention and the
Universal Copyright Convention." Conversely, of the twenty nations
rated as least democratic, only five were parties to one of the
international copyright conventions and, of these five, only two
adhered to the more stringent Berne Convention.1°0 There also
appears to be a rough correlation between democratization and the
enactment of effective copyright legislation. Most of the authoritarian
countries that joined an international copyright convention for the
first time during the decade preceding TRIPS's adoption became
sive of individual liberties. See Joseph E. Ryan, The Comparative Survey of Freedom-1993.
1994 Survey Methodology, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 1993-1994, supra, at 670 (noting that
"Freedom House does not view democracy as a static concept, and the Survey recognizes that a
democratic country does not necessarily belong in our category of 'free' states"); cf. Kenneth A.
Bollen & Burke D. Grandjean, The Dimension(s) of Democracy: Further Issues in the
Measurement and Effects of Political Democracy, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 651, 657-58 (1981) (finding
an "almost perfect" cross-national covariation between political liberty and popular sovereignty);
Russell Bova, Democracy and Liberty: The Cultural Connection, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1997, at
112, 112 (finding a correlation between even a limited, formal electoral democracy and at least a
minimal package of human rights and liberties, but cautioning that the transplantation of
Western institutions of electoral democracy does not guarantee the same high level of respect
for human rights and liberties found in the West). However, given an understanding of
democracy, as defined by Dahl and other social scientists, as: (1) more than mere electoral
democracy; and (2) a continuous, rather than dichotomous, concept, the difference between
"freedom" as defined by the Freedom House and "democracy" as treated here is more one of
semantics than of kind. Both essentially seek to measure quantitatively the extent of democracy
across political systems. See Kenneth A. Bolen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method
Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCL 1207, 1215 (1993) (noting that the
Freedom House "indicator of political rights appears to track democratic rule"); Schmitter &
Karl, supra note 74, at 87 n.2 (referring to the Freedom House Survey as the best known
attempt to "codify and quantify the existence of democracy across political systems").
98. TRIPS was adopted on April 15, 1994, and became effective on January 1, 1995.
TRIPS Article 9 requires that all WTO member states comply with the substantive provisions of
the Paris Act of the Berne Convention, except for those concerning moral rights. See TRIPS,
supra note 1, art. 9.
99. See Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178
(listing parties to the Universal Copyright Convention); FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 1993-1994,
supra note 97, at 682 (listing parties to the Berne Convention with dates of accession); World
Intellectual Property Association, Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by WIPO: Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (last modified Dec. 13, 1997)
<http//www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/e-berne.htm> [hereinafter Berne Convention List] (same).
100. The five least democratic countries that were parties included Cuba, Libya, People's
Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Of these, China and Saudi Arabia were members of
the Berne Convention. See FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 1993-1994, supra note 97, at 682 (listing
parties to the Berne convention with dates of accession); Berne Convention List, supra note 99
(same).
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substantially more democratic during that period.1 1 In contrast, only
two of the countries consistently rated as least democratic adhered to
a convention during that decade.10 2
Of course, adherence to an international copyright convention
is only a rough measure of a country's level of copyright protection. 1°c
Moreover, even if further investigation does substantiate a positive
correlation between copyright and democracy, 1' 4 it would not neces-
sarily establish that copyright is indeed a factor in inducing,
strengthening, or enhancing democratic governance. 05 In the absence
of convincing evidence of such a causal connection, the putative
correlation between copyright and democracy can thus serve merely
as a starting point for our assessment of the notion that copyright
universally contributes to democratic development.1°6
As suggested by democratic copyright paradigm proponents,
copyright might serve as a causative element in democratic develop-
ment by substantially underwriting one or more of three social phe-
nomena: (1) the broad dissemination of information and diverse ex-
pression; (2) the establishment of a relatively independent indigenous
sector of authors and publishers; and (3) the widespread recognition
of the value of innovative thought and individual contributions to
social discourse. The first two phenomena primarily, though not
exclusively, concern Dahl's sixth requirement for democracy: the
101. These included Albania, Czech Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Slovakia, Uruguay, and Zambia. See FREEDOM iN THE WORLD 1993-
1994, supra note 97, at 682 (listing the dates on which these countries acceded to the Berne
Convention).
102. The People's Republic of China joined the Berne Convention on October 15, 1992, and
the Universal Copyright Convention on October 30, 1992. Saudi Arabia joined the Universal
Copyright Convention on November 10, 1989 (and had already joined the Berne Convention on
March 1, 1984). See id.
103. For discussion of the problem of measuring intellectual property protection and a
summary of some of the methodology that has been employed, see Carlos A. Primo Braga &
Carsten Fink, The Economic Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns
of Convergence and Conflict, 72 CH.-KENTL. REV. 439,448-50 (1996).
104. Among other things, further investigation would have to be required to establish
whether international copyright treaties in fact require effective copyright protection and
whether Berne and Uniform Copyright Convention signatories in fact consistently comply with
their treaty obligations.
105. It appears, in fact, that democratization has generally preceded a country's adherence
to an international copyright convention. It remains to be seen whether authoritarian countries
that have enacted copyright legislation in order to comply with TRIPS will undergo a process of
democratization following such enactment, and even if they do, this will not necessarily estab-
lish copyright as a causal factor.
106. My assessment will build upon empirical work that seeks to identify the principal
determinants of democratization. While a full-scale empirical study of copyright's possible role
in that process is beyond the scope of this Article, this discussion is meant to draw tentative
conclusions and suggest directions for future empirical investigation regarding the extent to
which copyright may indeed be a factor in the process of democratization.
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availability of alternative sources of information, although that re-
quirement itself is necessary to the realization of the formal rights of
electoral control and free association. The third phenomenon relates
to a general questioning of the status quo and a greater respect for
the individual, each of which would seem instrumental to a transition
from authoritarian to democratic rule. In order for copyright to be a
causative element in democratization, two conditions must be met:
(1) copyright must be a contributory factor in effecting one or more of
the three phenomena; and (2) the phenomena that copyright helps to
bring about must themselves be contributory factors in democratic
development. My hypothesis, in other words, is that copyright acts as
a subdeterminant of one or more of three primary democratic deter-
minants.
Before considering each of these possible primary determi-
nants in turn, it is important to clarify two preliminary points that
concern all three. First, a determinant is merely a contributory factor
in bringing about a given state of affairs. It need not be a sufficient
condition, or even a necessary condition, in effecting that result. In
that regard, my hypothesis does not and need not depend on any
claim that copyright can by itself guarantee or bring about any of the
three possible democratic determinants that I will discuss: the free
flow of information and diverse expression, an independent media,
and respect for individual creativity. Clearly, copyright is not a suffi-
cient condition for these phenomena. To consider the most extreme
example, the enactment of a copyright law in a regime that otherwise
places severe constraints on freedom of speech, or in a system in
which authors are effectively compelled to transfer their rights to
agencies of the State (as has been the case in a number totalitarian
regimes), would have little, if any, democratic potency, and, indeed,
may even be used as a tool for censorship. 10 7 At issue, therefore, is not
whether copyright is a sufficient condition for democratic development
or even for any of the three primary determinants; it obviously is not.
I will consider, rather, whether copyright, together with other factors,
may significantly enhance the opportunities for democratic
development or, put another way, whether copyright may make a
107. See Lana C. Fleishman, The Empire Strikes Back: The Influence of the United States
Motion Picture Industry on Russian Copyright Law, 26 CORNELL INIVL L.J. 189, 191-204 (1993)
(describing Soviet copyright law and practice); see also LYMAN RAY PATrERsON, COPYRIGHT IN
HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 78-142 (1968) (describing the use of premodern printing privileges, the
antecedents of modern copyright, for purposes of censorship).
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significant positive contribution to democratic development even if it
is not a sufficient, or even necessary, condition for democracy.
Second, what I refer to as democratization or democratic de-
velopment actually consists of at least three distinct stages, and the
extent to which copyright can be said to contribute to democratization
may vary considerably from stage to stage. The first stage consists of
the transition from authoritarian to democratic government. The
question here is whether copyright might have a democracy-inducing
fimction, whether the recognition and enforcement of author and
copyright proprietor rights may be a causative factor in the erosion of
authoritarian control and the formation of democratic institutions.'0
The second stage is that of democracy consolidation. Its focus is the
development of a social and political commitment to democracy. Here
the inquiry is whether copyright contributes to the stabilization of
nascent democratic culture and institutions. The third stage might be
termed democracy enhancement. It involves the greater democratiza-
tion of what is already an essentially well-established political democ-
racy, such as those prevalent in the West. The question to be as-
sessed in this instance is whether copyright helps, within the frame-
work of advanced representative democracies, to create possibilities
for greater diversity of expression, a higher level of citizens' political
acumen, and a vibrant, highly participatory civil society.
1. Free Flow of Information and Diversity of Expression
Copyright's primary and most venerable public interest ration-
ale is that by protecting authors and their assigns against unauthor-
ized copying, copyright law promotes the dissemination of knowledge
and opinion originating from sources as diverse as the market will
bear. 0 9 This basic assumption appears to make eminent sense.
Absent the ability to prevent free-rider competition, potential authors
and publishers would be unable to recover the cost of the creation,
production, selection, marketing, and distribution of expressive works
that audiences wish to see or hear and would thus lack the requisite
financial incentive to invest in such activities. Granted, copyright
may make audience access more expensive by restricting competition
108. For an illuminating discussion of the role of law in the transition from authoritarian to
democratic government and in the consolidation of democratic institutions, see Teitel, supra
note 68, at 2009-20.
109. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 308 (discussing the incentives that copyright protection
provides to authors).
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in the narrow market for each expressive work.11 ° The incentive
rationale posits, however, that such a "tax on readers" is a necessary
evil because, without it, audiences would have little creative expres-
sion to choose from in the first place.
Although this seemingly common-sense model has guided
copyright doctrine for over two centuries, it has not been empirically
tested; it is not clear how much production and dissemination of
original expression would actually diminish if copyright were elimi-
nated. Indeed, some thoughtful scholars have argued-although here,
too, based on inductive reasoning rather than empirical study-that
copyright may be far less necessary than we might think.", They
have maintained that some, perhaps most, people gladly create liter-
ary and artistic works without any expectation of payment."2 They
have also pointed to extra-copyright means of preventing, or at least
ameliorating ruinous free-rider competition, including creators' lead-
time advantages, consumer preferences for originals over copies,
industries' informal and collaborative rights allocation, technological
fences, provider-consumer contracts, and the bundling of expressive
products with other goods or services.13
Such possibilities may well adhere in some sectors and in some
circumstances. Each carries potential pitfalls, however. To briefly
110. The metaphor of copyright as a "tae has a long and established pedigree, extending
back to Thomas Macaulay's pronouncement, on the floor of Parliament in 1841 in opposition to a
bill to lengthen the copyright term, that copyright imposes a "tax on readers for the bounty of
writers." THOMAS MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON POLITICS & LITERATURE 183 (Ernest Rhys ed., E.P.
Dutton & Co. 1909) (1841).
111. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 322-23 (1970) (concluding
that "the basic case for copyright protection for books is weak" and arguing that this "suggests
that a heavy burden of persuasion should be placed upon those who would extend such protec-
tion," including extending protection against photocopying and to computer programs); Stewart
E. Stark, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1996) (arguing
that "the need to generate creative activity" does not provide a "plausible justification for cur-
rent copyright doctrine"); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1998) (manuscript at 122, on file with author) (questioning whether the
copyright "incentive is needed or whether its overall effect is salutory").
112. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 111, at 1213-15 (arguing that some types of "authors" do
not need copyright protection as an inducement to create but conceding that other types do need
copyright protection); Weinreb, supra note 111 (noting that some people would create without
the copyright incentive, but also recognizing that, in at least some of those cases, works would
not be disseminated without publishers who do hope for remuneration).
113. See Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 287-300 (1989) (discussing extra-copyright mechanisms for
the protection of authors); Weinreb, supra note 111 (noting the possibility of extra-copyright
protection under certain circumstances); see also Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July
1995, at 136, 137-38 (discussing the substitution of product bundling for copyright protection in
a digital network environment).
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mention a few: (1) Although some creators, including perhaps most
scholars, may happily have their works freely copied and dissemi-
nated, they and their audiences are generally dependent on publish-
ers who would not select, edit, market, and distribute the creators'
works without protection against unauthorized copiers; (2) digital
technology enables the nearly-instantaneous original-quality
reproduction and worldwide dissemination of many expressive works,
effectively eliminating lead-time and original copy advantages; (3)
technological fences are notoriously permeable; and (4) contractual ar-
rangements offer no protection against third-party copiers.
Accordingly, while suggested possibilities for doing without copyright
certainly merit empirical study, an across-the-board jettisoning of
copyright and its incentive rationale hardly seems warranted at pre-
sent."4
Another plausible objection goes not so much to the incentive
rationale per se as to the efficacy of the copyright incentive for the
promotion of democracy. It centers on the character of copyright-
protected expression. Most expressive works for which authors and/or
publishers expect pecuniary remuneration (as well as the vast major-
ity of the time that audiences devote to reading, seeing, and hearing
such works) involve commercial entertainment, not conveying infor-
mation about the operations of government or systematic analyses of
pressing public issues.115 It may well be, indeed, that the sort of in-
formation and opinion that is arguably most critical for democratic
governance is precisely that which would be produced-by elected
officials, government agencies, political partisans, non-profit watch-
dogs, special interest groups, and Internet e-mailers-even without
the copyright incentive.
Like the general challenge to copyright's incentive rationale,
this objection is not without force, and I will presently return to it in
the context of examining copyright's potential role in each stage of
democracy development. It is worthwhile at this point, however,
briefly to outline two principal responses to the objection. First, in
those countries where government regulation and market conditions
114. On the need for, and inherent difficulty in carrying out, empirical work on the effects
of and need for international intellectual property protection generally, see KEITH E. MASKUS,
BUREAU OF bvTt LABOR AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 140 (1989).
115. See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 14 (1991); see also
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, UNESCO
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1996, at 9-16 to 9-37 (1997) [hereinafter UNESCO YEARBOOK] (showing
a high percentage of entertainment vis-&-vis public affairs programming on countries'
commercial radio and television stations).
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permit, a sizable, albeit minority, portion of commercially produced
expression does generally involve public affairs and news reporting.116
To be certain, much commercial reporting, especially as it appears on
television or in the tabloid press, may be more infused with enter-
tainment value than a considered effort to inform.117 Nevertheless,
given the significant expense of gathering and disseminating news
and given the desirability of having producers of such expression who
are relatively independent of government control and political patron-
age, commercial news organizations can be said, on the whole, to
make a significant positive contribution to democratic discourse. As
one commentator has aptly put it, following Churchill's pithy ap-
praisal of democracy, Western commercial mass media "represent the
worst form of journalism-except for all the others.""8
Significantly in that regard, if copyright's incentive rationale is
generally sound, it would hold for the reporting of politically apposite
current events no less than for light entertainment. At one time,
news reporting had little need for copyright because even in the face
of unauthorized copying, the lead-time advantage and ephemeral
value of most news stories gave news organizations a sufficient oppor-
tunity to recover their investment. 119 Today, that is far from the
case.1 0 With digital technology, competitors may instantaneously re-
produce and make available a news organization's expressive product
116. See ROBERT L. STEVENSON, COMMUNICATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE THIRD WORLD:
THE GLOBAL POLIcs OF INFORMATION 71 (1988) (noting that in most countries news and
current affairs programming occupies approximately 20% of television time); UNESCO
YEARBOOK, supra note 115, at 9-16 to 9-37 (showing a sizable minority of radio and television
programming on commercial radio and television stations to be news and public affairs).
117. See C. EDwiN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44-69 (1994) (detailing
how media dependency on advertising revenue has led to diminished media treatment of
controversial public issues in favor of content designed to put readers and viewers in a "buying
mood"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 22-23 (1993)
(bemoaning that commercial television news "deals rarely with serious issues and then almost
never in depth").
118. STEVENSON, supra note 116, at xiv.
119. See, e.g., Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News in the Early
Republic, 3 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 259 (1983) (noting that, because of the significant time
involved in distribution and printing, people living on the frontier of the early American
Republic could get a newspaper from Philadelphia or New York as quickly as their local paper
could obtain and print the same information). Under early copyright law, protection was indeed
unavailable to news reporting. See Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829)
(No. 2,872) (denying copyright protection to newspaper financial reports in part on grounds that
Congress did not intend to include daily newspapers within the scope of copyrightable "books").
120. Indeed, news entities lost much of their previous lead time advantage with the advent
of the telegraph. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237-42 (1918)
(holding that a news agency has a "quasi-property" right to prevent a competitor's
misappropriation of news stories by transmitting them to its customers via telegraph).
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or, as in one recent case, may simply incorporate that product within
the competitor's web site by the use of framing and hypertext links.121
Second, as I have argued elsewhere, the objection based on
copyright's purported entertainment orientation overlooks the politi-
cal valency of much of what passes as commercial entertainment. 2
What is often characterized as "mere" entertainment or "pure" art
may subtly, but powerfully, impact public values, attitudes, and opin-
ion regarding fundamental socio-political issues. For that reason,
totalitarian regimes have often sought to control such expression.n
a. Democracy Inducing
Taking these points into account, how might copyright law's
support for the dissemination of information, opinion, and entertain-
ment from a reasonably diverse array of sources help to induce transi-
tions from authoritarian to democratic government? Two possible
vehicles are worth exploring. Most immediately, democratic transi-
tion is often spurred by the widespread availability of information and
opinion that contradicts the official line of the decaying authoritarian
regime. In the overthrow of communist dictatorships in Eastern
Europe, as well as in democratic transitions elsewhere, the media
have played a well-documented and decisive role in mobilizing demo-
cratic forces by subverting totalitarian authority and spreading in-
formation about democratic struggles and advances.124 Indeed, espe-
121. The Washington Post, CNN, and other news entities recently sued Total News, Inc., a
web site operator, for linking to the plaintiffs' web sites in such a manner that the contents of
those sites appeared within a frame from the Total News site on which Total News sold
advertising. The case settled when Total News agreed to cease "framing" the plaintiffs' sites.
See Settlement Agreement, Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL)
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (on file with author); see also Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9,
108 F.3d 1119, 1119 (9th Cir. 1997) (deciding an infringement action involving the defendant
television station's repeated broadcast of the plaintiffs videotape of the beating of Reginald
Denny the day after the videotape was made), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 81 (1997).
122. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 350-51 (arguing that many expressive works have socio-
political effects even if they are not addressing an explicit ideological message).
123. See ALAN BULLOCK, HITLER AND STALIN: PARALLEL LIVES 426-27 (1991) (describing
the belief of totalitarian regimes in the importance of suppressing certain forms of artistic
expression); Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REv. 73, 96-101 (1996) (presenting
historical examples where art that was not overtly political threatened entrenched power
structures); Peter Wicke, The Role of Rock Music in the Political Disintegration of East
Germany, in POPULAR MUSIC AND COMMUNICATION 196, 202-03 (James Lull ed., 2d ed. 1992)
(discussing East German politburo efforts to first quash and then to control rock music).
124. See DANIEL K BERMAN, WORDS Ln COLORD GLASS: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN
TAlwAN's DEMOCRATIZATiON PROCESS 122-97 (1992) (discussing the role of the mass media in
the transformation of Taiwan into a modem industrialized democracy); PETER GROSS, MASS
MEDIA IN REvoLUTION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE ROMANIAN LABORATORY 29-40 (1996)
(discussing the role of both the Romanian mass media and the foreign press in the fall of the
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cially before the establishment of nascent democratic government, the
growing availability of alternative sources of information and opinion
may itself constitute a defining characteristic of democratic transi-
tion.125
The commercial media also help to undermine authoritarian
rule by providing a window to the democratic West and presenting a
rosy portrait of life in a more open and materially prosperous society.
As one commentator aptly put it:
Television and movies did not, by themselves topple Stalinist regimes,
anymore than Western books or music or art had rid the world of dictatorship
in earlier attempts at thought control. But they did provide glimpses of a
society where creature comforts were common, where expression was open,
where the link between free people and a free press was assumed and even
where bad taste was given mass license to broadcast. 26
Similarly, but more subtly, studies of traditional societies have shown
that media exposure tends to erode passive acceptance of
authoritarian power relations. It does so largely by imparting an
appreciation for innovation, enhancing audience ability to imagine
themselves outside prevailing roles, and engendering a sense that
individuals can act on their environment to achieve their personal and
political goals.127 Such influence, in turn, helps to expand political
consciousness and multiply political demands.128
Ceausescu regime); SLAVKo SPLICHAL, MEDIA BEYOND SOCIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE 28 (1994) (describing the influence of the mass media in the democratic
revolutions in Eastern European nations in the early 1990s); Jose Antonio Martinez Soler, The
Paradoxes of Press Freedom: The Spanish Case, in NEwSPAPERS AND DEMOCRACY:
INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS ON A CHANGING MEDIUM 153, 161-62 (Anthony Smith ed., 1980)
[hereinafter NEWSPAPERS AND DEMOCRACY] (chronicling the press's contribution to the downfall
of the Franeo regime).
125. See SPLICHAL, supra note 124, at 8 (noting that "the very idea of society communicat-
ing freely was in the center of the democratic struggles in East Europe in the late 1980s").
126. GROSS, supra note 124, at 52 (quoting JOHANNA NEUMAN, ATLANTIc COUNCIL OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE MEDIA: PARTNERS IN THE REVOLUTION OF 1989, at 25 (1991)); see also
JAMES LULL, CHINA TURNED ON: TELEVISION, REFORM, AND RESISTANCE 172 (1991) (noting that
the "extremely glamorous, idealized" images of life outside their country that Chinese viewers
see in the foreign programs and commercials on China's state television "mak[e] the cultural
contrasts extraordinarily sharp"); ORVILE SCHELL, DIScOS AND DEMOCRACY: CHINA IN THE
THROES OF REFORM 71-116 (1988) (providing anecdotal evidence of the influence of Western
culture on Chinese citizens); Karol Jakubowicz, Media and the Terminal Crisis of Communism
in Poland, in MEDIA, CRISIS AND DEMOCRACY: MASS COMMUNICATION AND THE DISRUPTION OF
SOCIAL ORDER 79, 85-86 (Marc Raboy & Bernard Dagenais eds., 1992) (discussing the impact of
Western entertainment programming on state television in Communist Poland); Wicke, supra
note 123, at 196 (discussing the influence of rock music in East Germany).
127. See ALEX INKELES & DAVID H. SMITH, BECOMING MODERN: INDIVIDUAL CHANGE IN SIX
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 144-53 (1974) (finding that mass media exposure is a significant causal
variable in individual modernization, but positing a probable feedback system in which
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Strikingly, commercial entertainment has played a leading
role in this democracy-inducing audience transformation. Studies
have noted the repeated failure of media public-information
campaigns to achieve the intended changes in audience attitude and
behavior for which they have been designed.29 In contrast, exposure
to works of entertainment, particularly foreign movies, television
programs, and music recordings, but also domestic variants on those
products, appears to have greatly intensified dissatisfaction with
authoritarian regimes and provided an outlet for pent-up demands for
change. 30
The role of the media, both public affairs and entertainment, in
helping to induce democratic transition thus appears well-established.
It is far less clear, however, that copyright law has contributed sub-
stantially to the generation and dissemination of democracy-inducing
expression or, more directly to the point, that requiring an authoritar-
ian state to implement a copyright law would so contribute. To the
extent that democracy-inducing expression consists of foreign works
that are imported into the authoritarian state or otherwise made
available to its citizens (such as by broadcast or the Internet), we can
assume, positing the basic validity of the incentive rationale, that
individuals who are open to new ideas may be more likely to seek out contact with media in the
first place); BISWA NATH MUKRJEE, MASS MEDIA AND POLITICAL MODERNITY 25, 105-28 (1979)
(concluding that print media, together with education and other factors, may significantly
contribute to political modernization, but concluding that radio exposure has little such effect);
EVERETT M. ROGERS, MODERNIZATION AMONG PEASANTS: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION 207-
16, 283 (1969) (finding that mass media exposure is a significant predictor-more than
functional literacy or physical mobility-of "empathy," the ability to identify with other roles
and life styles, and is negatively related to fatalism).
128. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 5 (1968)
(noting that mass media expansion, along with other changes, leads to extended political con-
sciousness and broader political participation); LULL, supra note 126, at 170-81 (discussing ways
in which widespread popular exposure to foreign television programming on China's state
television has undermined that communist regime's ideological power, particularly among
urban viewers).
129. See STEVENSON, supra note 116, at 60 (noting, among other failures, that such public-
information campaigns in developing countries have "often sparked hopes for a better life that
governments could not filfill").
130. See GROSS, supra note 124, at 49-52 (discussing access to foreign television broadcasts
and to foreign films via VCR tape in Romania in the years preceding the 1989-1990 revolution
and concluding that the foreign media-both news and entertainment-"functioned as major
contributors to communist Romania's sociopolitical disintegration); LULL, supra note 126, at
155-57, 170-81 (discussing the impact of foreign and foreign-inspired television dramas on
Chinese viewers); SCHELL, supra note 126, at 73-116 (1988) (providing an anecdotal account of
the effect of the influx of Western culture upon the Chinese populace); Wicke, supra note 123, at
196-205 (discussing the role that rock music and leading rock musicians played in undermining
authoritarian rule in East Germany); cf. Paul Siu-nam Lee, Mass Communication and National
Development in China: Media Roles Reconsidered, J. COMM., Summer 1994, at 22, 33-35
(stressing the potential of commercial entertainment to promote development through educa-
tion, encouraging innovation, and fostering cultural unity and stability).
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copyright protection in the works' country of origin is instrumental to
their creation and initial dissemination.'8 ' But the dissemination of
such works in authoritarian countries is generally accomplished
through illicit or spill-over access. Citizens make and distribute cop-
ies of foreign films, television programs, and music recordings or view
foreign television via private satellite dishes without paying copyright
royalties. 132 Indeed, the distribution of such expression is often illegal
in the authoritarian country, although authoritarian governments
may allow some seemingly innocuous Western entertainment and
may even broadcast some Western light entertainment television
programming on state controlled stations,8 8 often without paying
copyright royalties.'3 In essence, therefore, the dissemination of
foreign works in authoritarian countries takes place through free
riding on copyright protection in the country of origin (and, to the
extent that a work would not be made without copyright protection in
certain markets outside the country of origin, the free riding -is on
that copyright protection as well).
Concomitantly, imposing copyright protection for foreign works
in the authoritarian state could drastically diminish the supply of
such works in that country. Such protection may well put many
foreign works beyond the price range of that country's consumer
public. It would also give dictatorial authorities an internationally
acceptable justification for suppressing the works' dissemination.18 5
131. The copyright incentive does not play a factor in informational programming funded
by foreign governments, such as that of the Voice of America. On Voice of America broadcasts
and activities, see generally VOICE OF AMERICA, PROGRAMMING HANDBOOKZ VOICE OF AMERICA,
50 YEARS OF BROADCASTING TO THE WORLD, 1942-1992, at 1 (3d ed. 1991).
132. See BURNETT, supra note 50, at 89 (noting the massive unauthorized copying of books,
sound recordings, CD-ROMs, videotapes, and computer software in China); GROSS, supra note
124, at 50-52 (discussing illicit satellite dishes and the underground distribution and exhibition
of audiovisual works in Romania); STRENGTHENING PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 55
(discussing the massive unauthorized copying of audiovisual and print works in developing
countries).
133. See LULL, supra note 126, at 155-57 (describing the broadcasting of Western pro-
gramming in the People's Republic of China); William A. Hatchen, Media Development Without
Press Freedom: Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, 66 JOURNALISM Q. 822, 824 (1989) (describing the
broadcasting of Western programming in Singapore); Jakubowicz, supra note 126, at 85
(describing the broadcasting of Western programming in Communist Poland).
134. See, e.g., Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in
China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1095-96 (1996)
(discussing unlicensed broadcasts of American films on Chinese state television); International
Intellectual Property Alliance, Excerpt from the IIPA Special 301 Recommendations (last
modified Feb. 24, 1997) <http'//www.iipa.com/html/rbc-vietnam.html> (reporting on unlicensed
broadcasts of American films on Vietnamese state television).
135. For example, recent Clinton Administration intellectual property agreements with the
People's Republic of China mandate that China's central government assume the exclusive right
to import compact disk presses and conduct constant surveillance of those CD factories that are
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Granted, requiring authoritarian-state consumers to pay copyright
royalties would, in theory, augment copyright owner profits and
thereby give authors and publishers an incentive to create and
disseminate more and better works, as well as to tailor some works to
the tastes of those consumers. 1 6 It must be remembered, however,
that, with the exception of oil rich fiefdoms (and Singapore), the per
capita purchasing power of those living in authoritarian states is
generally only a fraction of that of residents of developed-country
democracies.17 In practice, therefore, imposing the copyright "tax" on
authoritarian-state citizens may effectively preclude their access to
existing foreign works.18 Since the vast majority of those works
would continue to be created even without copyright protection in the
authoritarian state, the result, at least in static terms, would be a
significant welfare loss.1 9 As far as the availability of foreign
still allowed to operate. The agreements also effectively require Chinese publishers to obtain
approval from Beijing for each new title and place the notoriously ruthless Ministry of Public
Security at the center of intellectual property enforcement. See William P. Alford, Making the
World Safe for What? Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy
in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. hI'L L. & POL. 135, 143-45 (1997)
(concluding that the agreements may well provide China's more authoritarian leaders with "a
convenient legitimization for repressive measures they intended to take in any event while
simultaneously constraining America's capacity to complain?).
In addition to the problem of diminished supply resulting from authoritarian government
suppression, developed country copyright owners often show no interest in distributing their
works or in licensing local production and distribution in developing countries. See Philip G.
Altbach, The Subtle Inequalities of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT: INEQUALITY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 9 (Philip G. Altbach ed., 1995) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT AND
DEVELOPMENT] ("One of the common complaints of Third World publishers is that many
Western publishers simply do not respond to requests for reprint or translation rights."); see
also RiCKETSON, supra note 51, at 591 (noting that obtaining copyright permissions for develop-
ing countries may involve considerable time delays and even prove impossible).
136. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 5.3, at 5:79 (positing that broad copyright
protection, including derivative rights, serves to give copyright owners an incentive to develop
copyrighted works in line with consumer tastes); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:
A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1605-14 (1982) (same).
137. See FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 1993-1994, supra note 97, at 680-82 (listing social and
economic comparisons for democratic and authoritarian countries).
138. Royalty payments per se make up only a part of the copyright tax. Copyright protec-
tion increases the copyright owner's market power, enabling him to reduce output and raise
prices, thus increasing the disparity between price and marginal cost. See STRENGTHENING
PROTECTION, supra note 50, at 69, 78-79. In addition, the transaction costs of enforcing
copyright and licensing the use of cultural works may be particularly high in developing
economies. See id. at 56.
Of course, the statement that copyright owners would in fact impose a prohibitive "tae
assumes that they would be unable or unwilling to price discriminate. Price discrimination
would involve marketing access to cultural works at different prices for each country or region
and setting those prices at a level at which most citizens of a given country or region could
afford. For further discussion of price discrimination in the international context, see infra Part
V.D.
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democracy-inducing expression is concerned, the imposition of
copyright protection for that expression in authoritarian states would
seem to have a detrimental, not positive, effect on democratic
transition.
Of course, if authoritarian states were required to protect and
respect the copyright ownership rights of their own domestic authors
as well as foreign authors, that might spur the creation and dissemi-
nation of indigenous democracy-inducing expression.140 But, here, too,
the meager resource base of the domestic audience would significantly
undercut copyright's practical import, as would the chronic
dependence of authoritarian-state authors on state-controlled distri-
bution networks.' 4' Moreover, even in authoritarian states that are
capable of supporting a copyright market, copyright's import would
often be limited to subtly subversive art and entertainment rather
than oppositional public affairs reporting and opinion. Commercial
media that have operated in authoritarian states have a decidedly
mixed record of democratic opposition, in some instances exposing
dictatorial excesses and in others serving as a mouthpiece for the
authoritarian regime. 42 In many countries, political parties and
movements have been the sole source of any systematic domestic
production and dissemination of oppositional information and opin-
ion.4 s The motivation for that expression has lain entirely in stead-
139. See Keith E. Maskus, BUREAU OF INTL LABOR AFF., U.S. DEF T OF LABOR, THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 53 (1989)
(concluding that "[i]t is at best an open question whether stronger copyrights in developing
countries would induce much greater creative effort in the advanced nations" and that
developing countries that strengthened their copyright systems would face "the distinct
possibility of net welfare losses").
140. Somewhat counterintuitively, the growth of indigenous media may depend no less on
according copyright protection to foreign works than to domestic works. See infra note 192 and
accompanying text.
141. This dependency often continues even after democratic transition. See infra note 156
and accompanying text (discussing the continuing dependency of the mass media in newly
formed democracies upon state-controlled distribution networks).
142. For example, Brazil's major commercial television network, TV Globo, consistently
supported that country's military dictatorship until it became clear, in 1984, that democratic
forces would prevail in their efforts to achieve democratic transition. See MICHAEL B. SALWEN &
BRUCE GARRISON, LATIN AMERICAN JOURNALISM 64-66 (1991). On the other hand, a number of
Brazil's independent magazines and newspapers published reports of government torture and
corruption and criticized TV Globe for its deference to the regime. See id. at 135, 166; see also
The Impact of Radio on Democracy in Africa, Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Africa of
the House Committee on International Relations, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Kenneth Y.
Best), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File [hereinafter The Impact of Radio]
(suggesting that the availability of alternative employment with independent media would
enable state media journalists of African nations to criticize government policies without fear of
losing their source of livelihood).
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fast political and ideological commitment, with the existence or ab-
sence of copyright protection a marginal concern. Similarly, in in-
stances of democratic overthrow of the authoritarian regime, state
media are often seized and operated by enthusiastic supporters of
democratic transition who, for a time, are happy to do so without any
expectation of financial remuneration. 14
b. Democracy Consolidating
As domestic cultural industries become more established and
as ideological motivation wanes, copyright's role in promoting the
dissemination of information, opinion, and entertainment in newly
democratic states may become more significant. However, copyright
generally will not be able to contribute significantly to that dissemi-
nation unless and until the nascent democracy's economy is suffi-
ciently developed to support commercial publishing and distribu-
tion.145 Developing countries that accord copyright protection for
foreign works often face shortages of those works, either because
Western publishers have little interest in licensing or distributing
their works in developing countries, or because developing country
143. See BERMAN, supra note 124, at 170-201 (describing the role of opinion magazines as
organs of political opposition movements in the democratic transition in Taiwan); MICHAEL H.
BERNHARD, THE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN POLAND: WORKERS, INTELLECTUALS, AND
OPPOSITIONAL POLmTICS, 1976-1980, at 102-08, 148 (1993) (depicting both the party-led and
independent underground press in Poland); see also SPLICHAL, supra note 124, at 33 (noting
that even after the democratic transition, most newspapers in East-Central Europe are identi-
fied with political parties). Iconoclast official media employees are also often a significant
source of noncommercial challenges to the official line. See Juri Luik, Intellectuals and Their
Two Paths to Restoring Civil Society in Estonia, in THE REEmERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION 77, 88-89 (Zbigniew Rau ed., 1991) (discussing success-
ful journalist efforts to use the official press to foster democratization in Estonia).
144. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 124, at 40 (observing that after the Romanian revolution,
former employees of Romanian Radio regional stations operated stations for weeks without
pay).
145. See Henry M. Chakava, International Copyright and Africa: The Unequal Exchange,
in COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 135, at 13, 18 (observing that since the African
economy cannot support commercial publishing and distribution, the issue of copyright en-
forcement in Africa is "somewhat academic"); see also Amadio A. Arboleda, Distribution: The
Neglected Link in the Publishing Chain, in PUBLISHING IN THE THIRD WORLD: KNOWLEDGE AND
DEVELOPMENT 42, 44 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds., 1985) (noting that "[e]ven meeting the basic
needs for achieving mass distribution, i.e., adequate book manufacturing equipment, distribu-
tion equipment, display equipment, a distribution system and plan (including transportation),
necessary capital, an adequate editorial and production staff, and tax relief, is beyond the
capabilities and capacities of publishers in most developing countries").
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publishers and consumers are unable to bear the additional costs of
paying the copyright royalties that Western publishers demand.146
It is not clear, moreover, to what extent commercial expression
serves the consolidation of democratic institutions. Scholars have
identified a number of factors that may contribute to the stability of
democratic government. 147 Foremost among these (although this
factor is itself largely a function of the others) is what might be
termed a "democratic culture." A democratic culture is grounded in a
widespread commitment to democracy among both political elites and
the masses. 4 It includes a belief in the legitimacy of democratic
institutions; considerable tolerance for opposing parties, beliefs, and
preferences; a willingness to compromise with political opponents;
and a certain measure of civility and restraint in political discourse149
In the initial stages of democratic transition, the media are
generally perceived as courageous exponents of democratic ideals,
concerned above all with exposing the oppression and falsehoods of
the authoritarian regime. But in the months following the defeat of
authoritarian rule, as publishers look increasingly to the market for
financial sustenance, commercial entertainment and tabloid journal-
ism commonly assume a prominent role in the expressive sector.6 0
146. See supra note 135 (discussing the nonresponsiveness of Western publishers to
developing country licensing requests); see also supra note 138 (discussing the costs of licensing
the use of cultural works in developing countries).
147. Among the interrelated factors that contribute positively to democratic stability are a
widespread belief in the legitimacy of the democratic system, economic well-being and develop-
ment, the absence of serious ethnic tension, the presence of a large middle class, a highly
developed nongovernmental associational life, a colonial legacy in which nascent democratic
institutions were fostered, the consolidation of political movements into a small number of
competing political parties, limits on state control over the economy, and international support.
See Larry Diamond et al., Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, in POLIrICS IN
DEVELOPING CouNTRiEs: COPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY 1, 9-34 (Larry Diamond et
al. eds., 1990); Diane Ethier, Democratic Consolidation: Institutional, Economic, and External
Dimensions, in DESIGNS FOR DEMOCRATIC STABILTY: STUDIES IN VIABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM
259, 261-69 (Abdo I. Banklini & Helen Desfosses eds., 1997).
148. See Diamond et al., supra note 147, at 9, 15-18; see also Kevin Neuhouser, Democratic
Stability in Venezuela: Elite Consensus or Class Compromise?, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 133 (1992)
(concluding that a widespread democratic commitment depends on sufficient state resources for
democratic officials to accommodate both elite demands for capital accumulation and worker
demands for greater income).
149. See Diamond et al., supra note 147, at 16-18.
150. See GROSS, supra note 124, at 125 (noting that following the 1989 revolution in
Romania, the press moved very quickly from its political groundings to a stage in which "yellow
journalism came to dominate, and the main impetus became economic survival"); Frances H.
Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian Experience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L.
243, 250 (1996) (discussing the rise of the tabloid press in post-Soviet Russia); Colin Sparks,
Civil Society and Information Society as Guarantors of Progress, in INFORMATION SOCIETY AND
CIVIL SOCIETY: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVwES IN THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER 21, 44 (Slavko
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Commentators have expressed concern that such consumerist expres-
sion, together with a deluge of highly polemical, oppositional, and
sensationalist news reporting, eviscerates the democratic impulse and
undermines democratic culture.151 Such expressive mayhem, they
maintain, tends to overwhelm nascent democratic institutions and
lead to widespread public cynicism and apathy.152 They have called,
accordingly, for greater press "responsibility" and, in some instances,
for greater state involvement in ensuring that responsibility.1ss
Given these concerns, the impact of market-based expression
on democratic consolidation is difficult to assess. In recent years, to
be certain, many newly empowered electorates have, in the period
following transition, undergone a sharp diminution of democratic
fervor as well as a considerable loss of faith in the media's ability to
help preserve and further democratic institutions.M The commer-
cialization of the media-which can loosely be identified with copy-
right's invocation of the market as the means to finance expressive
production-may well have contributed to these developments.
At the same time, however, the very commercial expression
that has arguably vitiated democratic enthusiasm, may, in other
ways, contribute to democratic consolidation. The oppositional and
sensationalist press has played an important watchdog role in many
new democracies, castigating newly elected officials for corruption,
Splichal et al. eds., 1994) (describing the rise of pornography and music videos in post-commu-
nist Eastern Europe).
151. See GROSS, supra note 124, at 164 (arguing that in the aftermath of the Romanian
revolution, the Romanian commercial mass media may have contributed to their audiences'
"fears, predilections toward negativity, passivity and even antipathy to 'democracy' and
resistance to change"); Foster, supra note 150, at 254-55 (citing Russian commentators who
believe that "Eeixposure of official frailties" to the public "encourages popular distrust, apathy,
and nonparticipation in the political process"); cf. Tamar Liebes & Rivka Ribak, Democracy at
Risk: The Reflection of Political Alienation in Attitudes Toward the Media, COMM. THEORY,
August 1991, at 239, 239 (assessing attitudes toward the media in Israel within the framework
of political alienation and media skepticism in advanced Western democracies).
152. See GROSS, supra note 124, at 164 (observing that "heightened news media consump-
tion" may lead to a "more confused and cynical population"); Foster, supra note 150, at 259-61
(citing Russian commentators who believe that "defamatory" media coverage of elections
"dampens voter enthusiasm and participation in elections").
153. See GROSS, supra note 124, at 162 (describing attempts by Romanian officials to enact
laws regulating press "responsibility"); Amando Doronila, The Role of Media in Strengthening
Democracy, 1 DEMOcRATIc INSTITUTIONS 39, 42-43 (1992) (urging the Philippine press to under-
take greater "responsibility" and to present alternatives to government policies criticized by the
press).
154. See GROSS, supra note 124, at 127-28 (presenting figures of public opinion polls show-
ing a significant decline in public confidence in the Romanian media in the three-year period
following the 1989 overthrow of Nikolae Ceausescu). This lost faith in nascent democracies is
congruent with growing media skepticism in advanced democracies. See Liebes & Ribak, supra
note 151, at 240.
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administrative failures, past collusion with the authoritarian regime,
and, in some instances, recurrent authoritarianism. 155 The press, in
fact, has sometimes had to resist government efforts to reassert a
measure of censorial control over the dissemination of information.156
In addition, commercial entertainment may contribute to
democratic stability, ironically perhaps, by blunting political passion
and thereby neutralizing potentially volatile political conflict. 57
Commercial entertainment may do so in part by serving as a rela-
tively benign forum for playing out political differences. 158 Moreover,
in seeking to define and sell to the lowest common denominator of the
consumer public, commercial entertainment may help to establish a
broad mainstream culture.19 While necessarily encompassing some
155. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 124, at 152-54 (contending that despite the media's failure
generally to inspire widespread faith in the democratic process in post-Communist Romania, it
did score a number of successes in unearthing government corruption and in laying bare
Romania's Communist legacy); SALWEN & GARRISON, supra note 142, at 131 (describing the
impounding of a watchdog news magazine by the Venezuelan attorney general).
156. See SPLICHAL, supra note 124, at 29 ("Government control of television and economic
problems faced by the print press remain major obstacles to media freedom in East-Central
Europe."); Foster, supra note 150, at 257-58 (detailing instances of government censorship in the
supposed "defense of democracy" in post-Soviet Russia). See generally The Impact of Radio,
supra note 142 (noting the exertion of regime control over previously semiautonomous public
broadcasting bodies in emerging African states). The media's dependence on state subsidy and
distribution networks has served as a ready vehicle for democratic transition governments to
seek to reassert a measure of control over the media expression. See GROSS, supra note 124, at
55-58 (detailing the continuing dependency of the mass media on state subsidy, printing
facilities, and distribution networks in post-Communist Romania and the media's resultant
vulnerability to state influence).
157. East-Central European presses have been criticized for remaining overly polemical as
a result of their continuing connection with political parties. See SPLICHAL, supra note 124, at
66 (stating that East-Central European journalists have been criticized for being "an important
impediment to press freedom" because they continue to combine news reporting with political
opinion). In that regard, while the commercial media are hardly free from racist and ethnocen-
trist expression, the most virulent fomenters of ethnic hatred-including calls for "ethnic
cleansing-tend to be noncommercial media that serve as mouthpieces for governments or
political movements. Recent examples include Radio-T6l6vision Libre des Milles Collines, a
nominally private radio station established and used by Hutu extremists from the Rwandan
government, military, and business community to incite Tutsi massacres, see Jamie Frederick
Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628,
630-33 (1997) (describing the founding and activities of this station), and the virulently national-
ist Bosnian Serb Radio and Television controlled by local Serb authorities, see Mike O'Connor,
Defying NATO, Hard-Line Serbs Resume Broadcasting in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at
A12 (discussing the clandestine broadcasting activities of nationalist Bosnian Serbs).
158. See BERMAN, supra note 124, at 212-13 (noting that since television exposes people to
other viewpoints, it "may actually weaken partisanship").
159. See Lee, supra note 130, at 34 (describing television entertainment's ability to create a
"social consensus"); see also NEUMAN, supra note 115, at 145-57 (discussing the powerful,
inherent economic pressures towards output homogenization in commercial media); Donald L.
Shaw & Shannon E. Martin, The Function of Mass Media Agenda Setting, 69 JOURNALISM Q.
902, 920 (1992) (arguing that mass media enhance social consensus on determining the
important public issues that need to be addressed).
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diversity of view and preference, that culture is grounded in-or helps
to produce-a base of common concerns, sensitivities, interests, and
language, often with a focus on the quotidian vicissitudes of indi-
vidual lives, rather than on political ideology and calls to action. In
the mix of factors that comprise a democratic culture, the ensuing
greater tolerance and civility may well make up for a certain cynicism
about the political process.160
c. Democracy Enhancing
While a degree of political complacency may help to consolidate
nascent democracies, commentators have long bemoaned the wide-
spread citizen indifference to and ignorance of public affairs that, they
assert, increasingly characterize advanced democracies. Such critics
argue that democracy can and should be more than a periodic compe-
tition of governing elites for the votes of a largely passive, uncompre-
hending electorate.161 They present, as an alternative, an ideal of
enhanced democracy, constituted by a proactive polity, vibrant and
pluralist civil society, deliberative public discourse, and high level of
voter political competency. 6 2 That ideal is in part a normative vision
of what democracy and meaningful human life should be. It also
reflects a sense that a more inclusive and egalitarian democratic
procedure would lead to greater social justice, and a belief that public
apathy and ignorance ultimately pose a greater threat to political
stability and individual liberty than does widespread passionate in-
volvement in collective self-rule. 63
Our question at this juncture is whether the copyright incen-
tive promotes the creation and dissemination of the sort of expression
that, in some measure, heightens political competency, thus
contributing to (although clearly not independently capable of bring-
160. Cf. NEUMAN, supra note 115, at 27-28 (citing a concern that in advanced democracies
the advent of radically decentralized news media may upset the existing political balance by
exacerbating social tensions and inequalities).
161. The competitive elite, largely procedural, paradigm of democracy is associated with
Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter. See JOSEPH A. SCHumPETER, CAPrrAusM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 235-83 (1947) (presenting this paradigm).
162. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLTICS FOR A
NEW AGE 117-38 (1984) (setting forth the notion of a "strong democracy" in which citizens take
an active role in democracy); HELD, supra note 68, at 316-23 (arguing that a successful democ-
racy requires citizens who are capable of taking full advantage of their opportunity to partici-
pate in government); SUNSTEN, supra note 117, at 17-28 (explaining these ideals and arguing
that if they are to be met, there must be "deep attention to public issues" and "public exposure
to diversity of view"); see also NEUMAN, supra note 115, at 28-30 (summarizing the viewpoint of
critical media theorists and other critics that commercial media trivialize political life).
163. See HELD, supra note 68, at 316-23.
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ing about) enhanced democracy. The most dire critics of citizens'
political competency would deny such a possibility. They insist that
"mass publics everywhere are woefully [and irremediably] unsophisti-
cated by anything approaching elite standards."164 Neither education
nor exposure to media, they posit, has any appreciable effect on
improving citizens' abysmally poor understanding of political issues or
on increasing mass participation in political activity.165
Other scholars are considerably more optimistic about citizen
capacity for meaningful democratic participation, even as they con-
cede that citizens generally possess an intractably low level of
"textbook political knowledge." 166 These scholars contend that citizens
consistently exhibit what has been termed "low-information
rationality," an ability to act in accordance with socioeconomic judg-
ments and to develop specific issue positions on matters of personal
importance, even in the absence of high levels of information. 167
Citizens do this, studies indicate, by taking cues and bits of informa-
tion from various sources, including trusted opinion leaders and the
media.'6 They make political judgments in much the same manner as
they engage in daily decisionmaking, employing strategies that
economize on effort and relying far more on intuitive and informal
thinking than on rigorous and systematic determinations. 6s
Within this cognitive framework, the media appear to inform
citizens' political judgments in a number of ways. First, the media
play a leading role in agenda setting. Citizen perceptions about the
importance of the problems facing the country are heavily colored by
164. Robert C. Luskin, Explaining Political Sophistication, 12 POL. BEHAVIOR 331, 352
(1990); see also John L. Sullivan et al., Ideological Constraint in the Mass Public: A
Methodological Critique and Some New Findings, 22 AM. J. POL. SGI. 233, 233-34 (1978)
(contending that the political sophistication levels of American citizens did not rise substantially
from 1956 to 1972).
165. See Luskin, supra note 164, at 352 (stating that "the revolutionary spread of educa-
tion" since 1950 has not created an increase in political sophistication in the United States).
166. BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 9-14 (1992); see also SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE
REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 34-35 (1991)
(arguing that citizens are capable of participating meaningfully in the democratic process).
167. See Stacy B. Gordon & Gary M. Segura, Cross-National Variation in the Political
Sophistication of Individuals: Capability or Choice?, 59 J. POL. 126, 128 (1997) (coining the
term "low-information rationality" and surveying the literature).
168. See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 151-215, 310-32
(1992); Gordon & Segura, supra note 167, at 128.
169. See Shanto Iyengar, The Accessibility Bias in Politics: Television News and Public
Opinion, in THE MASS MEDIA IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 85, 87 (Stanley Rothman ed.,
1992).
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the nature and extent of media coverage given to those issues.170
Second, the manner in which the media portray or "frame" an issue or
event significantly affects citizens' understanding of it. 171 As indicated
in one leading study, for example, television news depiction of poverty
in episodic frames (focusing on concrete instances or specific events)
rather than thematic ones (placing it in some general or abstract
context) tends to lead viewers to attribute causal and treatment
responsibility for poverty to individuals rather than the government
or society as a whole.7 2 Third, the media presents the views of
opinion-leading elites. Citizens' positions on political issues are
significantly colored by the pronouncements of public officials, party
leaders, policy experts, and media figures with whom they identify,
and those persons typically make their viewpoints known through the
mass media.173 Finally, the views of opinion-leading and activist elites
are themselves heavily influenced by the media. The importance of
the media as a source for political knowledge and opinion increases
dramatically with a person's education and interest in politics,
although politically sophisticated elites tend to treat media coverage
more critically than does the mass electorate. 74
This scenario of low-information rationality and what could be
characterized as a largely emotive, unidirectional media influence on
public opinion falls far short of the ideal of an ever vigilant, well-in-
formed, and deliberative democratic polity proffered by some theo-
rists. 17s Nor can the commercial media, whether news or entertain-
170. See PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 166, at 366; Iyengar, supra note 169, at 88-90. A
reason commonly posited for the media's agenda-setting force is individuals' inherent accessibil-
ity bias. People tend to give more weight to data which is readily accessible to them (including
data they have encountered frequently, recently, and in graphic format) than to data that is not.
See id. at 87-89 (describing this "accessibility bias").
171. See POPEIN, supra note 166, at 81-91 (discussing the "framing" of issues and events by
the news media); Iyengar, supra note 169, at 93-96 (describing studies suggesting that the way
in which network newscasts presented political issues influenced viewers' attributions of
responsibility for those events).
172. See Iyengar, supra note 169, at 94-96.
173. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES: MASS MEDIA IN MODERN DEMOCRACY 3-6
(1996) (discussing the "division of labor" in which public deliberation is largely, although not
entirely, mediated through opinion-leading elites); ZALL, supra note 168, at 311-13 (discussing
the "elite domination" of public opinion through the mass media).
174. See Gordon & Segura, supra note 167, at 142 (finding that citizens' media usage "will
have an important effect on the resulting level of sophistication and that more sophisticated
citizens tend to obtain more information from the print media than do less sophisticated citi-
zens); Shante Iyengar et al., Experimental Demonstrations of the Wot-So-Minimalr
Consequences of Television News Programs, 76 AM. POL. SCL REV. 848, 854 (1982) (contending
that "politically naive" citizens are not capable of critically analyzing media coverage of an
event).
175. In fact, media influence is far from entirely unidirectional. Indeed, communications
and cultural studies theorists have forcefully argued that audiences are active interpreters and
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ment, generally be said to move audiences towards that ideal. Indeed,
commercial expression may contain systematic biases and distortions,
whether because of media conglomerate self-aggrandizement, the
inordinate influence of wealth on what is disseminated, or the inher-
ent nature of certain media (such as television news's preference for
episodic over thematic framing).7 6
Nevertheless, there are a number of ways in which commercial
expression does contribute to democracy-enhancement, albeit a con-
ception of enhanced democracy that is considerably more mod-
est-and perhaps more realistic-than the ideal that some theorists
have proffered. First, commercial expression provides a forum for
information and debate on important social and political issues for
those persons--one might think of them as the electorate's surrogate
virtuous citizens-who do take a proactive role in democratic govern-
ance. Most people have neither the time, inclination, nor cognitive
skill to keep abreast of complex public issues, let alone seek to further
their positions through political activity.177 But those with a keen
interest in particular issues under discussion often do. These per-
sons, in turn, may lobby elected officials or act to convince and organ-
ize others to take a politically active role in connection with such
issues.
Second, the media provides useful information to policy experts
and opinion elites, and through them, to the electorate as a whole. As
noted by one leading proponent of democracy-enhancement:
[I]f extensive political information is available somewhere in the system, not
everyone has to pay attention to it all the time; a lot of information, and
reasonable conclusions from it, will trickle out through opinion leaders and cue
givers to ordinary citizens, who can deliberate about it in their own small, face-
to-face groups of family, friends, and co-workers. 78
Third, the commercial media's agenda-setting role may help to
form the basis for meaningful citizen deliberation, to the extent that
rearrangers of mass culture. See John Fiske, British Cultural Studies and Television, in
CHANNELS OF DIscouRsE, REASSEMBLED 284, 292-321 (Robert C. Allen ed., 1992) (surveying
British cultural studies examinations of "negotiated" and "oppositional" readings of television
programs and mass culture icons).
176. See PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 166, at 366-82, 394-96.
177. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1935-42 (1995) (illustrating, with biting humor, why citizens do not keep abreast of
public issues). Michael Walzer notes that citizen activists tend to be engaged in many different
associations, and aptly remarks: "[W]here do these people find the time?". MICHAEL WALZER,
ON TOLERATION 107 (1997).
178. PAGE, supra note 173, at 7.
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is possible in a highly pluralist, advanced democratic state. The me-
dia, as we have seen, contribute to shaping a rough consensus re-
garding what are the important public issues that need to be ad-
dressed. The resulting agenda may be more narrow and more skewed
than some commentators would like.79 Nevertheless, it does serve an
important fimction in identifying common issues within a pluralist
society's vast cacophony of individual concerns, thus providing a basic
foundation for public discourse1ce
Fourth, even aside from the provision of hard information and
reasoned opinion, commercial expression serves to articulate and, in
some instances, to help modify prevailing attitudes and values. To be
understood by their audiences, films, songs, and television programs
must deal in the currency of prevailing practices, ideologies, and
stereotypes, and in so doing must either reinforce or challenge
them.18' As such, the words, images, and sounds of commercial en-
tertainment have a profound influence on our social mores and collec-
tive sense of reality. 82 As they entertain, the works of popular culture
often reveal contested issues and deep fissures within our society, just
as they may reinforce widely held beliefs and values. In that regard,
moreover, attempts to present information and opinion in a
systematic "objective" manner, distilled from entertainment values,
may simply lose the audience. What educational and discursive func-
tion the media can serve may depend as much on attractive packaging
as on substantive content.183
179. Commentators have presented cogent criticisms of media performance and bias in
shaping our public agenda. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 117, at 44-70 (detailing distortions and
bias resulting from media dependency on advertising revenue); SUNSTEIN, supra note 117, at 53-
92 (criticizing the media's performance in presenting public issues); Owen M. Fiss, Why the
State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1987) (decrying the lack of diversity in media coverage of
public issues); see also JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225-27 (1971) (noting that political
liberties and democratic institutions "lose much of their value whenever those who have greater
private means are permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public debate").
180. See Shaw & Martin, supra note 159, at 902,920.
18L See generally CHANNELS OF DISCOURSE, REASSEBLED, supra note 175 (discussing,
from various theoretical perspectives, the manner in which audiences understand and interpret
television).
182. See generally STUART EWEN & ELIZABETH EWEN, CHANNELS OF DESIRE: MASS IMAGES
AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS (1982) (discussing the influence of commercial
culture on everyday perception).
183. See DORIS A. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 226 (4th ed. 1993) (stating
that the average citizen will only show interest in current affairs issues if he or she senses that
"the events will greatly affect their lives"); NEUMAN, supra note 115, at 122 (finding that people
of all demographic categories prefer "fimny and action-filled" television programs to
informational programming).
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In sum, commercial expression acts as a forum for what
Benjamin Page has termed "mediated deliberation."18 It is a vehicle
through which audiences glean a wealth of information, opinion, and
sensitivities from the welter of opposing views and outlooks presented
by opinion leaders, experts, and entertainers. This view does not
deny or belittle the ways in which commercial media fall short of the
democratic ideal. Indeed, given the certain incongruity between that
ideal and the market for expression, it may well behoove democratic
states to provide direct subsidies to certain types of expression and to
support certain speakers who would not otherwise have an
opportunity to be heard.18 Nevertheless, even apart from averting
the danger of government censorship that would plague a system of
expression heavily dependent on such subsidies,1' copyright protected
expression does, in the aggregate, contribute to the political
competency of democratic electorates and allow for greater
opportunities for public discourse. As such, the copyright incentive
must be seen, on balance, as a positive factor in enhancing democracy,
especially when one views democracy not as a republic of ideal
citizens, but as the collective self-rule of intermittently-virtuous,
cognitively-limited, real-life human beings. 87
2. Independent Sector of Authors and Publishers
Along with the free flow of information and diverse expression,
copyright law has the potential to underwrite a sector of authors and
publishers who can look to paying audiences rather than the state as
184. PAGE, supra note 173, at 11.
185. See Karl-Erik Gustfasson, The Press Subsidies of Sweden: A Decade of Experiment, in
NEWSPAPERS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 124, at 104, 125 (concluding that state subsidies of
newspapers in Sweden have stemmed the process of industry concentration and preserved
greater diversity and reader choice); Netanel, supra note 10, at 359 (arguing that "the
democratic character of public discourse may well depend upon some measure of state subsidy
and regulation to disseminate information and give a voice to persons and views that might
otherwise receive insufficient attention in an unregulated media market"). For an assessment
of the positive and negative repercussions of government subsidies for free expression, see
generally Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80
MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996).
186. See SPLICHAL, supra note 124, at 42-43 (noting a correlation between state impinge-
ment on media autonomy and media dependency on state subsidy in post-Communist East and
Central Europe); Redish & Kessler, supra note 185, at 562-63 (noting that even in an
established democracy, state subsidies may be used to further government officials' political
agendas).
187. Cf. Peter Berkowitz, The Politic Moralist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1997, at 36, 40
(maintaining that since political discourse necessarily entails a measure of compromise, ma-
nipulation, and deception, democracy demands that "pious hopes" of more virtuous, ideal dia-
logue "not be indulged").
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their principal source of financial support. Such a sector may be vital
to democratic development in four interrelated ways. First, the sec-
tor's financial independence from state patronage enhances its ability
to act as a watchdog of the state, to expose corruption and authoritar-
ian retrenchment and to level criticism of government officials and
their policies. Second, financial independence enables authors and
publishers to produce a greater variety of expression, free from official
notions of proper literature and art. Third, the presence of an indige-
nous sector of political and cultural expression creates greater possi-
bilities for addressing local issues and developing a local democratic
culture. As we have seen, expression that is imported from abroad
may help to undermine authoritarian control. Yet, a sphere of public
discourse consisting entirely of imported expression would be unlikely
to support local political and civic organization and, particularly in
more advanced stages of democratic development, would only inter-
mittently and haphazardly confront local officials and state policy.18
Fourth, and partly overlapping with the third factor, relatively
autonomous, indigenous authors and publishers contribute to, and
make up a significant part of, an independent civil society, a realm of
discourse and association that is widely seen as a vital component of
democratic culture and development.119
The importance of an independent indigenous sector of authors
and publishers at each stage of democratic development and the effi-
cacy of copyright law in supporting that sector largely follows my
analysis regarding the dissemination of information and diverse ex-
pression. Independent, indigenous media have been a powerful force
in democratic transition and development.' 90 For that reason, United
Nations efforts to promote and consolidate democratization have
188. See MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION: THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 38
(1995) (observing that global satellite broadcasts may "dilute any competitive political voice at
home as much as they weaken the controlled voice of the state itself').
189. See Larry Diamond et al., Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in
Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings, 150 WORLD AFF. 5, 11 (1987) (asserting that a
"rich and free associational life" is an important stimulus for democracy); Ethier, supra note
147, at 266-68 (discussing the effect of an independent civil society upon newly democratic
governments). For a theoretical perspective, based on Hannah Arendt's work on totalitarian
control over social and family life and Jurgen Habermas's understanding of public opinion, see
Susanne Spolbeck, Anti-Semitism and Fear of the Public Sphere in a Post-Totalitarian Society,
in CIVIL SOCIETY: CHALLENGING WESTERN MODELS 64, 75-76 (Chris Hann & Elizabeth Dunn
eds., 1996).
190. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism, and the Struggle for
Democracy, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COuNTRIEs: AFRICA 33, 70-71 (Larry Diamond et
al. eds., 1988) (documenting the role of the pluralistic press in Nigeria).
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placed special emphasis on establishing the conditions in which a
vibrant, independent media can emerge.191
In theory, requiring authoritarian and nascent democratic
regimes to accord copyright protection to both foreign and domestic
works would contribute significantly to the development of independ-
ent, indigenous expression. Copyright protection for domestic works
would bring market support for local authors and publishers, allowing
them to tailor their expression directly to the tastes and needs of the
domestic audiences, without the interposition of government flat.
Copyright protection for foreign works would be necessary because,
otherwise, a flood of cheap, royalty-free foreign works would hinder
copyright-protected domestic competition, as may have occurred in
the United States before copyright protection was accorded to works
by British authors in 1891.192
As we have seen, however, at least in the initial stage of demo-
cratic transition, according copyright protection to foreign works may
significantly diminish their availability, and according copyright pro-
tection to domestic works would likely play a marginal role in sup-
porting local authors and publishers who wish to challenge authori-
tarian rule. Domestic media opposition to authoritarian regimes has
generally been led by two groups: employees of state media organiza-
tions who have managed to carve out a measure of expressive auton-
omy and small-scale underground presses or presses supported by
political movements. 193 In many instances, indeed, even after a newly
democratic regime has taken power, the media lack the financial
resources to wean themselves of state support. They depend heavily
on state funds, subsidized newsprint and machinery, and distribution
191. See Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote
and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 41, at 23-30, U.N. Doc. A/50/332 (1995) (detailing the
need for further U.N. assistance for development of free and independent media).
192. See Wendy Griswold, American Character and the American Novel: An Expansion of
Reflection Theory in the Sociology of Literature, 86 AM. J. SOC. 740, 748-51 (1981) (discussing
the distortive effect of this royalty-free competition upon American authors); see also Janet H.
Maclaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
GLOBAL CONSENsus, GLOBAL CONFUCT? 89, 105 (R. Michael Gadbaw et al. eds., 1988) (asserting
that Hong Kong's domestic recording industry has flourished since the 1978 enactment of
copyright laws curbing piracy of foreign sound recordings); Dina Nath Malhotra, Copyright: A
Perspective from the Developing World, in COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 135, at 35,
43 (discussing the possible detrimental effects on local authors and the publishing industry of
foreign government subsidies for the distribution of cheap copies of foreign books in developing
countries).
193. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing different types of media opposi-
tion to authoritarian regimes).
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networks. 94 A system of indigenous expression based principally on a
copyright-supported market would be preferable because media
dependence on state patronage has led to reassertions of a measure of
state censorship and control in many newly democratic regimes. 195
Such a system, however, would seem to require a greater amount of
expendable consumer income than is available in many democratic
transition countries. 96 For that reason, in measuring the "alternative
sources of information" variable for determining a country's level of
democratic development, commentators generally consider whether
domestic media, even if state owned or funded, in fact exhibit
expressive autonomy. Media dependency on state patronage does not
preclude a finding that "[a]lternative sources of information exist and
are protected by law," although it may weigh against such a finding.197
Advanced democracies are generally characterized by a large
and powerful market-based media, although, even here, many media
and forms of expression receive considerable government funding.98
Democracy enhancement theorists have sometimes argued, in this
regard, that the commercial media, by virtue of their sheer size, con-
centration, and independence from public accountability, hinder
rather than facilitate meaningful democratic self-rle.199 In this view,
copyright law might run counter to democracy enhancement by
serving as a means by which media organizations consolidate their
194. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing mass media's dependency upon
state subsidies in many newly created democracies).
195. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (outlining the increased censorship of mass
media outlets relying upon state subsidies).
196. As an Indian publisher aptly notes, for a student from a developing country, the
difference between buying a book and photocopying may well be the equivalent of a month's
rent. See Urvashi Butalia, The Issues at Stake: An Indian Perspective on Copyright, in
COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 135, at 49, 67.
197. See, e.g., Michael Coppedge & Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Measuring Polyarchy, in ON
MEASUIRING DEMOCRACY, supra note 69, at 50 (noting that this variable may count in favor of
democracy even if "there is significant government ownership of the media," so long as "they are
effectively controlled by truly independent or multi-party bodies"); cf. WILLIAM A. HATCHEN,
THE GROWTH OF MEDIA IN THE THIRD WORLD: AFRICAN FAmURES, ASIAN SUCCESSES 111 (1993)
(noting that, as a factual matter, the most vital mass media sectors in developing countries are
those that are firmly anchored in the private economic realm, not the political).
198. See David Throsby, The Production and Consumption of the Arts: A View of Cultural
Economics, 32 J. ECON. LIr. 1, 20-22 (1994) (comparing the level of government subsidization of
the media and other forms of expression in the United States and several Western European
nations).
199. See BEN BAGDIKEAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 174-92 (1992) (decrying media
concentration and arguing that it has a deleterious effect on the democratic process); see also
ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, STATE, SOCIETY, AND LIBERTY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 250 (J. Underwood trans., 1991) (discussing, within the framework
of German political theory and constitutional law, the threat that concentration of publicly
funded and privately owned media poses for freedom of information and opinion).
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market power.20° Copyright also enables a media entity effectively to
exercise private censorship; through copyright, media conglomerates
may prevent uses of popular images in ways that might subvert their
corporate image, threaten the marketability of their expressive prod-
ucts, or simply call into question the political views of corporate man-
agement.2 01
However, some level of copyright protection may actually allow
for greater expressive diversity than might otherwise be possible in
the face of considerable media conglomeration. Copyright might do so
by serving as a vehicle for media conglomerates to "outsource" expres-
sive production to independent entities. As Robert Merges has shown,
intellectual property rights appear to enhance and, in some cases, to
enable contract-based, as opposed to intra-firm, organization. 20 2
Statutorily defined and readily enforceable copyright holder rights
lower transaction costs and reduce the risks involved in acquiring
expressive products from unrelated firms and personnel.203 As a
result, a media conglomerate's market power need not translate into
direct control over expressive inputs. As a recent study of the record-
ing industry has found, media "majors" may rely heavily upon more
innovative, entrepreneurial independents for new products and ideas,
rather than seeking to incorporate creative personnel within a single,
relatively stultifying bureaucratic organization.2 0
In sum, copyright law may make possible a relatively "open"
system of cultural production, characterized by a significant level of
innovation and diversity even under oligopolistic conditions. 2 5 The
need to diminish media's censorial power still requires that copyright
holder rights be limited to allow a breathing space for creative refor-
mulations of existing expression, just as it warrants speech subsidies
200. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLuM. L. REV. 983,
1035-39 (1970) (discussing the threat posed to First Amendment values by the aggregation of
copyrights in a single holder).
201. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 362-63 (describing private media censorship through
copyright law and asserting that copyright law should limit the media's ability to censor).
202. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A
Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1573-74 (1995).
203. See id.
204. See Paul D. Lopes, Innovation and Diversity in the Popular Music Industry, 1969 to
1990, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 56, 60-70 (1992); see also Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure, the Creative
Process, and Popular Culture: Toward an Organizational Reinterpretation of Mass-Culture
Theory, 11 J. POPULAR CULTURE 436, 440 (1977) (noting that larger, established media
organizations have a poorer record than do smaller, independent firms in providing innovative
products).
205. See BURNE~r, supra note 50, at 115-16 (noting that large cultural industries using an
open system of production and development may show significant expressive diversity despite
ownership concentration).
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and antitrust regulation of media conglomerates.2°6 On balance,
however, a basic core of copyright holder rights may well serve to
ameliorate some of the negative effects of media concentration in
advanced democracies.
3. The Value of Individual Expression
Copyright may also support democratic development by
venerating individual innovation and expression. Copyright law
effectively rewards individual authors for making original contri-
butions to collective discourse and the store of knowledge. By accord-
ing protection to creators of original expression, rather than simply to
publishers who reprint long-existing works, copyright underscores the
value of fresh ideas and of individual contributions to our cultural
heritage. As such, it tends to undermine cultural as well as political
hierarchies, thus contributing to democratization.
Underlying this argument is the idea that copyright law has
both symbolic and immediate practical import. Like most legal forms
and processes, copyright law is a part of the making of culture.2 7 It
affirms certain social roles, values, and understandings of individual
capacity and negates others. Given the law's rhetorical and norma-
tive potency, copyright may contribute to democratic transition not
merely by regulating behavior, but also by helping to produce societal
norms that are integral to democratic self-rule.20 8
In particular, copyright's acknowledgment of the value of indi-
vidual expression embodies two conceptual pillars of liberal democ-
racy. The first is the Enlightenment ideal of the self-expressive, mor-
ally responsible, and transformatively potent individual. That ideal
posits that people are capable, through the constructive power of
language and reason, of wresting control of their thinking away from
established authority and of taking responsibility for their own words
and deeds.209 It insists that each individual has his own distinct per-
206. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of subsidization of the
print media in Sweden). As Paul Goldstein has convincingly noted, free speech burdens posed
by media concentration per se should be met by the development of copyright misuse doctrine
and by antitrust and communications regulation. See Goldstein, supra note 200, at 1043-49.
207. See Binder & Weisberg, supra note 34, at 1151 (emphasizing that law does not "simply
reflect but must also help compose society and its characters").
208. The role of law as a determinant of individual preferences and values is discussed in
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1903-04 (1987), and Cass
R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1145-50
(1986).
209. See CHARLEs TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
167-75 (1989).
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sonality and expressive style. Individuals may thus author new ideas
and cultural forms rather than submissively follow traditional
precepts.2 10
Second, copyright's emphasis on authorship draws upon repub-
lican understandings of individuals' expressive contributions to public
deliberation and discourse. Authors, in this view, are a nation's
"virtuous citizens," educators and spokespersons who elucidate the
political, cultural, and aesthetic issues that shape a polity.211
Authorship is an exercise of "self-responsibility,"212 the ability criti-
cally to examine social norms as an independent moral agent, within
the matrix of political concern for the public good. Individual expres-
sion is the pillar of scientific progress and public liberty. Individual
authors play a vital role not only in the dissemination of knowledge,
but also in personifying and inspiring public vigilance against tyran-
nical encroachment.213 Their identity with and sense of responsibility
for their expressive work is integrally bound up with an understand-
ing of the political centrality of speech.214
To the extent that copyright law does in fact carry a certain
symbolic potency and to the extent it effectively affirms the value of
individual expression reflected in Enlightenment and republican
thought, it may undermine notions of uncritical obedience to political
and cultural authority. In so doing, it may help to spark democratic
transition.215 Since innovation and authorship are also critical com-
ponents of more advanced democratic societies, copyright's symbolic
210. Among other sources, this aspect of Enlightenment thought has roots in the pedagogi-
cal efforts of Montaigne and other Renaissance neo-classicists to liberate readers from submis-
siveness to traditional authority. The neo-classicists insisted that the reader could find in
classical texts, and other works, what was significant to himself for his own purposes, rather
than simply imbibing what was placed before him. See David Quint, Introduction, in LITERARY
THEORY/RENAISSANCE TEXrs 1, 2-5 (Patricia Parker & David Quint eds., 1986).
211. As John Quincy Adams's verse proclaimed:
Behold the lettered sage devote
The labors of his mind
His country's welfare to promote
And benefit mankind.
ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERs IN AMERIcAN CULTURE 6 (1984).
212. For a further discussion of the Enlightenment ideal of self-responsibility, see TAYLOR,
supra note 209, at 167-68.
213. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 356-67 (describing the Framers' view of authors and
their works as "a pillar of public liberty").
214. Cf Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a
Less-Than-Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1996) (contending that this under-
standing is historically and culturally contingent).
215. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 617-18 (arguing on this basis that pressure, backed by
threat of trade sanctions, on nondemocratic regimes to enforce copyright protection is, in effect,
aimed at forcing greater democratization in such countries).
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force may also contribute to democracy consolidation and enhance-
ment.
This thesis has two points of potential weakness, however.
The first centers on the problem of "legal transplants." A legal trans-
plant is "any legal notion or rule which, after being developed in a
'source' body of law, is then introduced into another, 'host' body of
law."216 The problem for the copyright-as-symbolic-force thesis is that
legal norms are interwoven into an intricate fabric of procedures,
political arenas, cultural expectations, and social practice.217 As a
result, a legal rule or doctrine often operates quite differently, or
carries very different symbolic content, when transplanted from the
source to the host jurisdiction. Even if a rule is transplanted word-
for-word, it may effectively be modified in substance or simply
rendered irrelevant in the host country.218
A poignant example is the failed century's-long effort of
Western powers to cajole and pressure successive Chinese admini-
strations to implement Western-style intellectual property laws. As
documented in William Alford's fascinating account, even when
Chinese governments have formally adopted such laws, intellectual
property protection has consistently run aground in the face of
bureaucratic, political, and cultural resistance.219 In China, as was
true in medieval and early modern Europe and continues to be so in
much of the world today, art and literature are oriented towards
transmitting the wisdom of the ancients, not proffering new concepts
and ideas. To copy another's work is to pay honor, not to misappro-
priate. 220 It may be that consistent, rigorous state enforcement of
216. Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Problems of
Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 199 (1994).
217. See Binder & Weisberg, supra note 34, at 1192-1221.
218. See id. For an arguably extreme view of this point, see Pierre Legrand, The
Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants', 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 120 (contending
that, given the contextual nature of law and language, "[alt best, what can be displaced from one
jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words"). For further discussion of the
issue of law and culture in the context of TRIPS and intellectual property, see Brian F.
Fitzgerald, Trade-Based Constitutionalism: The Framework for Universalizing Substantive
International Law?, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 158-60 (1997).
219. See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIUZA'TION (1995).
220. See id. at 9-29. As Alford notes, this view was expressly set forth by Confucius, who is
reported to have said, "I transmit rather than create; I believe in and love the Ancients." Id. at
9 (quoting THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS, bk. 7, ch. 1 (Arthur Waley trans., 1938)). See generally
T.S. Krishnamurti, Copyright-Another View, 15 BULL. COPYRIGHT SocY U.S-A. 217 (1968)
(depicting the traditional view in India that copying another's work is not misappropriation);
Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection Debate: Are the
North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say "Property"? A Lockean, Confucian,
and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COmP. L. 307 (1996) (discussing different cultural
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copyright owner rights could eventually alter that world view. But
such a process would be far more extended and complex than simply
requiring China, once again, to enact specified rights and remedies.
The second plausible objection to the argument that copyright's
symbolic force contributes to democratic development focuses on the
nature of copyright's symbolic content. Commentators have con-
tended that copyright has come to signify not an afi ation of indi-
vidual contributions to collective discourse, but rather a far more
atomistic notion of Romantic genius and possessive individualism. 221
As a result, they contend, copyright does not stand for democratic
institutions and discourse per se. Instead, copyright reinforces a
particular kind of Western political thought, a model of liberalism
that displaces an understanding of democracy as collective self-rule
with one based entirely on negative liberty, the freedom to further
individual interests and preferences without government
interference. 222  The notions of Romantic genius, possessive
individualism, and negative liberty are so peculiarly Western, they
argue, that attempting to force their adoption in the rest of the world
is both doomed to failure and substantively unjustified. 223 Those
notions, and the copyright law that supports them, disrupt local
understandings of creativity and expression and hinder the
development of local, more community-oriented forms of democratic
views of intellectual property); Donald B. Marron & David G. Steel, Which Countries Protect
Intellectual Property?: An Empirical Analysis of Software Piracy (1997) (unpublished working
paper, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business) (on file with author) (concluding that
countries with a "collectivist culture" have much higher rates of unauthorized copying of
software than do countries with an "individualist culture"). For a discussion of the elevation of
reinterpretation of prior works over invention and of the widespread acceptance of copying in
medieval and early modern Europe, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 344-47 (1988); Thomas Mallon, The Origins and Ravages of
Plagiarism, 43 J. COPYRIGHT Socy 37 (1995); Stephen Orgel, The Renaissance Artist as
Plagiarist, 48 ELH 476 (1981).
221. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFrWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 51-59 (1996); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 1-8 (1993); Keith Aold, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1322-27 (1996);
Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native
Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 249, 251
(1993); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 455-56.
222. See BOYLE, supra note 221, at 49-50; Aold, supra note 221, at 1325, 1354; Coombe,
supra note 221, at 258-65.
223. See BOYLE, supra note 221, at 195-97.
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governance, which are the only forms of democracy likely to sprout in
much of the world.224
This objection is itself of uncertain force. For one, it is highly
debatable that copyright has in fact come to stand for an atomistic
Romanticism rather than simply the possibility of exercising expres-
sive "self-responsibility."2 While the former might be associated with
an exaggerated individualism, the latter situates the individual
within a framework of discursive exchange. It celebrates self-expres-
sion not as a mythic manifestation of authorial genius, but as a vital
component in furthering the public interest in information and di-
verse opinion. In addition, the objection confuses means with ends.
Some dose of Romantic individualism might usefully spur tradition-
bound authoritarian societies towards greater democratization, even
if the form of democracy that is ultimately appropriate to those socie-
ties is more collective in orientation.
Nevertheless, in at least one respect, the Romanticism objec-
tion, when considered together with the legal transplant problem, is
well-taken. Critics claim that copyright came to reflect and to further
atomistic, Romantic notions of individual creativity when the law
greatly expanded the scope of copyright owner prerogatives, extending
copyright owner control over creative reformulations of existing works
and limiting recognition of collective creations.226 Regardless of
whether the critics are correct in attributing such expansion to
Romanticism, an overly expansive set of copyright holder rights would
both clash more violently with non-Western practice and undermine
copyright's constitutive democracy-promoting objectives. 227 If it is to
224. See Parekh, supra note 80, at 156-72 (arguing that Western "liberal democratic
institutions and practices" hinder the growth and development of alternative forms of
democracy); see also BOYLE, supra note 221, at 196 (asserting that "author-focused" intellectual
property systems fail to maximize free speech and democratic debate).
225. On this point, see Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in
Authorial Control Over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT Soc' 93, 98-112 (1994) (arguing
that those who assert a material natural rights/Romanticism influence upon copyright are
"batting at a straw man"). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the
Rhetoric of Property, 75 TFx. L. REV. 873 (1997) (taking issue with James Boyle's depiction of
the Romantic influence in intellectual property law).
226. See Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 304-05 (1992) (contending that Romantic notions
of authorship "limit the ability of authors to modify or improve existing works").
227. See BOYLE, supra note 221, at 125-30 (detailing the conflicts between an expansive,
author-centered model of intellectual property and the more communitarian understanding
prevalent in many developing countries); Brad Sherman, From the Non-original to the Ab-
original: A History, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 111, 111-30 (Brad
Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (outlining the debate over the extension of copyright
protection to visual art created by the Australian Aboriginies); see also Netanel, supra note 10,
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advance democratic development, international copyright doctrine
must be sufficiently pliant to account for cultural variation and local
needs.
4. Sum
In sum, copyright's propensity for contributing to democratic
development varies with local conditions and economic development.
At the very least, copyright's positive contribution depends upon
effective, privately-owned distribution networks and sufficient
consumer surplus to "subsidize" independent media by paying for
access to original expression. Copyright seems to promote democracy
enhancement and consolidation only in countries of a sufficiently high
level of economic development to support those enterprises.
Copyright holder exclusive rights would appear to have only marginal
effect on, or even to impair, democratic transition and democratic
consolidation where such support is lacking or where government is
otherwise able to exert concerted pressure on commercial media.
While these conclusions are tentative and suggest the need for
further, more systematic empirical study, they certainly belie the
notion that requiring authoritarian and developing countries to
implement proprietary copyright regimes modeled on those of the
West will, as a matter of course, engender global democracy. They
suggest, rather, that copyright should be carefully tailored to give
greater potency to its support of democratization and to minimize the
barriers that it may pose under various local conditions.
Rather than insisting that a developing country accord full
copyright protection, for example, it may be more conducive to demo-
cratic development to allow for a good measure of compulsory licens-
ing, with royalties set to enable widespread access, while also provid-
ing some remuneration to copyright owners. 22 Such a system would
effectively establish a regime of developing-country free-riding on
developed-country copyright protection in the interest of global de-
mocratization.29 It would make foreign works more accessible to
at 364-82 (arguing, in the context of the United States, that an overly broad copyright may
thwart copyright's democracy-enhancing objectives).
228. Early developing country efforts to obtain greater leeway for compulsory licensing
within the Berne Convention were embodied in the 1976 Stockholm Protocol to the Convention,
which was ultimately defeated. See RICKETSON, supra note 51, at 598-662 (discussing the
events surrounding the drafting and defeat of the Stockholm Protocol). For a further explication
of such a compulsory licensing system, see infra notes 429-34 and accompanying text.
229. Such a system would have to include controls to prevent the resale of licensed mate-
rial to developed countries. See infra note 434 and accompanying text (describing the controls
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citizens of nascent democracies and, within greater limits, possibly
citizens of authoritarian states as well. If tailored to provide for
licenses for the printing and production of foreign works, rather than
merely the importation of foreign-produced copies, it could also help to
provide a measure of income for local media, thus contributing to
their fiscal independence.230 While local authors would have to face
the competition of royalty-reduced foreign works, the emergence of
local commercial media would eventually provide greater opportuni-
ties for them as well.
Likewise, to the extent that centralized copyright owner con-
trol over popular images, sounds, and words is detrimental to a robust
exchange of ideas, it would better serve the interest of democracy
enhancement to allow greater leeway for "secondary" authors to crea-
tively reformulate existing expression without having to obtain copy-
right owner permission. In allowing for such highly derivative but
subversive reformulations of cultural icons-like counterculture paro-
dies of Mickey Mouse or the bootleg sale in American inner cities of
"Black Bart Simpson" T-shirts-copyright law would further the goal
of expressive diversity and serve, at least to some extent, to loosen
media conglomerates' hold on public discourse in advanced democratic
states.231
Part V will consider these and other applications in the context
of the constraints posed under the current international copyright
regime. Such particular applications, however, must first be
grounded in a general assessment of the nature and extent of support
in international law for asserting copyright's democratic principles in
the global arena.
IV. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS: COPYRIGHT AND THE DEMOCRATIC
ENTITLEMENT
Baseline support for asserting a democratic copyright in the
global arena may be found in the emerging right to democratic
set out in the Appendix to the Berne Convention which would prevent the resale of licensed
material).
230. See Chakava, supra note 145, at 28 (noting the advantages for African publishers and
African consumers of licenses to African publishers for the printing and distribution of foreign
literary works over the purchase of foreign-produced copies).
231. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-58 (9th Cir. 1978) (denying a
"fair use" exception for a counterculture parody of Mickey Mouse); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects
of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1865 (1991) (discussing the "Black Bart Simpson" phenomenon).
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governance (or "democratic entitlement"), a set of international legal
norms requiring countries to maintain democratic political processes
and to respect individual human rights.2 2  The democratic
entitlement gives legal imprimatur to the universal value of
democratic governance, an essential presupposition for applying
copyright's democratic principles worldwide. In addition, over and
above its broad support for democratic governance, the democratic
entitlement may specifically mandate that international and domestic
copyright law be tailored so as best to support democratic institutions
and culture.
This Part will explicate the sources and nature of support for a
democratic copyright in the democratic entitlement. To give that
discussion some context, however, it is first important to understand,
at least in general terms, what might arguably be the democratic
copyright paradigm's import for existing international copyright
relations. What might it mean to say that nations' copyright relations
must reflect the democratic copyright paradigm, and in what fora
might we insist that they do so?
A. Informing International Copyright Law
The democratic copyright paradigm might inform international
copyright relations in three fundamental ways. First, it might pro-
vide an independent legal basis, over and above the provisions of
multilateral copyright treaties, for requiring states both to accord
some minimum degree of copyright protection and to impose certain
limitations on copyright owner rights. Most of the world's countries
already either adhere to the Berne Convention or are obligated to
comply with the "Berne plus" standards set forth in TRIPS.- 3 Under
232. The relationship between international law guarantees of democratic process, on the
one hand, and of individuals' human rights, on the other, is one of some complexity and
controversy. In particular, some commentators assert that international norms protecting
individual human rights can and must stand on their own, without being entirely subsumed
within a general right to democratic governance. See STEINER & ALsToN, supra note 96, at 660-
61 (raising this issue). But cf. Anthony D'Amato, What Kind of Democracy Do We Want to
Export?, in INTERNATiONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 375, 375-76 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994)
(contending that the democratic entitlement must itself be rights-based as opposed to merely
process-based). Nevertheless, because international human rights norms both bolster and draw
sustenance from the recognition of democracy as a universal value, see infra notes 267-71 and
accompanying text, I will treat them as an integral part of the democratic entitlement.
233. As of this writing, 125 countries adhere to the Berne Convention and 130 adhere to
TRIPS. TRIPS requires that countries comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne
Convention (except as they pertain to moral rights) and imposes additional requirements as
well. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing TRIPS's "Berne plus" approach).
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these treaties, as we have seen, each party state must meet minimulm
standards of protection that are roughly analogous to copyright holder
rights under U.S. law. As such, Berne and TRIPS, as supplemented
by the WIPO Copyright Treaty's treatment of digital technology, can
generally be said to institute a regime of "strong" copyright already
applicable throughout much of the world.
Given the comprehensive reach of the existing "strong
copyright" regime, any democratic entitlement requirement that
countries implement effective copyright protection might seem at-first
to be entirely superfluous. That is not the case, however. Some
authoritarian countries, most notably Iran, Iraq, and Singapore,
adhere to neither the Berne Convention nor TRIPS. Others,
including China, adhere to the Berne Convention, but not TRIPS, and
arguably fail to enforce the nominal protections that they have
granted to authors pursuant to Berne, enforcement that would be
required under TRIPS.215 Applying the democratic copyright
paradigm as a "freedom imperialism" sword, one might argue that
such nonsignatory or noncomplying states must provide at least a
level of effective copyright protection required by the right to
democratic governance. A state that fails to do so would be in viola-
tion of its obligations under international law even if it has no obliga-
tions or has nominally complied with its obligations under interna-
tional copyright treaty. The violating state could be called to account
in the domestic courts of many countries,236 as well as in a variety of
international fora dedicated to promoting compliance with interna-
tional human rights instruments.237
234. For a list of Berne Union members, including the dates of their adherence, see Berne
Convention List, supra note 99. For a list of WTO members (each of which must adhere to
TRIPS) and the date each joined the Organization, see WTO Member List, supra note 62.
235. See generally Butterton, supra note 134 (discussing China's lack of enforcement). In
what is seen as a distinct improvement over Berne, TRIPS requires that parties make available
enforcement procedures that "permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellec-
tual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements." TRIPS,
supra note 1, art. 41(1).
236. For a brief but illuminating discussion of the influence of international human rights
law on domestic law and adjudication, see Francioni, supra note 90, at 476-81.
237. Leading international human rights oversight commissions include the Human Rights
Committee, established pursuant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, established to monitor compliance with
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the European Commission
on Human Rights, established under the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights; and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, created under the American
Convention on Human Rights.
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At the same time, to the extent that the democratic entitle-
ment mandates or suggests the need for a limited copyright, it might
require countries to impose certain limits on copyright owner
prerogatives even where such limits would not be required under
Berne or TRIPS. While Berne and TRIPS permit various limitations
and exceptions to copyright holder rights, they do not generally
require them.28 Accordingly, a party state that enforces its copyright
law in a manner that facilitates private censorship or places heavy
burdens on the free flow of information and opinion would not
necessarily run afoul of the state's obligations under either of those
treaties. In contrast, the democratic entitlement might well require
countries liberally to permit uses of copyright-protected works where
such uses significantly contribute to public discourse without unduly
undermining copyright's support for authors and publishers. That
international law obligation would be independent of a country's
commitments under Berne and TRIPS. Like the posited obligation to
provide some degree of effective copyright protection, it would carry
weight in various domestic and international fora.
Second, the democratic paradigm might inform international
copyright relations by serving as an interpretative framework for
nations' copyright treaty obligations. Both Berne and TRIPS include
numerous open-ended provisions, susceptible of variable construction.
Since "relevant rules of international law" are a principal tool of
treaty interpretation,- 9 the democratic entitlement-assuming, again,
that it requires or suggests a particular balance of copyright holder
rights and public access-would bear on such construction.
Third, the democratic entitlement might serve an evaluative
function. It might provide a basis for criticizing copyright treaty
provisions that are arguably inconsistent with the needs of a
democratic copyright. One might argue, for example, that in contrast
238. Berne and TRIPS mandate limitations on copyright holder rights in two instances.
Article 10(1) of Berne, which is incorporated into TRIPS pursuant to Article 9(1) of TRIPS,
provides that, so long as certain specified conditions are met, "[i]t shall be permissible to make
quotations from a work." Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 10(1). Article 9(2) of TRIPS
provides that "[c]opyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such." TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
239. Article 31(3Xc) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that those
interpreting a treaty take into account, among other factors, "any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(c), 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The treaty interpretation provisions of the Vienna Convention
are widely seen as expressive of customary international law. See infra note 366-67. As such,
the provisions govern the interpretation of both Berne and TRIPS. See Netanel, supra note 7, at
449-50,465.
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to the view of TRIPS as freedom imperialism, TRIPS's requirements
for broad, stringent copyright protection actually impede
democratization and thus run contrary to the right of democratic
governance. To the extent this is the case, the democratic entitle-
ment, as applied to copyright, would provide an impetus for modifying
the offending provisions.
In Part V, I will look more specifically at how the democratic
copyright paradigm might be brought to bear upon particular issues
in global copyright relations. I will first return, however, to examine
how and to what extent the paradigm may draw support from the
democratic entitlement and related human rights law.
B. The Democratic Entitlement
The idea that democracy is not only a universal good, but a
universal legal entitlement as well has achieved prominence during
the last decade, sparked by the increased willingness of nations and
international bodies to view democratic governance as a matter of
international concern. 0 Scholars have cited a growing body of inter-
national law from a variety of sources as evidence of this nascent
right to democratic governance. Its foundations may be found in nu-
merous binding instruments, most principally the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),21 the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHR"),22 the Charter of the Organization of American
240. For discussion of the idea that democracy is becoming a global entitlement, see JAMES
CRAWFORD, DEMOCRACY IN INTERNAIONAL LAW 5-7 (1993); HELD, supra note 74, at 104-05;
Christian Tomuschat, Democratic Pluralism: The Right to Political Opposition, in THE
STRENGTH OF DIVERSITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 27, 27-46 (Allan Rosas &
Jan Helgesen eds., 1992); The American Society of International Law, National Sovereignty
Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law, in THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 86TH ANNUAL MEETING 249,
249-50 (1992) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAw 86TH ANNUAL MEETING]; Gregory H. Fox, The
Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 552-70 (1992);
Franck, supra note 15, at 46-47; Theodor Meron, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 153 WORLD
AFF. 23, 24-27 (1990); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty And Human Rights In Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 866, 871-76 (1990). For criticism of the idea, see Parekh,
supra note 80, at 156-70 (arguing that Western "liberal democracy" may not be suitable for all
countries); Kausikan, supra note 86, at 26 (arguing that rights associated with Western
democracy cannot be universally applied to non-Western cultures).
241. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368
[hereinafter ICCPR].
242. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
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States,24 the American Convention on Human Rights,2 the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights,2 5 the Charter of Paris for a
New Europe,2 6 and the Moscow Document of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe.27 The component underpin-
nings of the democratic entitlement are further elucidated in authori-
tative treaty interpretation, the practice of signatory states, oversight
commission compliance reviews, and decisions of international judi-
cial tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights.2 " The
entitlement is also anchored in customary international law. It has
been asserted, for example, that most, if not all, of the norms enu-
merated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have attained
binding legal effect through their repeated invocation in domestic and
intergovernmental fora, tribunals, resolutions, and instruments. 9
Finally, the right to democratic governance finds support in
what states and international law scholars have come to denote as
"soft law."20 While not binding, at least in the sense of a justiciable
243. Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec. 13, 1951, T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
Article 5 of the Charter requires that member states promote "the effective exercise of represen-
tative democracy." Id. art. 5.
244. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,9 I.L.M. 673.
245. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
245. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 LL.M. 190 thereinafter Charter
of Paris].
247. Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for
Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Procedures for Fact-Finding, Oct. 3,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1670 [hereinafter Moscow Document].
248. See generally Franck, supra note 15 (citing various sources of international law in
support of a democratic entitlement).
249. See JOHN HUMPHREY, No DISTANT MII.ENIUM: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 155 (1989) (asserting that the Declaration is now "binding on all states, including the
states that did not vote for it in 1948"); see also Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
287 (1995) (surveying state practice, scholarly commentary, and references in international
treaties, resolutions, and tribunal decisions); W. Michael Reisman, A Hard Look at Soft Law:
Remarks by W. Michael Reisman, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 86TH ANNUAL MEETING, supra note
240, at 378 (1988) (noting the spectrum of views as to whether the norms enumerated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have binding legal effect).
Customary international law "results from a general and consistent practice of states which
is followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). A determination of the content of
customary law thus requires both evidence of practice and an articulation of "opinio juris," the
belief that such practice is legally mandated. In recent years, however, particularly in the area
of human rights, commentators and tribunals have increasingly relied on statements,
declarations, and resolutions as evidence of practice as well as opinio juris. The not
uncontroversial result has been an implicit recognition that opinio juris may compensate for an
inconsistency or scarcity of supporting practice, at least in the area of human rights and
humanitarian law. See Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of
International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 239-40 (1996).
250. On soft law, see generally American Society of International Law, A Hard Look at Soft
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 86TH ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 240, at 371; C.M. Chinkin, The
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rule, soft law may serve as a guide to treaty or customary law inter-
pretation and as a basis for legitimizing state conduct.21 Soft-law
precepts may also eventually "harden" into customary law (when
states have come to treat a precept as a binding obligation) or inspire
more definitive treatment in treaty.2s2 Soft-law foundations may
include General Assembly resolutions, declarations of intergovern-
mental conferences, and reports and publications of United Nations
agencies and other international bodies.258 Soft law may also be found
in treaty provisions that lack the specificity or obligatory character of
binding legal norms but nevertheless set forth standards, guidelines,
hortatory precepts, or model codes that do have legal import.M
In part because of its varied sources and in part because of
continuing debate among political theorists about what are the requi-
site components of democracy, the contours of the democratic entitle-
ment remain uncertain and controversial.2 55 Commentators disagree
about the extent to which certain aspects of the entitlement have
attained the status of universal obligation,256 and about whether cer-
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
850 (1989); Francesco Francioni, International "Soft Law':• A Contemporary Assessment, in
FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT
JENNINGS 167 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996); Paul Szasz, General Law-
Making Processes, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 35 (Oscar Shachter & Christopher C.
Joyner eds., 1995). See also Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises, 22 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 11 (1979) (discussing, without using the
term "soft law," the possible international law effects of multinational enterprise guidelines and
codes of conduct).
251. On soft law's legitimation function, see Baade, supra note 250, at 34-39. I use the
term 'justiciable" in a sense that is synonymous with "legally cognizable," that is, a question in
which it can be readily determined whether a country is or is not in violation of international
law. I do not mean to suggest that a dispute on a "justiciable" question could necessarily be
brought before a judicial tribunal. International law is defined, applied, and enforced in
numerous nonjudicial, as well as judicial, and in informal, as well as formal, fora. See generally
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT (1994)
(describing various sources for international law generation and enforcement).
252. See Francioni, supra note 250, at 175; Szasz, supra note 250, at 47.
253. See Szasz, supra note 250, at 46-47. For example, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights both affirms
the democratic entitlement and reflects upon its content. See Vienna Declaration, supra note
95, art. 1(8) (affirming that democratic governance, human rights, and fundamental freedoms
are universal values).
254. See Reisman, supra note 249, at 376; Szasz, supra note 250, at 46-47.
255. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 96, at 658-61 (noting that uncertainty regarding
the content and the scope of democratic entitlement parallels disagreement among political
theorists concerning the requisites for a true democracy).
256. Much of this disagreement centers on the extent to which provisions of treaties such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights either restate or have served to
engender customary law that binds states that are not a party to the treaty. See supra note 249
and accompanying text (describing the debate over treaties, statements, and resolutions as the
basis for customary law).
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tain universal obligations are properly deemed a part of the demo-
cratic entitlement.27 Among proponents of a democratic entitlement,
however, there appears to be evolving support for a core right that is
roughly parallel to Dahl's seven minimum requirements for political
democracy.25 That right that may also serve as a grounding point for
soft-law emanations that both inform and extend beyond those min-
ima.
The entitlement's central component, commentators agree, is
the requirement of free, fair, and reasonably frequent elections.2 9 As
set forth in the ICCPR, that requirement embodies the right of every
citizen "t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors."260
With the collapse of one-party states in Africa, Eastern Europe, and
Latin America, there is growing unanimity among parties to the
Covenant that "genuine" elections denote the principle of party plu-
ralism, giving voters the opportunity to vote for an organized opposi-
tion, not just to abstain from supporting a single official party.261 As
such, the electoral right lies at the heart of a system of representative
democratic government and, as the United Nations General Assembly
has resolved, it also constitutes "a crucial factor in the effective en-
joyment... of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 262
However, the mere requirement of a formally pluralist
electoral process is widely and justifiably seen as insufficient for
democratic governance.2 63 Indeed, the ICCPR's companion provision
to the electoral right declares a broader right to political participation.
It states that "[e]very citizen shall have the right and the
257. Cf. Charter of Paris, supra note 246, para. 9, at 193 (enumerating the requisites for
democracy).
258. See supra text accompanying note 78 (enumerating Dahl's minimum requirements for
democracy).
259. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 240; Fox, supra note 240; Franck, supra note 15.
260. ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 25.
261. See Fox, supra note 240, at 559-60.
262. G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 458-59, U.N. Doc. A/45/766
(1990). But see Bollen, supra note 69, at 7-8 (maintaining that, although there appears to be a
"positive feedback relation" linking majority rule through genuine period elections with individ-
ual political rights, it is not known whether such a relation is valid); Zakaria, supra note 82, at
22 (underscoring the problem of democratically elected, but repressive, regimes).
263. See Fox, supra note 240, at 566-67 (noting the view of the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission that "excessive government intrusions into the political process warp and
delegitimize electoral outcomes"); Franck, supra note 15, at 79 (including processes for realizing
self-determination and freedom of expression, together with electoral rights, as equal
components of the democratic entitlement).
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opportunity... without unreasonable restrictions... [t1o take part in
the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives."264 As Henry Steiner has convincingly argued, the
right to political participation extends beyond involvement in electoral
politics. 265 It also embraces the notion of citizen participation in the
full spectrum of public life, ranging from school boards to the
associational settings of civil society. It prompts states to adopt
measures to ensure that citizens in fact enjoy reasonable
opportunities to engage in public discourse and participate in the
exigencies of collective self-rule. Seen this way, the right to political
participation constitutes a soft-law (or at least a softer-law) adjunct to
the more specific and presently cognizable electoral right. The
participation right enunciates "a shared ideal" of participatory
democracy, but leaves open the precise manner in which that ideal is
to be attained. The right is meant "to be realized progressively over
time in different ways in different contexts through invention and
planning that will often have a programmatic character."266
As a number of international instruments and commentators
have emphasized, the democratic entitlement must also encompass
the fundamentals of a rights-based constitutional democracy.267 These
include a separation of powers and enumerated protections of
individuals and minorities against majoritarian excess. Seen in this
way, the democratic entitlement stands, in part, as a constraint on
the "anti-democratic" behavior even of democratically elected govern-
ments.268 It acts to prevent majoritarian suppression of political
opposition movements, discrimination against cultural, linguistic, and
264. ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 25(a).
265. See Henry Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B.
77, 78 (1988).
266. Id. at 130.
267. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, supra note 95, para. I() (asserting that "[Iln the context
of [democracy], the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the
national and international level should be universal and conducted without conditions
attached"); Charter of Paris, supra note 246, para. 7, at 193 (proclaiming that "[diemocracy has
as its foundations respect for the human person and the rule of law"); ECHR, supra note 242,
pmbl., para. 4 (reaffirming a "profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the
foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by effec-
tive political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the
Human Rights upon which they depend"). See also CRAWFORD, supra note 240, at 7 (asserting
that "[d]emocracy implies a range of rights-to participate in public life, effective freedom of
speech, the opportunity to organise political parties and other groups, and so on"); D'Amato,
supra note 232, at page 375-76 (arguing for a substantive, rights-based universal democratic
entitlement).
268. Cf. Fox & Nolte, supra note 81, at 68 (asserting that democracy is a substantive right
that cannot be abrogated even by a democratically elected party running on a platform of
instituting an authoritarian regime).
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religious minorities, and systematic violations of individual human
rights. The democratic entitlement need not be synonymous with a
stereotypical Anglo-American liberal view of individual rights as
prepolitical entitlements guarding each individual's opportunity to
pursue his self-defined interests. 269 It does, however, require certain
limits on state power, a civil society that is relatively free from state
control, and a strong measure of personal autonomy, all as necessary
for individuals' effective participation in public affairs. 270 As such,
human rights norms play a central role in informing and realizing the
participation right, just as democratic governance provides the best,
although not certain, guarantee of respect for individual integrity and
autonomy.271
C. Entitlement Support for a Democratic Copyright
1. Implicit and Soft-law Support
It would be foolhardy to assert that copyright lies solidly
within the democratic entitlement. Nonetheless, copyright may well
constitute an adjunct to one or more of the entitlement's principal
components. It may also fall within a periphery of nonenforceable,
but nevertheless legally significant, soft-law norms that support
democratic development.
Most obviously, a requirement for some manner of copyright
protection might be inferred from the right of free expression. As
enunciated in various instruments, including the Universal
Declaration, ICCPR, and ECHR, the right of free expression includes
the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of any
kind, from any source, and in any media, including in the "form of
art".22 To the extent that copyright is central to the dissemination of
269. See Parekh, supra note 80, at 170-72 (criticizing this Anglo-American view of individ-
ual rights).
270. On the distinction between liberal autonomy and democratic autonomy, see HELD, su-
pra note 74, at 156.
271. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J.
373, 387-88 (1993) (arguing that democratic government is a necessary, although not sufficient,
condition for individual autonomy). But see Zakaria, supra note 82, at 40-42 (maintaining that
some states, like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, that sharply restrict political participation
and choice, provide a better environment for the life and liberty of their citizens than certain
illiberal democracies like Slovakia and Ghana).
272. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 19(2); ECHR, supra note 242, art. 10; Universal
Declaration, supra note 93, art. 19. The right is not absolute, but it may be subject only to those
restrictions that are imposed in conformity with the law and which are "necessary in a
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information and ideas from a variety of sources and media, it serves
to effectuate that right. In what might be seen as an instance of
implicit soft-law support for the proposition that copyright serves as
the "engine of free expression,"273 UNESCO declarations on
promoting independent and pluralistic media in developing countries
have identified media freedom from the economic as well as political
control of the state as an integral part of the right to free expression
and as essential to the maintenance and development of democracy.274
Similarly, to the extent that copyright is a positive factor in public
education, citizen involvement in political and cultural life, and the
maintenance of a robust and pluralist civil society, it may constitute
an important measure for realizing the right of political participation.
Seen this way, copyright also helps to give content to the electoral
right; when an electorate is wholly passive and uninformed, elections
can only nominally constitute the "genuine" and "free expression" of
electoral wll.275
However, even assuming that copyright has significant
instrumental value for realizing the right to free expression and other
core elements of the democratic entitlement, it by no means follows
that states must recognize and protect copyright as a matter of
international law. The ICCPR does mandate that party states adopt
such measures "as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
democratic society." See ECHR, supra note 242, art. 10(2); Universal Declaration, supra note
93, art. 29(2). The ICCPR contains similar language regarding permissible restrictions of the
right of free expression, but omits the express requirement that the restrictions be "necessary in
a democratic society." See ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 19.
273. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
274. See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
DECLARATION OF ALMA ATA ON PROMOTING INDEPENDENT AND PLuRALUsTC ASIAN MEDIA AND
DECLARATION OF WINDHOEK ON PROMOTING AN INDEPENDENT AND PLURAL=sTIc AFRICAN PRESS,
at 1-3, 6, 9-10, U.N. Doc. DPI/1317 (1993). State funding need not necessarily lead to editorial
interference, although it does pose a significant risk of such interference. As the Windhoek
Declaration states: "[T]he public media should be funded only where authorities guarantee a
constitutional and effective freedom of information and expression and the independence of the
press." Id. at 11; see also Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Declaration on the
Freedom of Expression and Information, arts. I, 11(d) (Apr. 29, 1982), reprinted in DUTCH
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 88, 90
(1986) (declaring that "the existence of a wide variety of independent and autonomous media,
permitting the reflection of diversity of ideas and opinions" is vital to the freedom of expression
and information "as a basic element of democratic and pluralist society").
275. In the words of Louis Brandeis:
Under universal suffrage... every voter is a part ruler of the state. Unless rulers have,
in the main, education and character, and are free men, our great experiment in
democracy must fail. It devolves upon the state, therefore, to fit its rulers for their task.
It must provide not only facilities for development but the opportunity of using them. It
must not only provide opportunity, it must stimulate the desire to avail of it.
Louis D. Brandeis, True Americanism, in BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 25, 27 (Philippa Strum ed.,
1995).
288 [Vol. 51:217
1998] COPYRIGHT AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 289
recognized" therein.26 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee,
charged with overseeing the ICCPR, has suggested that the Covenant
requires not merely that states enact a formal guarantee of free
expression, but also that they act to provide the "conditions which in
practice" enable its exercise.277 Nevertheless, the extent to which the
state has a positive legal duty to ensure that its citizens have access
to a broad spectrum of information and opinion, and not only a more
limited duty to refrain from actively impeding that access, is a matter
of considerable controversy.278 Additionally, even if states are legally
required to take steps to ensure that citizens have access to
alternative sources of information, that does not mean that such steps
must, as a matter of international law, include the provision of
copyright protection to authors of original expression. Even assuming
that such protection would in fact significantly contribute to
expressive diversity, states might take other measures to satisfy their
international law obligations to ensure citizen access. Such measures
might include providing funds and communications infrastructure for
independent media organizations, regulating commercial media to
blunt the untoward effects of private monopoly, and subsidizing
Internet access. 279 To be certain, state funding and regulation of
media have often invited state censorship and partiality.280 But states
276. ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 2(2); see also Oscar Shachter, The Obligation to
Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLIICAL RIGHTS 311, 311-31 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (discussing the
ICCPR requirement that a member state adopt measures as may be necessary to give effect to
the rights enumerated in the ICCPR).
277. See Freedom of Expression, ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 10/19
(1983) [hereinafter Human Rights Committee Comment], reprinted in MANFRED NOWAK, U.N.
COVENANT ON CIVL AND POLiTCAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 855(1993).
278. See D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 383
(1995) (noting that the precise content of the positive obligation Article 10 of the ECHR imposes
on states to protect individuals' freedom of speech against private censorship "is still in need of
elaboration"); NOWAK, supra note 277, at 344 (noting that while ICCPR Article 19(2) clearly
protects individuals against state interference, it is "more difficult to answer whether the right
to seek information obligates the States Parties in certain cases to guarantee with positive
measures access to State or private information or to make information available themselves").
To the extent no positive duty is required, international law may be somewhat less broad than
Dahl's requirement that "alternative sources of information exist." DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra
note 70, at 11.
279. The European Commission on Human Rights has suggested that it may be incumbent
upon states under Article 10 of the ECHR to take steps to guard against "excessive press-
concentrations." See De Geillustreerde Pers N.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71, 8 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5, 14 (1976); see also Human Rights Committee Comment, supra note
277 (noting that "because of the development of modern mass media, effective measures are
necessary to prevent such control of the media as would interfere with the right of everyone to
freedom of expression").
280. See supra note 156.
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that manage to avoid such untoward results might facilitate sufficient
citizen access to alternative sources of information to satisfy whatever
positive duty international law requires in that regard.
It is uncertain, in sum, whether the right to free expression
and other core components of the democratic entitlement imply a
positive requirement to accord authors exclusive rights to market
their expressive works.281 However, over and above this potentially
key, yet uncertain inferential support, international human rights
instruments contain an express recognition of both authors' rights
and the need for some measure of public access to authors'
creations.282 The Universal Declaration proclaims that "[e]veryone
has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which
he is the author."2 In an adjacent provision, which is seen to imply
public interest limitations to authors' rights, the Declaration
recognizes the "right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement
and its benefits."28
281. Moreover, as I will further discuss below, to the extent that overly broad copyright
owner prerogatives facilitate private censorship or otherwise impair robust debate and the free
flow of information, the right of free expression-and, less directly, the electoral and
participation rights-would seem to require that suitable limits be placed on those prerogatives.
Without such limits, some who wish to reproduce or reformulate existing expression in order
effectively to challenge prevailing assumptions and others who wish to gain access to
information and diverse views will be unable to do so. See infra Part IV.C.2.
282. While these and other human rights norms are meant to apply in all countries, both
authoritarian and democratic, their enforcement is widely seen as vital to the establishment
and strengthening of democratic institutions. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, supra note 95, art.
1(9) ("Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are
interdependent and mutually reinforcing.").
283. Universal Declaration, supra note 93, art. 27(2). 'Moral interests" principally refer to
those of being identified as the author and determining the manner and form in which the
author's work is disseminated to the public; "material interests" concern the opportunity to earn
remuneration for the work's creation and dissemination. See ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D'AuTEUR
ET COPYRIGHT: DIVERGENCES ET CONVERGENCES, ETUDE DE DROIT COMPARt 158 (1993). For an
in-depth comparative discussion of authors' material and moral interests under the common law
and civil law traditions, see generally Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the
Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994).
284. Universal Declaration, supra note 93, art. 27(1). As a leading expert on international
copyright aptly puts it: "Both sides of the copyright coin are well set out in article 27 of the
Declaration of Human Rights. The rights of organized society in paragraph (1) and the rights of
the copyright owner in paragraph (2)." STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 5 (1989); see also STROWEL, supra note 283, at 157-58 (noting the tension
between the two provisions). Article 27(2) was incorporated into the Universal Declaration as
an amendment to the initial draft. The amendment was proposed by France, apparently out of
concern that Article 27(1) could be interpreted to unduly limit authors' rights. The French
proposal was adopted, over the opposition of the United States, by a vote of 18 to 13, with 10
abstentions. See id. at 158-59.
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These twin provisions, which together incorporate a norm of
limited copyright into the international human rights regime, are
further elaborated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 28 Article 15(1) of the Covenant
recognizes the right of everyone to "take part in cultural life," "enjoy
the benefits of scientific progress," and "benefit from the protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary
or artistic production of which he is the author."28 Of additional
relevance to copyright and its scope, Article 15(2) provides that the
"steps to be taken" by state parties to "achieve the full realization of
this right shall include those necessary for.., the development and
the diffusion of science and culture."287 Article 15(3) then recognizes
the need for authorial autonomy, free from undue state interference.
It provides that parties "undertake to respect the freedom
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity."288
The ICESCR now counts more than 130 states as parties and
arguably has come to express customary law with regard to
nonparties as well.289 Nevertheless, the copyright and cultural
participation provisions of both the Universal Declaration and the
ICESCR have a considerable "softness" to them.290 The ICESCR and
the Declaration provisions upon which it builds are generally seen
285. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
286. Id. art. 15(1).
287. Id. art. 15(2).
288. Id. art. 15(3). As Asbjorn Eide perceptively notes, these rights embody a "process-
oriented" conception of culture, which sees culture as "the evolving achievements of artistic and
scientific creation," in contrast to a more traditional, arguably authoritarian "system-oriented"
concept, which views culture as "a coherent self-contained set of values and symbols" reproduced
over a period of time by a cultural group and which sees individuals more as products of their
culture than innovators. Asbjorn Eide, Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXBOOK 229, 231 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS].
289. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 96, at 256 (noting that as of September 1995, 132
states were parties to the Covenant). Provisions of the ICESCR, including those involving
copyright and the right to participate in culture, may be expressive of customary law because
they parallel provisions in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights that some contend have
become a part of customary law. See id. at 268. The South African Constitutional Court has
recently ruled, in contrast, that a right to intellectual property is not a "universally accepted
fundamental right, freedom and civil liberty." In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 115 (CC). Critical to the court's ruling was
its finding that, although such right to intellectual property is recognized in many international
conventions, "it is much more rarely recognised in regional conventions protecting human rights
and in the constitutions of acknowledged democracies." Id. For an article criticizing the
substance and contesting the factual predicate for that decision, see generally Oh Dean, The
Case for the Recognition of Intellectual Property in the Bill of Rights, 60 THRHR 105 (1997).
290. See Reisman, supra note 249, at 375 (asserting that "[wle have... a sliding scale of
hardness or softness in all norms").
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more to set forth broad standards and aspirational goals than to enact
concrete, "justiciable" rights.291 The ICESCR requires only that each
state act "with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized" in that covenant.29 2 Although states are
required to do so "by all appropriate means" and "to the maximum of
[their] available resources,"293 they retain considerable discretion to
set priorities according to policy agendas. 294
On the other hand, even if the ICESCR does not require im-
mediate implementation of its enumerated rights, the Covenant does
impose a binding, albeit somewhat amorphous, obligation to act expe-
ditiously and effectively, within the confines of domestic resource
constraints, towards the full realization of the rights.295 In that re-
gard, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which is charged with overseeing state compliance
with the Covenant,26 has taken the position that the ICESCR does
impose a "minimum core obligation" on state parties "to ensure the
satisfaction of... minimum essential levels of each of the rights."297
291. See Kitty Arambulo, Drafting an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Can an Ideal Become Reality?, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INTL L. &
POL'Y 111, 114-20 (1996) (summarizing the views of various commentators). As noted above, I
use the term 'justiciable" as synonymous with "legally cognizable," not to connote a right that
could necessarily be brought before a judicial tribunal. See supra note 251.
292. ICESCR, supra note 285, art. 2(1). Similarly, the Universal Declaration preamble
refers to the rights enumerated in the Declaration as a "common standard of achievement."
Universal Declaration, supra note 93, pmbl.
293. ICESCR, supra note 285, art. 2(1).
294. See Arambulo, supra note 291, at 115 (noting that the ICESCR drafters were of the
opinion that states would have considerable discretion in meeting Covenant standards to set
priorities according to available resources and political policy agendas); see also MATTHEW C.R.
CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 136-37 (1995) (noting that states are given a margin of
discretion in assessing what resources are available to realize the rights, but cautioning that
-such discretion is not absolute). In contrast, the ICCPR-which includes the right to free
expression-mandates that party states adopt such measures "as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized" therein. ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 2(2); see supra note 276.
295. See Report on the Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, U.N. ECOSOCOR, 46th Sess., Annex III, General Comment No. 3, para. 9, at 85, U.N.
Doc. No. E/1991/23, E/C.12/1990/8 (1991) [hereinafter General Comment No.3] (stating that the
ICESCR concept of "progressive realization" "constitutes a recognition of the fact that full
realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in
a short period of time," but stating that the Covenant does impose on states "an obligation to
move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal").
296. The ICESCR requires states to provide to the United Nations periodic reports on the
measures they have adopted and the progress they have made in achieving realization of the
rights that the treaty sets forth. See ICESCR, supra note 285, art. 16(1). In 1987, the United
Nations established the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to monitor and
report on state efforts in this area. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 96, at 316.
297. General Comment No. 3, supra note 295, 10, at 86. According to the Committee's
chair, each right thus gives rise to a core "absolute minimum entitlement, in the absence of
which a state party is to be considered to be in violation of it[s] obligations." Phillip Alston, Out
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It insists, indeed, that certain Covenant provisions are capable of full
and immediate application in many countries.298
The extent to which the authors' rights and cultural rights set
forth in ICESCR Article 15 might be presently cognizable and what
might constitute their core, essential components remain open ques-
tions. To grant authors some measure of protection against unauthor-
ized copying and distortions of their works would not seem to require
a significant allocation of domestic resources, at least not much be-
yond that required to establish a judicial system for the hearing of
civil disputes generally. In giving examples of those provisions that
might be susceptible of immediate application, however, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights included Article
15(3) requiring states to respect creative autonomy, but did not in-
clude Article 15(1) and (2) regarding authors' rights and other cul-
tural rights. 29 9 Similarly, although states' ICESCR compliance reports
are expected to describe the measures taken to realize authors' rights
and other cultural rights,300 Committee oversight reports and United
Nations publications regarding progress made towards the realization
of economic, social, and cultural rights have given only cursory
reference to the protection of intellectual property, the conditions of
creative freedom, and public access to works of culture.30' Indeed, the
focus of Committee oversight has clearly been more on economic and
social than on cultural rights, and the same is true of almost all
scholarly commentary regarding the ICESCR.302
of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 353 (1987).
298. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 295, para. 5, at 84.
299. See id.
300. See Revised Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Reports to be Submitted
by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. No. E/1992/23 (1992), reprinted in
ECONOMIC, SOCIALAND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 288, at 421,434-35.
301. Isolated references include: MANOUCHEHE GANJI, THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROGRESS, at 19, U.N. Doc. No.
EICN.4/1108/REV.1 (1975) (mentioning, in a cursory fashion, the protection of intellectual
property); Report on the Eighth and Ninth Sessions of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 3, General Comment No. 3, para. 128, at 34, U.N. Doc.
No. E/1994/23, EIC/12/1993/19 (1994) (rebuking Iran in connection with the fatweh issued
against Salman Rushdie).
302. Cultural rights have attracted relatively little attention in ICESCR oversight and
compliance. Some aspects of those rights, however, have been addressed in the context of
related provisions of the ICCPR, such as the freedoms of expression, religion, and association
and the right to "take part in the conduct of public affairs." See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note
96, at 264 (discussing cultural rights addressed in the ICCPR); see also Eide, supra note 288, at
229 (noting that individual cultural rights "have received little attention" and appear in the
Universal Declaration and the ICESCR "almost as a remnant category").
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In the absence of any definitive or even detailed consideration
of the scope of authors' rights under Article 15, it would certainly
appear that even if ICESCR rights do contain a measure of hard-law
justiciability, Article 15 does not require that countries accord authors
quasi-proprietary exclusive rights in their expressive works. One can
imagine a system, for example, in which authors are salaried employ-
ees of the state, but are accorded a sufficient degree of autonomy to
satisfy the justiciable core, even if not the soft-law penumbra, of the
Article's moral interests and creative freedom requirements. Indeed,
a mandate for copyright would be even less warranted if, as some
commentators have asserted, justiciability can only concern
individuals' "negative liberty" right to be free from unwarranted state
interference, and not those matters in which the state must act
affirmatively to facilitate individuals' ability to exercise their rights.3 03
If that is the case, a state could satisfy the justiciable core of Article
15 without providing authors with any subsidy, employment, or
exclusive rights, simply by refraining from expropriating whatever
compensation authors might be able to reap from an unregulated
market.304
However, regardless of whether and to what extent Article 15
contains a presently cognizable core, its legal import is not limited to
that core. Article 15 also enunciates a soft-law standard, a goal to
which nations must aspire. In that soft-law sense, and seen as a pe-
ripheral adjunct to the right to democratic governance, Article 15
would provide-in line with United Nations pronouncements on the
importance of fiscally independent media for democratization305-that
countries should endeavor to accord a level of protection consistent
with and designed to further the free flow of information and the
development of an independent and pluralist indigenous media, and
thus generally to spur democratic development.
That norm would be programmatic; specific applications would
vary according to the exigencies of democratic and economic develop-
303. See, e.g., Marc Bossuyt, La Distinction Entre les Droits Civils et Politiques et les Droits
Economiques, Sociaux et Culturels, 8 HuM. RTS. J. 783 (1975).
304. Concern that the Soviet Union's 1973 adherence to the Universal Copyright
Convention was a device for asserting state control over the works of Soviet authors in the
United States led Congress to provide, in the 1976 Copyright Act revision, that, absent a prior
voluntary transfer, no action by a governmental body purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer,
or exercise any of the exclusive rights under a copyright is to be given effect under the Act. See
17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1994). The circumstances surrounding the enactment of that provision are
discussed in Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107, 1123-24 (1977).
305. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing pronouncements of the United
Nations which describe the importance of an independent media).
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ment in each country. In advanced democratic states, it would likely
entail a set of exclusive rights akin to the minimum rights required to
be accorded to authors under the Berne Convention. Although the
Berne Convention has a far more attenuated connection with the
right of democratic governance than do the ICESCR and ICCPR, its
formulation of the scope of authors' minimum rights reflects an ex-
press concern for facilitating the free flow of information and dis-
course on public affairs. 06 In authoritarian states, nascent democra-
cies, and developing countries, the level of protection should be set, as
discussed in Part III, so as best to serve the needs of democratic tran-
sition and consolidation.
This soft-law norm would not impose a cognizable obligation
independent of international copyright treaty, at least in the sense
that a country could be called to account for failing to provide a cer-
tain level of protection. But a country's failure to meet soft-law
copyright standards might properly be considered by the domestic
courts of other countries in refusing to dismiss a copyright
infringement claim for forum non conveniens or declining to honor a
copyright license choice of law clause.30 7 As a "relevant rule of
international law," moreover, the norm would serve as a primary
306. See CLAUDE MASOUYE, WIPO GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 24, 46, 57, 60-62
(1978) (discussing various Berne provisions that limit authors' rights in the interests of news
reporting, the diffusion of knowledge, and freedom of information); RICKETSON, supra note 51, at
477 (noting that the perceived need to temper authors' rights as required to serve the public
interest has been an integral part of the Berne Convention since its inception).
307. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright
Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 595 (1997) (suggesting that a U.S. court should consider the
adequacy of an alternative jurisdiction's copyright law before entering a forum non conveniens
dismissal in a copyright infringement action). The law of most countries permits courts to
refuse to give effect to a contractual choice of law provision if to do so would lead to the applica-
tion of a law that contravenes a strong public policy in the forum state. See, e.g., European
Community Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 76, 1980 O.J. (L
266) (stating that a forum court may refuse to apply a choice of law provision if such application
would be "manifestly incompatible" with forum public policy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971) (stating that a court may reject the parties' choice of law if:
(1) application of that law to an issue would violate the public policy of the state which has the
most significant relationship to the transaction; and (2) the "most significant" state has a
materially greater interest in resolving the particular issue than the chosen state does). In the
copyright context, see, for example, Michel de Grece, Cass le civ., Feb. 1, 1989, 142 R.I.D.A. 301
(refusing to recognize a ghostwriter's waiver of the moral right of attribution, even though the
ghostwriter contract stated that it was to be governed by New York law, which would allow such
a waiver); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway"." Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1474 n.29 (1995) (raising the
possibility that a jurisdiction might refuse to honor a choice of law provision in a license, by web
site notice, of the non-exclusive right to use a contribution to a collective work).
295
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
means of copyright treaty interpretation.308 It would help to fill in the
gaps in those cases in which Berne and TRIPS standards fail de-
finitively to indicate whether a given level of protection is required or
how a traditional right is to be applied in the context of new techno-
logical uses. The norm would also play an evaluative role. It would
serve as a critical benchmark for determining whether the current
copyright treaty regime adequately serves the goal of democratization,
thus establishing a framework for further treaty revisions and
enactments.
In sum, the democratic entitlement gives rise to copyright
standards, which, despite their variable and programmatic character,
may have material significance in international copyright relations.
Those soft-law norms, moreover, do not exhaust the entitlement's
possible import for global copyright. In addition to setting soft-law
copyright standards, the democratic entitlement may well impose
upon states a justiciable, hard-law requirement to carve out
democracy-supporting limitations and exceptions to whatever
copyright-holder rights a state does accord. In particular, the
international right to free speech and free access, as codified in
ICCPR Article 19(2), should be seen to require limitations on
copyright owner prerogatives when necessary to promote the free flow
of information. It is to those justiciable limitations that I now turn.
2. Justiciable Limitations
If properly tailored copyright enhances possibilities for the
exercise of free expression.30 9 As we have seen, some degree of
copyright protection provides an important incentive for the
dissemination of creative expression and helps to support a fiscally,
and thus politically, independent sector of authors and publishers.
But an overly broad set of copyright owner prerogatives may, in some
instances, so constrain public access to existing expression and so im-
pede creative and critical reformulations of that expression as to run
afoul of the international right of free speech and free access.3 10 On
too many occasions, copyright owners have sought to use their pre-
308. See Vienna Convention, supra note 239, art. 31(3Xc) (codifying the rule of customary
international law that among the primary factors in treaty interpretation are "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties").
309. For that reason, the United States Supreme Court has aptly referred to copyright as
"the engine of free expression." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985).
310. For a fuller discussion of the ways in which an overly broad copyright may stifle the
free exchange of ideas, see Netanel, supra note 10, at 294-303.
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rogatives to stifle criticism,31' avoid public scrutiny,312 or simply
hinder the expression of unwanted political, social, or artistic views.313
More systematically, even when proprietors of expressive content
have no censorial intent, an overly expansive copyright imposes an
unduly burdensome "tax" on audiences wishing to view or listen to
that content and on authors seeking to engage in the time-honored
tradition of borrowing from or reformulating existing expression. The
supracompetitive prices that copyright makes possible, coupled with
the costs of negotiating for a copyright license, may render numerous
uses of authors' expression prohibitively expensive, thus posing
unacceptable barriers to the exchange of ideas and free flow of
311. See, e.g., Belmore v. City Pages Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 675 (D. Minn. 1995) (discussing
a suit brought by a Minneapolis police officer to prevent a newspaper from exposing his racist
fable, which had appeared in a police organization newsletter).
312. The Church of Scientology, for example, has recently initiated numerous lawsuits in
various countries to prevent Church dissidents and others from posting Church documents on
the Internet. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1365-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260,261-62
(E.D. Va. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1521-22 (D. Colo.
1995); Church of Spiritual Tech. v. Karin Spaink, No. 961160, Summary Judgment of the
(President of the District Court of the Hague, Mar. 12, 1996) (order granting summary
judgment), described in Maurits Dolmans & Annette Schild, Copyrights and the Internet; A
European's Perspective (presented at Fordham University School of Law, Fourth Annual
Conference on Intellectual Property and Policy, April 11-12, 1996), unofficial English translation
at Karen Spaink, Verdict: Scientology v. Providers and Karen Spaink, 12 March 1996 (visited
Feb. 2, 1998) <http'//www.xs4all.nl/-kspaink/fishman/home.html>) (unpublished manuscript)
[hereinafter Church of Spiritual Tech. v. Spaink]; see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811
F.2d 90, 92-100 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a biographer's quotations from J.D. Salinger's
unpublished letters did not constitute fair use); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303, 304-11 (2d Cir. 1966) (vacating a preliminary injunction restraining the distribution of
a biography of Howard Hughes that incorporated material from a series of magazine articles,
copyright in which had been acquired by Hughes's holding company in an effort to thwart
publication). Even more ominously, perhaps, in a number of instances governments have
invoked copyright in government documents or state employee writings in order to suppress
criticism or information about state policy. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Australia v. John
Fairfax & Sons Ltd., 147 C.L.R. 39, 58-59 (H.C. 1980) (holding that the Australian government
could successfully assert the Crown copyright in a motion to enjoin, on an interim basis, the
reproduction of government documents in a book criticizing the government's policy in East
Timor); Attorney General (U.K.) v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd., 1 N.Z.L.R. 45 (H.C. 1988)
(1988) (concluding that the government of the United Kingdom could not prevent the
publication of the memoirs of a former British intelligence officer), afftd 1 N.Z.L.R. 161 (CA
1988), leave to appeal to Privy Council denied, 1 N.Z.L.R. 180 (1988).
313. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that
publication of a counterculture comic book portraying Disney characters engaged in sexual acts
and illicit drug use was not fair use). In another case, a French court found that a production of
Waiting for Godot in which the lead roles were played by women, in contrast to Samuel
Beckett's express instructions that the roles should be played by men, violated Beckett's moral
right of integrity as asserted by his heirs. See Lindon v. La Compagnie Brut de Beton, Trib. gr.
inst. de Paris, (3e ch.), 155 R.I.DA 225 (1993).
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information necessary to spur, consolidate, and enhance democratic
governance. 31 4
Granted, copyright laws generally purport to grant proprietary
rights only in authors' original expression, and not in the information
or abstract ideas contained therein.315 As a result, copyright owners
may only prevent or exact a fee for uses of the literal form of their
protected works; they may not prevent a person from revealing the
existence of the protected work or from discussing information or
ideas contained in the work. But while copyright's censorial potential
would certainly be much worse without that idea/expression
dichotomy, the potential remains nonetheless.
For one, the idea/expression dichotomy is notoriously malleable
and indeterminate. 316 Indeed, the copyright law of most developed
countries has effectively recharacterized as protectible expression
what used to be considered public domain idea.3 17 Under today's
copyright law, even loose paraphrases and adaptations may infringe
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.313  In that regard,
moreover, the very uncertainty and threat of litigation over whether
an author has appropriated another's copyrightable expression may
314. For further discussion of this point in the domestic U.S. context, see Netanel, supra
note 10, at 294-97.
315. TRIPS incorporates this limitation into the international copyright regime. It pro-
vides that "[c]opyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas." TRIPS, supra
note 1, art. 9(2). For a discussion of the relationship between the idea/expression dichotomy and
free speech, see 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 48, § 1.10[B][2], at 1-74 to 1-82.
316. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960). The Peter Pan Fabrics court stated: "Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an
imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must
therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Id.
317. See Netanel, supra note 10, at 304 (discussing U.S. copyright law).
318. Until the 1948 Brussels Revision, the Berne Convention required Berne Union states
to accord exclusive adaptation rights to authors from other Berne Union states only with respect
to adaptations that did "not present the character of a new original work." Since the Brussels
Revision, however, the Convention has required that such authors be given the exclusive right
to authorize any adaptations, including those that would constitute a new original work. See
RICKETSON, supra note 51, at 389-99; see also Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 12
(providing for the adaptation right). In the United States, that expansion of copyright's scope
has taken place partly by an extension of the adaptation right and partly by a liberal
interpretation of what constitutes a "reproduction." See Netanel, supra note 10, at 377
(discussing these developments); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970) (holding that a defendant's imitative greeting card may be infringing even
though it copied neither copyrighted text nor copyrighted artwork); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 49-56 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that a parallel plot development
between a movie and a play is sufficient to support an infringement claim despite the absence of
literal copying).
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itself chill what might be properly characterized as the permissible,
and even laudable, taking of an idea. 19
Second, in many instances free speech values are best served
by the literal copying of existing expression, not merely the
reformulation of ideas or information. Effective criticism, parody, and
news reporting often require a measure of literal copying. Artistic
expression may also gain considerable force by literal references to
existing works.320 Copying, moreover, is generally a far cheaper
method of conveying the ideas or information contained in the copied
work than is creating a new work that presents those ideas or that
information in different words or form. Copying expression may thus
be highly conducive to making certain ideas or information available
to those who might not otherwise afford access, a concern of
particular poignancy in developing countries.3 21
We must remember, of course, that copyright yields free
speech benefits as well as burdens-and even its burdens pale in
comparison to authoritarian states' methodical suppression of
political dissent. But instances of overt copyright owner censorship
and copyright's effective imposition of a tax on the flow of information
and debate may nevertheless contravene international law
guarantees of free speech and free access. This view draws support
from U.S. jurisprudence. Courts and commentators have noted that
the First Amendment places limits on copyright owner rights.322
319. See Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 DAYTON L.
REV. 587, 612-13 (1997); Yen, supra note 48, at 425-29.
320. See John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 103, 111 (1988).
321. See Butalia, supra note 196, at 67 (noting that for a student in a developing country,
the difference between buying a book and photocopying may well be the equivalent of a month's
rent).
322. See supra note 48 (discussing judicial recognition of First Amendment limits on
copyright protection). A number of commentators have discussed the possible conflict between
an overly capacious copyright and the First Amendment. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola,
Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 283, 289-99 (1979) (attempting to structure a workable accommodation between the
First Amendment and the property rights granted by federal copyright law); Goldstein, supra
note 200, at 988-1055 (outlining possible conflicts between copyright law and the First
Amendment); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1992, at 185, 204-05 (criticizing judicial pronouncements that copyright doctrine adequately
reflects First Amendment free speech protections); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186-1204
(1970) (attempting to reconcile copyright with the First Amendment); L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 41-63 (1987) (detailing the conflict
between copyright restrictions on consumer access to expression and First Amendment
guarantees of access to ideas, as well as arguing that the Copyright Clause itself should be
interpreted to contain free speech restrictions on Congress's power to accord proprietary rights
in expression); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in
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While courts have resisted prescribing such limits by direct
application of the First Amendment, they have done so by
emphasizing that First Amendment values are manifested in the
limitations and exceptions to copyright owner rights found in United
States copyright law.828 Similarly, national laws that provide an
adequate breathing space for transformative and educative uses of
existing works would comport with the international right to freedom
of expression. The failure of a state's law to provide that breathing
space, however, would support a finding, whether by a judicial organ
such as the European Court of Human Rights or an oversight body
such as the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, that the state is in
violation of international law.
Before proceeding with this point, it is important briefly to
consider two caveats. First, there is certainly no reason to assume
that copyright per se would impermissibly abridge infringers' speech
rights under international law24--and, of course, neither are
copyright-imposed speech restrictions per se unconstitutional under
the First Amendment. Rather, it is only certain applications and
extensions of copyright holder prerogatives that may contravene
international free speech law. Second, we must be wary of blithely
drawing analogies between First Amendment jurisprudence and the
international right to free speech. In particular, the scope of the
international right to free speech may, in certain respects, be more
circumscribed than under First Amendment jurisprudence. The
ICCPR provides that the right to free expression may be subject to
"certain restrictions.., as are provided by law and are necessary [flor
respect of the rights or reputations of others."325 While the First
Amendment is also subject to implied qualification,3 21 the express
reference to restrictions in the ICCPR may reflect a broader
willingness of other democratic countries to curtail speech rights in
Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 878-914 (1983) (discussing cases in
which First Amendment defenses to copyright infringement actions were raised); Yen, supra
note 48, at 421-33 (noting that the idea/expression dichotomy is insufficient to alleviate
copyright law's "chilling effect" on certain types of expression); see also U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASsESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES THE
LAW 66-67 (1989) (discussing the First Amendment tension between public access and copyright
owner exclusive rights).
323. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing how United States copyright law
incorporates First Amendment values).
324. See NOWAK, supra note 277, at 354 (noting, as a general proposition, that copyright
protection is justified under ICCPR Article 19(3)).
325. ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 19(3)(a).
326. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (noting that the First
Amendment sets forth no "absolute rule" prohibiting all "regulation that depends on the content
of speech").
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the interest of checking racial animus, 327 safeguarding an individual's
reputation and privacy, 28 and protecting certain economic rights.329
Despite these caveats, however, there is reason to posit that
the international right to free expression, like the First Amendment,
can be abridged by an overly capacious copyright. For one, despite the
rights-of-others limitation found in the ICCPR and other human
rights instruments, it is clear that the state enforcement of a private
right may run afoul of the international right to free expression, just
as it may, under certain circumstances, constitute an impermissible
abridgement of free speech under First Amendment jurisprudence.330
Recent cases before the European Court of Human Rights indicate, for
example, that an excessive award of damages for defamation or an
injunction forbidding the publication of disparaging statements
regarding a competitor may contravene the free speech provisions of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 331 provisions that are roughly parallel to
327. Indeed, in a provision with respect to which the United States entered a formal reser-
vation, the ICCPR itself provides that "[any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."
ICCPR, supra note 241, art. 20(2).
328. See Sandra Coliver, Hollywood and Free Speech: The Contribution of the First
Amendment and U.S. Media to the World-Wide Promotion of Democratic Values, 17 WHITrIrR L.
REV. 271, 272-74 (1995) (noting that despite the influence of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), in European defamation law, defamation law in the United Kingdom is far less
protective of free speech than that of the United States).
329. See, for example, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH & Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 165 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1989), which upheld, by a 10-9 vote, a German court order restraining the
publication of accurate reports of alleged customer inability to obtain promised refunds from a
mail order firm to protect the rights of the mail order firm against a competitor's disparaging
statements under Germany's unfair competition statute. In addition to these substantive
limitations, international tribunals may be bound to give greater deference to the judgment of a
sovereign state than would a U.S. court assessing the First Amendment viability of a state or
federal law. See generally Paul Mahoney, Universality versus Subsidiarity in the Strausbourg
Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some Recent Judgments, 1997 EuR. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
364 (contending that the European Court of Human Rights properly accords greater deference
in cases involving cultural expression than in those involving political expression).
330. For a helpful recent account of state action doctrine in First Amendment law, see
Matthew L. Spitzer, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of the V-Chip, 15 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 429,438-53 (1997).
331. In Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, 316 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51 (1995), the
European Court of Human Rights held that a damage award for the defamation of a public
official acting in his official capacity, which was three times the size of the highest libel award
previously made in England, was a burden on speech "prescribed by law" in order to protect the
reputation of another. The court did hold, however, that the damage award was not "necessary
in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the European Convention because
the U.K. courts had failed to provide 'the assurance of a reasonable relationship of proportional-
ity to the legitimate aim pursued." Id. at 78.
In Markt Intern Verlag GmbH, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6, a German court had restrained
publication of accurate reports of alleged customer inability to obtain promised refunds from a
mail order firm to protect the rights of the mail order firm under a German unfair competition
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those of the ICCPR.312 State protection of private entity control over
information and expression in a manner that unduly constrains
individuals' rights of free speech and free access should be similarly
impermissible. Indeed, although the tension between free speech
rights and such private control has received far greater attention in
the United States than elsewhere, the concern that overly broad
copyright owner prerogatives may violate the free speech provisions of
the European Convention has recently found expression in a number
of fora.55
statute. After Germany's Federal Constitutional Court had upheld the injunction against a
claim that it violated the right to freedom of expression and of the press under Germany's
constitution, the European Commission opined that the court order violated Article 10 because
even though the injunction served to protect the rights of a private party against unfair
competition, it could not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society." Id. at 43. However,
the European Court of Human Rights held, after the President broke a nine-to-nine tie vote,
that it could not say that Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, in ruling the speech restraint
to be necessary, had exceeded the margin of appreciation (i.e., degree of deference) due to
Contracting States in assessing the extent and necessity of an interference with the right to free
expression. See id. at 21. On those narrow grounds, and over a vigorous dissent, the Court of
Human Rights held that there had been no violation of Article 10. See id.
332. Article 10 of the European Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
ECHR, supra note 242, art. 10.
333. See, e.g., Church of Spiritual Tech. v. Spaink, supra note 312 (finding that the
defendant did not violate Dutch copyright law by quoting, in a Web page, a Church of
Scientology document, but failing to decide whether the defendant's action was protected by
ECHR Article 10); Sir Anthony Mason, Developments in the Law of Copyright and Public Access
to Information, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 636, 638 (1997) (stating that there is a need to
reconcile copyright protection with the First Amendment and the ECHR, although contending
that restricting public access to works of entertainment is less of a concern than when material
that "is relevant to the well-being of a democratic system of government" is involved); European
Commission DG-XII Legal Advisory Board, Reply to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society (visited October 25, 1997)
<http'//www2.echo.lu/legal/en/ipr/reply/reply.html> (stating that the extension of copyright to
include acts of intermediate transmission and reproduction, as well as acts of private use and
viewing of information, would endanger the basic freedoms expressly provided by Articles 8 and
10 of the European Convention); Contracts and Copyright Exemptions, supra note 49, at 20-21
(contending that constitutional law, incuding ECHR Article 10, "could serve in certain
circumstances as an additional limit to the exercise of exclusive rights, in cases where
restrictions imposed by copyright owners on the use of protected material affect users'
fundamental rights and freedoms"); cf Fewer, supra note 48 (calling for recognition of the need
to limit copyright owner rights under the guarantee of freedom of expression in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms); Megan Richardson, Freedom of Political Discussion and
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The specific limitations on copyright holder rights that
international free speech law should impose would roughly parallel
those that might be required under the First Amendment. The first
limitation would be temporal. The tax that copyright levies on public
access can be justified only if it is limited in time. At some point,
cultural works must enter the public domain so that everyone may
freely copy, modify, or reformulate them. National laws that accord
perpetual copyright protection would pose an impermissible burden
on free speech,334 as would, arguably, the extension of the copyright
term much past the evolving international norm of the life of the
author plus seventy years. 35 International free speech law would also
impose substantive limitations on copyright's scope. A country that
sought to extend copyright protection to ideas or facts,336 or that
eliminated exceptions for quotation and news reporting along the
lines provided for in the Berne Convention, would run afoul of its
obligations under international free speech law.337  Finally, the
international law of free speech may limit the remedies that are
available for copyright infringement. As under First Amendment
Intellectual Property Law in Australia, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 631 (1997) (contending that
freedom of speech concerns should be relevant in Australian copyright infringement cases). But
cf. De Geillustreerde Pers N.V. v. The Netherlands, App. No. 5178/71, 8 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 5 (1976) (finding that freedom under ECHR Article 10 to impart information regarding a
television program schedule rests solely in the authors of the schedule, not in a magazine that
has yet to obtain the schedule, so long as the schedule's authors regularly make the schedule
available to the public through alternative media outlets).
334. In the past, Mexico, Guatemala and Portugal have each accorded perpetual protection,
although none do so today. See Sam Ricketson, The Copyright Term, 6 IIC 753, 755 n.7 (1992).
France purports to provide perpetual protection for authors' moral rights. See Law No. 92-597,
Art. L.121-1, discussed in Andr6 Lucas & Robert Plaisant, France, in INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, at FRA-1, FRA-102 (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer
eds., 1997) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT]. For a discussion of the possibility that a
perpetual copyright would run afoul of the First Amendment, see 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 48, § 1.01[C][1].
335. The European Union has directed its member states to enact copyright terms of the
life of the author, plus 70 years. See Council Directive 93/98, arts. 1, 7, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9,
reprinted in SWEET & MAXWELL'S E.C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATERIALS 29-34 (Anna Booy
& Audrey Horton eds., 1994). The directive has, in turn, sparked moves in Congress to increase
the length of protection in the United States as well. See supra note 23 and accompanying text
(discussing the controversy over proposed legislation in the United States to lengthen copyright
protection).
336. See 1 NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 48, § 1.01[B], at 1-7 to 1-10 (stating that such
copyright protection would implicate the First Amendment).
337. In addition, TRIPS prohibits copyright protection for ideas or facts and the Berne
Convention requires an exception for fair practice quotations. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art.
9(2); Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 10(1). Article 2(8) of the Berne Convention provides
that the Convention shall not apply to "news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the
character of mere items of press information." Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(8). It
does not, however, proscribe copyright protection for such information. My contention is that
such copyright protection would nonetheless be prohibited under international free speech law.
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jurisprudence, international law strongly disfavors both prior
restraints on speech and the imposition of punitive damages that
would unduly chill freedom of expression.338 A tribunal applying those
doctrines to copyright should accordingly look askance at a country's
liberal use of preliminary injunctions or ready imposition of presumed
or punitive damages in copyright infringement cases, especially where
the defendant has made her own expressive contribution rather than
slavishly copying the plaintiffs work.3 9
An international tribunal might look to state practice to give
further support for and content to the limitations on copyright holder
rights flowing from the free speech guarantees enumerated in
international treaties. 40 The Continental European view of copyright,
338. For U.S. law, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) (holding, on
First Amendment grounds, that punitive and presumed damages may be awarded in public
concern libel cases only where a defendant tells a falsehood knowingly or recklessly); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,714 (1971) (per curiam) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963), and stating that "[amny system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity"). On ECHR
Article 10, see The Observer and the Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, 14 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 153, paras. 60-70, at 174-77 (1992) (noting that while Article 10 does not prohibit
prior restraints, it does "call for the most careful scrutiny" of such measures, and holding that
an interlocutory injunction against publication of the memoirs of a former secret service agent
was permissible only to the extent proportionate to its aims); Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United
Kingdom, 316 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51 (1995) (finding a sizable award in a public figure libel
action to be a violation of Article 10); see also D. McGOLDRIcK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
461 (1991) (noting the Committee's focus on prior restraints in determining violations of ICCPR
Article 19).
339. The extent to which courts should refrain from issuing injunctions in copyright
infringement cases is a question of considerable uncertainty and controversy in U.S. law.
Although the ready availability of injunctive relief and presumed damages has long been a
feature of U.S. copyright law, a number of commentators and courts, including, recently, the
Supreme Court, have expressed concern that such relief may chill speech and run contrary to
copyright's constitutive purpose. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578
n.10 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra note 10, at 1132, and admonishing courts "to bear in mind that
the goals of the copyright law, 'to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,' are
not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to
have gone beyond the bounds of fair use"); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir.
1988) (finding "special circumstances" that would cause "great injustice" to defendants and
"public injury" were an injunction to issue), affd sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 207
(1990); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Appellate and Summary
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1998), available at Eugene
Volokh, Areas of Scholarly Interest (visited Jan. 15, 1998)
<www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/copy.rev.html> (asserting that injunctions and presumed or
punitive damages in copyright infringement actions may, under certain circumstances, run
afoul of the First Amendment).
340. State practice constitutes a mandatory factor in treaty interpretation only if it
constitutes "practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding [the treaty's] interpretation." Vienna Convention, supra note 239, art.
31(3)(b). Subsequent practice may consist of positions taken in international fora, as well as
national legislation and other facts, acts, or omissions that are indicative of the parties'
understanding of their treaty obligations. For a discussion of subsequent practice in treaty
interpretation, see IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATiES 136-38 (2d
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the view that has largely shaped both the Berne Convention and the
copyright law of most nations, centers on protecting authors'
individual, personal rights.3 41 An understanding of copyright as first
and foremost a vehicle for advancing public education and democratic
discourse animated early French copyright law, but has long since
receded to the background342 Nevertheless, both the Berne
Convention and domestic Continental copyright laws recognize
certain exceptions to authors' exclusive rights in connection with news
reporting, classroom instruction, and other activities related to public
education and the free flow of information.m In some countries,
ed. 1984) (discussing Vienna Convention generally); Netanel, supra note 7, at 466-69
(contending that the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Agreed Statements constitute subsequent
practice under the Berne Convention). Subsequent practice generally involves a tacit, rather
than explicit, understanding of the terms of a treaty. (Explicit understandings constitute
"subsequent agreement" under Vienna Convention Article 31(3Xa).) Nevertheless, it is far from
certain that state limitations on copyright holder rights would constitute state practice "in the
application of" human rights instruments within the meaning of Vienna Convention Article
31(3Xb) because, except for some recent expressions of concern over the possible conflict
between copyright expansion and international free speech guarantees, those limitations seem
to reflect more a general desire to ensure the free flow of information essential to a democratic
society than a specific understanding that copyright limitations are mandated by international
free speech law. On the other hand, the longstanding practice of limiting copyright holder
rights for the express purpose of ensuring the free flow of information does closely parallel
international free speech concerns. See Contracts and Copyright Exemptions, supra note 49, at
13 (noting that "[wihether from the droit d'auteur or copyright tradition, most countries have
enacted measures designed to safeguard the public's freedom of information and freedom of
speech"). At the very least, therefore, an international tribunal could properly consider that
practice, in addition to analogous law setting forth free speech limitations on private control of
information, in giving content to open-minded free speech provisions of human rights
instruments. See Vienna Convention, supra note 239, art. 32 (providing that "[riecourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation" when the mandatory means of interpretation
leave 'the meaning ambiguous or obscure").
State practice may also give rise to customary international law independently of treaty or
treaty interpretation when that practice is "general and consistent" and is followed "from a
sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). An argument could be made that state practice regarding both
copyright protection and limitations to that protection meets these criteria. In that event, the
customary law arising from such state practice could bind even countries that are parties to
neither international copyright conventions nor, for that matter, international human rights
instruments. A full discussion of that possibility is beyond the scope of this Article.
341. See, e.g., Decision of German Federal Supreme Court, BGHZ 15, 249 (recognizing the
author's right as a manifestation of the general right of personality grounded in Articles 1 and 2
of the German constitution).
342. For a discussion of the early public benefit rationale in French copyright law, see Jane
C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America,
64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990); see also GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 78-
82, 89 (1994).
343. For an in-depth historical account of such exceptions and limitations under the Berne
Convention, see RICKETSON, supra note 51, at 477-548; see also DIETE, supra note 49, at 137-60
(1978) (surveying limitations on copyright owner rights in European Community countries);
U.N. EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, THE ABC OF COPYRIGHT 35-41
(1981) (summarizing limitations on copyright owner rights in force in most countries).
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indeed, such exceptions are grounded in a constitutional requirement
that author's rights, like all property rights, must be limited as
necessary to serve the public interest.3"
Action and positions taken by states in international fora-also
evidence of state practice under international law3-similarly
contain express support for the idea that copyright holder rights must
be tailored to serve the larger public interest. As noted above, for
example, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by some 140 nations in
December 1996, explicitly recognizes "the need to maintain a balance
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest."36 In
that spirit, the Agreed Statements adopted along with the Treaty
confirm that both existing as well as new exceptions and limitations
to copyright owner rights may be appropriate in the digital
environment.3 47
In sum, while other countries' commitment to copyright
limitations might arguably lack the breadth and ideological punch of
First Amendment-inspired U.S. jurisprudence, both state practice and
344. See, e.g., The "School Book Case," In re Kistner et al., BVerfG 31, 229 (236), translated
in 3 HC 395, 397 (1972) (stating that in defining the proper scope of copyright the legislator
must "bring about a just balance between the sphere of the individual and the interests of the
public"). According to one leading German commentator, German law subjects copyright
owners to greater public interest limitations than those imposed on owners of tangible property.
See Gerhard Schricker, Urheberrecht zwischen Industrie-und Kulturpolitik, 1992 GRUR 242,
246. In Spain as well, the prevailing view, backed by a decision of the civil-law division of
Spain's Supreme Court, is that copyright is grounded in a constitutional provision that provides
for rights of private property that are to be defined by legislation in accordance with their "social
function." As a result, Spanish commentators hold, copyright holder rights may be subject to
the same sorts oflimitations that may be applied to property rights generally. See Luis Gimeno,
Politics, Patents and Copyright in Twentieth Century Spain, in THE PREHISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMS 161, 178-82 (Alison Firth ed., 1997)
(discussing this prevailing view, as well as the opposing view that Spanish copyright derives
from constitutional provisions protecting artistic freedom in more absolute terms than it
protects property rights, and concluding that the opposing view appears not to have been
followed by Spain's legislature and is unlikely to be adopted by Spain's Constitutional Court).
345. See HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 23 (observing that resolutions at international fora
are a manifestation of state practice). Unless arising from a tacit understanding of the meaning
of free speech provisions under international instruments, however, such practice will constitute
a supplementary rather than primary and mandatory means for interpreting those provisions.
See supra note 340.
346. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4, pmbl. 5; see also Memorandum Prepared by the
International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on a Draft Model
Law on Copyright for the Committee of Experts on Model Provisions for Legislation in the Field
of Copyright, World Intellectual Property Organization, 3d Sess., para. 17, at 8, WIPO Doc. No.
CE/MPC/III/2 (1990) [hereinafter WIPO Memorandum] (noting that the "great majority of the
government delegations" participating in the first session of the committee of experts for a
model copyright law supported the view that copyright law must not only serve the interests of
authors, but must also "take into account the interests of producers, users, consumers and the
society as a whole, and all that required an appropriately balanced regulation with certain
inevitable compromises").
347. See Agreed Statements, supra note 67, Statement Concerning Article 10.
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international instruments connote a keen appreciation of the need of
a democratic society to limit, as well as to recognize, authors' rights. 8
International human rights law should accordingly impose a ceiling
on copyright owner prerogatives, no less than to recognize authors'
"absolute minimum entitlement." Emphasizing the value of creative
expression and providing authors and publishers an opportunity to
gain financial independence from the state would contribute to
democratic development. State enforcement of overly broad copyright
protection, however, runs afoul of core components of the democratic
entitlement.
V. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
As a matter of policy and international law, copyright's
democratic principles might support, as an aspirational goal, a
Western-style copyright featuring a strong but limited proprietary
right. To require that such a right be instituted on a global basis,
however, would more likely impair than engender democratic
development. Countries, rather, should be encouraged to tailor
copyright holder rights as may best sustain fiscally and politically
independent media under local conditions.
This Part will focus on how copyright's democratic principles
might be thus applied within the confines of prevailing international
copyright relations. It will address four points of particular
controversy: (1) the extent to which TRIPS might be interpreted to
grant at least some degree of flexibility to WTO member states in
fashioning limitations (including circumscribed compulsory licenses)
to copyright owner rights; (2) the need to supplement the regime of
mandatory minimum standards of protection with mandatory
limitations on copyright holder rights; (3) the issue of "cultural
exceptions" to free trade regimes; and (4) the question of a copyright
348. The principal exception to the general congruence between prevailing state practice
and such free speech limitations on copyright holder rights is in the area of remedies.
Developed countries typically provide for liberal granting of injunctive relief, bath interlocutory
and permanent. See, e.g., Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 334, at FRA-125 (noting that in France
"[i]njunctions prohibiting continuing infringement are almost always given"). But see Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (cautioning courts that injunctions
should not be automatically granted in colorable cases of fair use under U.S. law). In addition,
TRIPS requires WTO member states to provide "expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements," including the possibility of injunctions. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 41(1), 44(1).
TRIPS also states that member states may provide for the "payment of pre-established damages
even where the infringer did not know or had no reasonable grounds to know that he was
engaged in infringing activity." Id., art. 45(2).
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holder's right to carve up world markets by prohibiting "parallel
imports" of copies of an expressive work that have already been
distributed with the copyright holder's authority in another country.
A. TRIPS Interpretation
As noted in Part III, TRIPS4 9 came into effect on January 1,
1995, as part of the agreement that established the WTO and
substantially revamped the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT).350 TRIPS, which now binds some 130 countries, brings
minimum standards of intellectual property protection into the WTO
regime of trade liberalization.351 Its underlying premise is that a
country's failure adequately to protect the intellectual property of
foreign nationals effectively constitutes a nontariff barrier to trade.352
Among its most significant provisions, TRIPS makes disputes
over member state compliance subject to the new WTO dispute
settlement procedures.353 TRIPS and the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding provide that, upon the request of a complaining state,
a WTO dispute settlement panel will be convened to determine
whether the allegedly noncomplying state provides the level and scope
of intellectual property protection that TRIPS requires.5 Upon a
finding of noncompliance, the panel may authorize the complaining
state to levy trade sanctions against the noncomplying state.
55
Like any adjudicatory body, WTO dispute settlement panels
will undoubtedly be called upon to interpret the substantive
provisions they have been asked to apply. In claims regarding
349. See TRIPS, supra note 1.
350. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1. The WTO has replaced the secretariat that
evolved to administer the GAT]P, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, T.IAS. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969). In addition, contemporaneously with the opening for
signature of the WTO Agreement, the parties adopted the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994"), reprinted in Uruguay Round, supra note 1. GATT 1994 is legally
distinct from, but incorporates, the GATT.
351. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (describing the TRIPS framework).
352. See Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue-The Making of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 WORMD COMPETITION
137, 140-43 (1994); Adrien Otten & Hannu Wagner, Compliance With TRIPS: The Emerging
World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 393 (1996).
353. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 64. See generally Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 61
(discussing this development in illuminating detail).
354. The complaining state must first hold consultations with the allegedly noncomplying
state and may request the establishment of the panel only if the parties do not agree upon a
solution within 60 days. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 4(7).
355. See id. For a further discussion of how dispute panel decisions may be enforced, see
Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 324-32.
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TRIPS's copyright provisions, panels will need to ascertain the
required level of protection and the scope of permissible limitations
and exceptions to copyright owners' exclusive rights under TRIPS.
They will also have to determine the extent of deference to give the
allegedly noncomplying member state's own good faith interpretation
of TRIPS's copyright provisions when that interpretation differs from
the panel's.356 Neither task will be easy; many of TRIPS's copyright
provisions are highly indeterminate, leaving considerable room for
varying interpretation and application.
A likely point of contention in TRIPS compliance disputes will
be the meaning of TRIPS Article 13, which provides that WTO
member states "shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder." 57 Article 13 contains several
open-ended phrases. It nowhere defines how unique and narrow the
subject of a limitation or exception must be to qualify as a "special"
case or what constitutes "normal" exploitation, "unreasonable"
prejudice, and "legitimate" right holder interests. Panel
interpretation of those phrases may determine whether any of a full
range of possible limitations and exceptions to copyright owner rights
will run afoul of a country's obligations under TRIPS. It has been
suggested, for example, that certain applications of U.S. fair use
doctrine, under which U.S. courts have sometimes held substantial
copying for the purposes of criticism, 58  parody,3 59  political
commentary,360 education,361 research, 62 and even consumer uses363 to
356. See Judith H. Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 VA. J. INVL L. 357, 362-63 (1997) (maintaining that, except for
antidumping challenges, WTO dispute panels are empowered 'to be more assertive and less
deferential"); Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 304-07 (favoring considerable deference
to the member state's good faith interpretation). For a discussion of the deference to be
accorded by WTO dispute settlement panels in general, see Steven P. Croley & John H.
Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996).
357. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13.
358. See Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 675-80 (D. Minn. 1995) (finding that
reproduction of a police organization newsletter article for purposes of exposing police racism
was a noninfringing fair use).
359. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (holding that the
commercial character of a song parody did not create a presumption against fair use and re-
manding for further proceedings).
360. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 206-09 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
copying portions of former President Ford's then unpublished memoirs constituted fair use),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 539, 539 (1985).
361. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that a commercial copyshop's copying for preparation of a university coursepack
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be noninfringing, would not be permitted under a strict reading of
Article 13. A nascent democracy's imposition of a compulsory license
on certain foreign works, as a means of ensuring the availability of
such works at prices that local institutions and individuals could
afford, could also be seen to conflict with a "normal" exploitation of
such works and to prejudice the copyright holder's "legitimate"
interests.36
A WTO dispute settlement panel would not have a free hand in
interpreting Article 13. Under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding applicable to TRIPS as well as to the WTO Agreement
generally, panels may not "add to or diminish the rights and
obligations" set forth in TRIPS and must construe TRIPS in
accordance with "customary rules of -interpretation of public
international law."365 The Understanding's reference to "customary
rules of interpretation of public international law" was intended and
would likely be taken to be an implicit invocation of the treaty
interpretation provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. 66 These provisions are widely seen to codify the principal
guidelines for treaty interpretation in customary international law.361
For that reason, GATT and WTO panels have repeatedly invoked the
Vienna provisions in settling trade disputes.18s
constitutes fair use), vacated on grant of rehearing en banc, 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996); see also
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that defendant commercial copyshop's copying was not fair use, but suggesting that, in
the event of copying by a nonprofit defendant for classroom use, the burden of disproving fair
use would fall on the copyright holder).
362. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362-63 (Cl. Ct. 1973)
(holding that copying of medical research publications by the National Institutes of Health was
a noninfringing fair use), affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376, 376 (1975).
363. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,421 (1984) (stating
that home videotaping of television programs for purposes of "time-shifting," or watching a
program after it has been broadcast, is a noninfringing fair use).
364. See Gana, supra note 12, at 761-62 (asserting that a compulsory license would likely
run afoul of TRIPS Article 13).
365. DSU, supra note 2, art. 3(2).
366. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 356, at 200. Since the United States is not a party
to the Vienna Convention, it was deemed more appropriate to refer to customary law rather
than to the Convention, particularly since the United States takes the position, in line with
prevailing opinion, that the Convention provisions on treaty interpretation largely restate
custom. See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw AND THE GATI/WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 418 n.16 (Ernst-Urich Petersmann ed., 1997). For a discussion of
the U.S. Executive's general recognition of the Vienna Convention as an authoritative guide to
customary international law regarding treaties, see RESTATEMENT (THMD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 145 (1987).
367. See SINCLAIR, supra note 340, at 153; Abbott, supra note 366, at 418.
368. See, e.g., Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Mar. 14, 1997, WTO
Doec. No. WT/DS31]R, paras. 5.17, 5.29 [hereinafter Canada Periodicals]; Japan-Customs
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The Vienna Convention sets forth a number of factors that
must be considered in treaty interpretation. Of relevance here, an
interpreting body must take into account, together with treaty
language, context, object and purpose, and other factors, "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties."369 As discussed above, such rules would include components
of the democratic entitlement that bear upon copyright's proper scope.
Even where the right of free expression would not require the
limitation or exception to copyright holder rights that is at issue, the
hard and soft-law components of the democratic entitlement should
color the WTO dispute panel determination of whether, under the
open-ended provisions of TRIPS Article 13, the limitation or exception
should be allowed. Where the exigencies of democratic development
suggest the need for fair use or a compulsory license, the imposition of
such a limitation or exception should not be seen to conflict with the
"normal" exploitation of the work or to prejudice "legitimate"
copyright holder interests. At the very least, the panel should accord
a greater degree of deference to an allegedly noncomplying member
state's good faith interpretation of TRIPS when limitations on
copyright owner rights reflect the state's effort to accommodate free
speech values.3 70
Panels have been understandably reluctant to consider
nontrade issues when adjudicating GATT disputes,371  and
considerations of democratic development might appear to strain the
bounds of dispute panel competence no less than resource
conservation, labor standards, individual human rights, and other
such social policy concerns.3 72  But copyright protection and
Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wine and Alcoholic Beverages, July 11, 1996,
GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.), para. 6.7, at 83; United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 29, 1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS2/R, para. 6.7; United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 16, 1994, WTO Doc. No. DS29/R, para. 5.18,
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (not yet adopted).
369. Vienna Convention, supra note 239, art. 31(3)(c).
370. Similarly, panels should apply international free speech law when interpreting
TRIPS's standards to accord countries considerable leeway in drawing the idea/expression
dichotomy, to allow for greater borrowing from existing works in creating new ones, and in
limiting the availability of injunctive relief to avoid prior restraints on speech. See supra notes
334-38 and accompanying text (discussing international free speech law).
371. For a contrary view that panels must consider nontrade values lest the WTO lose
popular acceptance, see generally Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
658 (1996).
372. See Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of
TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 19 INT'L LAw. 99, 114-15 (1995) (noting that TRIPS panels might
not be competent to resolve the "larger issues" of privacy, freedom of expression, and access to
information).
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limitations are both inextricably bound up with free speech values
and the support of a democratic culture. Accordingly, when free
speech limitations or other aspects of the democratic entitlement are
implicated in the setting of copyright standards, a panel established
to determine the conformity of those standards with TRIPS should
have no choice but to consider them.
B. Mandatory Limits on Copyright Holder Rights
Democracy-enhancing limits on copyright holder rights, such
as those contemplated by the right to free expression, should be
incorporated as mandatory provisions of international copyright law.
Both the Berne Convention and TRIPS set forth minimum standards
of protection that member states must provide to authors and their
assigns. Each also explicitly allows, and indeed encourages, member
states to provide for higher levels of protection than required by those
minimum standards. In that regard, with two possible exceptions,373
the limitations to copyright holder rights that those instruments
enumerate are merely permissive; no state is required, for example, to
provide every or even any limitation or exception that would be
permitted under TRIPS Article 13.
In an age of Internet communication, in which a work may be
reproduced and disseminated all over the world with a few clicks of a
mouse, copyright harmonization is becoming increasingly
important.74 The establishment of Internet piracy zones, where
copyrighted works are downloaded and made available to anyone in
any country with Internet access, would stifle development of the
373. Article 9(2) of TRIPS writes the idea/expression dichotomy into international copyright
law. It provides that "[clopyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, proce-
dures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such." TRIPS, supra note 1, art 9(2).
For a discussion of the indeterminate nature of the idea/expression dichotomy, see supra notes
316-19 and accompanying text.
Berne Convention Article 10(1) provides that:
It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully
made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice,
and their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from
newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries.
Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 10(1) (emphasis added). That provision, together with all
of Berne's substantive provisions except for those concerning moral rights, is incorporated into
TRIPS pursuant to TRIPS Article 9.
374. But of. Dan Burk, Digital Voice and Virtual Exit: Copyright in the Global Information
Economy, 73 CHs.-KENT L. IEV. (forthcoming 1998) (arguing that a measure of variety in
copyright regulation may serve as a vehicle for competition among countries for the business of
the production and distribution of cultural works, and may thus lead to a regime that is more
desirable than one of enforced upward harmonization).
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much-touted "Global Information Infrastructure."375  Given the
potential of that infrastructure to facilitate democracy-inducing,
democracy-consolidating, and democracy-enhancing communication, 37s
international copyright law should proscribe state encouragement of
or leniency towards such piracy.
Yet, just as digital content providers must be assured of
adequate global protection, those who creatively reformulate or copy
existing works in ways that would be permissible in most jurisdictions
must also be assured that they will not be liable for infringement in a
country that sets forth exceptionally narrow exceptions and
limitations to copyright holder rights. The December 1996 WIPO
diplomatic conference recognized the need to circumscribe copyright
holder rights if the Global Information Infrastructure is to serve as a
vehicle for the advancement of learning and public discourse. In this
vein, the conference adopted an Agreed Statement providing that both
existing and new limitations to copyright owner rights may be
appropriate in the digital environment. 77 But while that statement is
a step in the right direction, it is not enough. The free flow of
information through the Internet, with its potential to spur
democratic development, will be impaired if the very expressive acts
that facilitate democracy in certain jurisdictions can give rise to
copyright infringement liability in others.378 Asserting copyright's
democratic principles in the global arena would thus favor treaty
provisions requiring universal, minimum exceptions and limitations
to copyright holder rights.
Such exceptions and limitations are especially warranted in
the area of open-access digital communication. Once a copy or
variation of an existing work is put on the World Wide Web, it is
375. See Ginsburg, supra note 307, at 1477-78 (noting that massive digital copying by con-
sumers could undermine publisher markets no less than could infringing competitors).
376. See Howard Frederick, Computer Networks and the Emergence of Global Civil Society,
in GLOBAL NETwORKs: COMPUTERS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 283, 283-95 (Linda M.
Harasim ed., 1993). However, the possibility of massive unauthorized copying and dissemi-
nation of text, graphics, music, and audiovisual works over the Internet threatens to hinder
these salutary developments.
377. See Agreed Statements, supra note 67, Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10.
378. For a litany of instances in which government authorities have sought to prevent or
penalize Internet communications that were legal elsewhere, see generally David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996). I
do not contend that any Internet communication that is legal in any jurisdiction should per se
be legal in all others. Nor do I favor, as do Johnson and Post, the recognition of a separate,
semiautonomous jurisdiction for cyberspace. I merely argue that in order for copyright to serve
democratic development, universal user and transformative author rights are warranted no less
than universal rights for copyright holders in existing works.
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instantaneously available throughout much of the world, and, indeed,
current technology provides no proven and fully effective mechanism
for web site operators to withhold access to users located in any given
country. 79 As a result, an operator who does not wish to risk liability
in a country that accords copyright owners with an exceptionally
expansive panoply of rights will simply exercise self-censorship by
leaving potentially infringing material off his site altogether, to the
detriment of potential audiences the world over.
Given the global market in many hard copies and analog
broadcasts, however, universal limitations on copyright holder
prerogatives should not be restricted to the digital network
environment. Producers and international distributors of sound
recordings, books, and videocassettes, and transmitters of cross-
border television broadcasts, have a somewhat greater ability than do
web site operators to avoid copyright expansionist countries; they may
simply refrain from publicly distributing or broadcasting in those
countries derivative material that would be infringing under
expansionist law. The resulting free speech burden would be
somewhat less severe than in the digital network environment since
audiences in nonexpansionist countries would still benefit from access
to works that are not infringing under their law. Nevertheless, by
preventing the import of works that are noninfringing elsewhere, an
expansionist country's overly capacious set of copyright owner rights
may chill democratic discourse within that country.
A poignant example of the need for universal constraints on
copyright owner rights-one that is peculiar to the digital
environment-concerns the temporary, incidental storage of Internet
communications in the ordinary course of network operations. With
current technology, expressive works are broken down and
transmitted in discrete digital units, called packets, that are
temporarily and automatically stored on a series of network
computers when users view or listen to the contents of a web site.
Especially where the user is situated in a country other than that in
which the web site is based, the packets may pass through and may
be temporarily stored in one or more third countries. Indeed, given
varying volumes of Internet traffic, the digital packets of a single
379. While Web availability promises to be global, its current dimensions should not be
exaggerated. Although easy to overlook when reading much f the literature regarding the
Internet's purported global impact, many countries and probably most of the world's population
have no Internet access. See Lefla Conners, Freedom to Connect, WINED, Aug. 1997, at 106, 106-
07 (stating that most of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have either restricted access to the
Internet or no access at all).
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expressive work may travel along different signal paths and may
traverse different jurisdictions before being effectively reassembled at
the user's host computer.38t
The problem from the copyright perspective is whether such
incidental storage constitutes a potentially actionable reproduction
and, if it does, whether it would fall within an exception or limitation
to the copyright holder's exclusive right to make reproductions. The
copyright law of each country would resolve those issues with respect
to any digital storage that occurs within that country's physical
borders.381  As a result, web site operators and Internet
communications network proprietors may face copyright liability in
some jurisdictions, but not others, for the same Internet activity.
Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention provides that "[a]uthors of
literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have
the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in
any manner or form."s2 It is unclear under that provision whether
the reproduction "in any manner or form" would cover temporary and
incidental digital storage in the course of Internet operation. As
indicated in the Committee of Experts Memorandum on the WIPO
Copyright Treaty draft presented at the beginning of the diplomatic
conference:
Today, the countries of the Berne Union may interpret the right of
reproduction in different ways. Some countries may consider that temporary
reproduction, at least some acts of reproduction the results of which live only a
very short time, does not fall under the right of reproduction, whereas other
countries may take a contrary interpretation. 38
380. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global
Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7-13, 40 (1993) (describing network structure, packet
switching, and multi-jurisdictional signal paths).
381. See Ginsburg, supra note 307, at 591-92 (noting that to the extent temporary RAM
copies constitute potentially actionable reproductions, countries in which such copies occur in
the course of Internet distribution may assert a territorial claim to apply their copyright law).
382. Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 9(1).
383. Memorandum Prepared by the Chairman of the Committees of Experts on the Basic
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference on
Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Chairman of the Committees of Experts,
para. 7.14, WIPO Doc. No. CRNR/DC/4 (1996), available at World Intellectual Property
Organization, Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions
(last modified Jan. 23, 1998) <http/www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/4d-all.htm> [hereinafter Basic
Proposal]. The WIPO Committee of Experts clearly felt that the contrary interpretation was the
preferred interpretation. In line with a proposal set forth by the European Community and its
member states, the draft proposed to "clarify the widely held understanding that both
permanent and temporary reproduction constitute reproduction within the meaning of Article
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As originally drafted, the WIPO Copyright Treaty was to
provide that temporary and incidental storage would in fact constitute
a potentially actionable reproduction, but that countries would be
permitted to provide an exception where the reproduction "takes place
in the course of use of the work that is authorized by the author or
permitted by law."38 That provision ran up against considerable
opposition, however, and was ultimately deleted from the Treaty.38
In its place the conference adopted an Agreed Statement-by majority
vote rather than consensus386-providing that both the reproduction
right and the exceptions to that right permitted under the Berne
Convention "fully apply in the digital environment."387 The Agreed
Statement further provides that "the storage of a protected work in
digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention."38 It does
not indicate whether temporary and incidental storage would
constitute a reproduction or whether such storage should fall within
an exception to the reproduction right. As a result, parties to the
Berne Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty may continue to
treat such storage as actionable and may apply varying exceptions.
An international copyright law that sought to further
copyright's democratic principles would provide for a mandatory,
universal exception for transient, incidental reproduction.89
Requiring Internet network telecommunications providers to obtain a
copyright license for every incidental reproduction would severely
burden Internet communication, which, given the Internet's
increasing importance for global communication, would be highly
detrimental to the free flow of information. Moreover, to condition
such an exception on whether the underlying use is infringing, as in
the original WIPO Copyright Treaty draft, would be no less
detrimental. In that case, Internet network and service providers
would be forced to police users to avoid liability for unauthorized, non-
9(1) of the Berne Convention." Id. para. 7.05. The Memorandum further emphasizes that
including temporary storage within the reproduction right would be "well within any fair
interpretation of Article 9(1)." Id. para. 7.06.
384. Id. art. 7(2).
385. See Thomas C. Vinje, The New WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Happy Result in Geneva, 19
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 230,231-33 (1997).
386. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 48, Release No. 42-6/97, at 17.
387. Agreed Statements, supra note 67, Agreed Statement Concerning Article 1(4).
388. Id.
389. Such a mandatory exception was proposed by several countries at the conference as a
possible compromise measure. See Vinje, supra note 385, at 232.
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permitted transmissions.39o In cases of colorable, but uncertainly
permitted uses, Internet service providers would most probably
prevent the transmission rather than take the risk of liability.39' Such
a regime would thus effectively extend the reach of copyright owner
prerogatives far beyond their statutory limits, posing an unacceptable
chill on free expression.3 92
C. Cultural Works Exceptions to Free Trade Regimes
A number of democratic (as well as nondemocratic) states favor
the dissemination of indigenous expression by subsidizing local
authors and media and imposing quotas on the importation or
distribution of foreign works.393 United States trade officials have
adamantly opposed subsidies and quotas that favor local expression at
the expense of U.S. works. Indeed, an ongoing dispute between the
390. See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 135, 190-91
(discussing arguments raised by opponents and proponents of imposing liability for unauthor-
ized transmissions upon Internet network and service providers).
391. Proposed U.S. legislation would encourage this bias. Under the On-Line Copyright
Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997), on-line service providers would be liable
for infringing material if they fail to remove material within 10 days of receiving notice alleging
that the material is infringing, but would not be liable for removing or blocking access to
material for up to 10 days in response to such a notice, even if it turns out that material is
noninfringing. In contrast, the proposed European Union Directive on the Harmonization of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society would require
European Union countries to exempt from copyright infringement liability "[tiemporary acts of
reproduction... which are an integral part of a technological process for the sole purpose of
enabling a use to be made of a work or other iubject matter, and having no economic
significance." E.U. Information Society Directive, supra note 4, art. 5(1). An earlier version of
the proposed Directive would have conditioned the exemption on the contemplated use being
one 'that is authorized or otherwise permitted by law." Commission Proposal for a European
Parliament and Council Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and
Related Rights in the Information Society, European Commission, art. 5(1), available at Bureau
of National Affairs, Electronic Information Policy & Law Report (last modified Dec. 2, 1997)
<http'I/www.bna.com/e-law/docs/ecdraft.html>. However, that condition was eliminated in the
final proposal.
392. Cf Institute for Information Law, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, Liability
for On-line Intermediaries 67, 70 (1997), available at
<http:/www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk/IMP-FTP/liab.pdf> (suggesting that Internet service and
access providers may invoke ECHR Article 10, even absent any editorial responsibility for
distributed content).
393. See W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and
Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. IN'IL L. 105, 118-19 (1995) (enumerating subsidies and
quotas, including some outright prohibitions on imports of foreign films, in the European Union,
Canada, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Pakistan). Less directly, many countries, including the
United States, restrict foreign ownership of local broadcast media. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310
(bX3)-(4) (1994) (providing that FCC television and radio licenses may not be issued to foreign
corporations or to U.S. corporations in which foreign persons hold a controlling interest);
Broadcasting Act, 1990, ch. 42 (Austl.), sch. 2, pt. DI, § 57 (providing that a "foreign person must
not be in a position to exercise control of a commercial television broadcasting license").
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United States and the European Union over a European Community
directive that requires European Union countries to allocate at least
fifty percent of their television airtime to "European works"
threatened to derail the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations (which
eventually culminated in the adoption of TRIPS and the agreement to
establish the World Trade Organization).314 Such a result was averted
only at the last minute, when the parties effectively agreed to pull the
issue off the agenda, leaving the still-festering controversy for other
fora. 95
United States trade officials view such quotas, as well as
government subsidies for local media, as blatant trade
protectionism.396 They argue that television programs, films, sound
recordings, and other expressive works should be treated no
differently from any other product.3 97 The Europeans and other
countries that have enacted such measures respond that the support
394. See Shao, supra note 393, at 106-07. The Directive was issued by the Council of the
former European Community in 1989 and has its origins in the Community's "Television
Without Frontiers" initiative, set forth in a 1984 Green Paper. See Commission of the European
Communities, Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common
Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM (84)300 final. Article 4(1) of
the Directive provides, in pertinent part: "Member States shall ensure where practicable and by
appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of
Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to
news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services." Council Directive 89/552, art.
4(1), 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, 26. For recent commentary, see generally John David Donaldson,
"Television Without Frontiers": The Continuing Tension Between Liberal Free Trade and
European Cultural Integrity, 20 FORDHAM INTIL L.J. 90 (1996).
395. See Frederick M. Abbott, The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the 21st
Century, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 477-78 (1996). More precisely, the United States and
European Union agreed to treat the audiovisual industry as a service, governed by the new
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), and to conduct further negotiations
concerning market access in the audiovisual sector within the GATS negotiating forum. See
Abbott, supra note 366, at 478; Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception:
Does it Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it Affect or is it Affected by the
Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 298-301 (1997).
396. In response to the Directive, Ambassador Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade Representative,
issued a press release stating that the Directive was "an obviously protectionist initiative" and
that the Directive is "inconsistent with the Community's obligations not to discriminate against
foreign products ... under the GATT." U.S. Trade Representative Press Release No. 89-56 (Oct.
19, 1989) (statement by Ambassador Carla A. Hills). Likewise, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a resolution, by a vote of 342 to 0, denouncing the Directive as "trade
restrictive and in violation of the GATT." 135 CoNG. REc. H326-27 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989).
397. See U.S. Urges Free Worldwide Trade in Movies, Radio Programs During Uruguay
Round Talks, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1369 (Sept. 12, 1990). It was long a point of
contention between the United States and European Union whether audiovisual works are
"products" and thus covered by the GATT or "services" and thus not. See Donaldson, supra note
394, at 121-28. The WTO regime now contains a General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"), and toward the close of the Uruguay Round, the United States and the European
Union agreed that negotiations concerning market access in the audiovisual field will take place
in the GATS negotiating forum. See supra note 395 and accompanying text (describing the
agreement that these negotiations will take place in the GATS forum).
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of local media is necessary to preserve the integrity and continued
viability of indigenous culture in the face of an onslaught of
inexpensive U.S. imports.98  U.S. commentators and copyright
industry representatives have countered with considerable skepticism
regarding such claims for cultural independence. They have
questioned whether culture is something that can or should be
dictated by government fiat,8  and have noted that, in any event, local
media often emulate U.S. formulas, belying the purported cultural
protection rationale for such measures.4°°
The dispute over the permissibility and desirability of cultural
works exceptions has already arisen in the context of WTO dispute
settlement. The United States recently challenged Canada's effort to
protect its local magazine-industry advertising revenues against U.S.
competition by prohibiting the importation into Canada of foreign
magazines of which more than five percent of the advertising space in
any issue specifically targets Canadian audiences.41 The United
States successfully argued before a WTO dispute panel that the
Canadian measure was in violation of Article XI:I of GATT 1994,
which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports.402 Significantly,
the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement exempts "cultural
industries," including magazine publishers, from that Agreement's
398. The Directive also seeks to engender a pan-European culture through furthering
cross-border broadcasts within the European Union. See Donaldson, supra note 394, at 101-02.
On U.S. audiovisual industry competitive advantages stemming from its large domestic market
and extensive film and television libraries, see Laurence G. C. Kaplan, The European
Community's "Television Without Frontiers" Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture,
8 EMoRY IN'L L. REV. 255, 268-69 (1994). The notion of an inherent U.S. audiovisual industry
economic advantage is challenged in ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 12-21 (1991).
399. See NOAM, supra note 398, at 23-25 (questioning the concept of a national culture);
Donaldson, supra note 394, at 147-52 (stating that culture is and should be dynamic, and, as a
result, it may be difficult to draw meaningful distinctions between European and American
culture); Shao, supra note 393, at 142-45 (maintaining that the notion of "cultural integrity" is
often used as a front for state censorship and the furtherance of special interests); cf Stuart
Hall, New Cultures for Old, in A PLACE IN THE WORLD? PLACES, CULTURES, AND GLOBALIZATION
176, 199-203 (Doreen Massey & Pat Jess eds., 1995) (a British commentator questioning
"cultural fundamentalism").
400. As Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America and a vocal
opponent of European protection of its cultural industries, argued, such protection has "nothing
to do with culture, unless European soap operas and game shows are the equivalent of Moliere."
U.S. Industry Members of Congress Offer Mixed Reaction, But Most Back Accord, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2110 (Dec. 15, 1993).
401. See Canada Periodicals, supra note 368. The United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement exempts "cultural industries," including enterprises engaged in "the publication,
distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals or newspapers," from that agreement's
liberalized trade regime. On Canada's cultural protection measures, see generally Keith
Acheson and Christopher J. Maule, Canada's Cultural Exemption; Insulator or Lightning Rod?,
21 WORLD COMPET=ION 67 (1997).
402. See Canada Periodicals, supra note 368, paras. 5.5, 5.11.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:217
liberalized trade regime,40 a provision that has often been cited by
European and other proponents of a cultural exception. 404  United
States initiation of WTO dispute proceedings over Canadian measures
that were permissible under the Free Trade Agreement signals U.S.
resolve to marginalize that exception, and may portend future U.S.
action within the WTO to challenge European media subsidies and
quotas.405
Of possible significance to such action, over and above the
GATT's general trade-barrier prohibitions, TRIPS may itself afford a
basis for challenging cultural industry protection. TRIPS provides
that, after January 1, 2001, a member state may be found in non-
compliance with the Agreement, even if it has not violated an express
TRIPS provision, if the state's law is deemed to frustrate a TRIPS
objective or nullify or impair a benefit under TRIPS that the
complaining state could reasonably have expected to enjoy.4°6 As was
well understood by TRIPS negotiators, the United States could
conceivably claim that European Union restrictions on United States
403. See Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, arts. 2005(1), 2012, H.R. Doc. No.
216, 100th Cong. (exempting, as well as defining, cultural industries), reprinted in 27 I.L.M.
281. The United States only grudgingly agreed to the exception and reserved the right to
retaliate with "measures of equivalent commercial effect" if Canada chose to restrict the import
of U.S. cultural products. See Jon Filipek, 'Cultural Quotas": The Trade Controversy Over the
European Community's Broadcast Directive, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 323, 357 (1992). Nevertheless,
the United States subsequently agreed in the North American Free Trade Agreement to
incorporate by reference the cultural industry exclusion of the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
Annex 2106, 32 I.L.M. 605.
404. See, e.g., Jamie Portman, Will Ottawa Protect Culture?, Calgary Herald, Dec. 28, 1993,
at B7, quoted in Kirsten L. Kessler, Note, Protecting Free Trade In Audiovisual Entertainment:
A Proposal For Counteracting the European Union's Trade Barriers to the U.S. Entertainment
Industry's Exports, 26 LAW & POLY INTL BUS., 563, 580 n.153 (1995) (reporting that, in
connection with the Uruguay Round cultural exemption talks, France's President Mitterrand
declared that the European Union had "the right to ask the American government to have the
same regard for Europeans as they do for.., the Canadians").
405. For an insightful and thorough review of United States and European Union positions
regarding whether the Broadcast Directive's local content requirements run afoul of the GATT,
see Donaldson, supra note 394, at 108-59. For the time being, the United States and European
Union have agreed to leave the issue of European audiovisual sector subsidies and quotas to
GATS negotiations. See supra note 395 (discussing the agreement between the United States
and the European Community that these negotiations will take place in the GATS forum).
406. TRIPS Article 64(2) provides that subparagraphs 1(b) and (c) of Article XXII of GATT
1994 (which establish the nonviolation causes of action) shall not apply to the settlement of
disputes under TRIPS until the expiration of five years from the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement, which was January 1, 1996. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 64(2). For a more
detailed discussion of the possibilities of nonviolation complaints in the context of TRIPS, see
Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 61, at 285-88. On non-violation complaints under the WTO
and GATT agreements, see ERNsT-ULMCH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTP DISPUTF SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 135-
76(1997).
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copyright industry imports effectively nullify and impair the benefit of
European copyright protection for such works.407 If a WTO panel were
to accept such a claim, European Union states could be held in non-
compliance with TRIPS by virtue of such restrictions, even if
European Union copyright laws meet or exceed TRIPS standards.
From the perspective of a democratic copyright, the proper
basis for determining cultural exception disputes is neither principles
of free trade nor the goal of cultural preservation, but democratic
development. As we have seen, a vibrant sector of independent and
indigenous media is vital to such development. 48 While imported
information and expression have also proven critical to democratic
transition, indigenous media are much more likely to address local
political, cultural, and social issues. Independent and indigenous
media also form a crucial component of a vibrant, local civil society,
which is itself central to the vitality of democratic governance.
Accordingly, so-called "cultural exception" measures should be
permitted to the extent required to foster and maintain the viability
of indigenous authors and communications media, while still allowing
ample imported expression. Although the efficiencies of a global
market might favor the elimination of barriers to trade in expressive
products, the exigencies of democratic development require that
expression be treated differently from other goods and services.
Despite dramatic movement towards globalization on many fronts,
much politics and governance will remain local and national for some
time to come.4°9  Even if nation-states are "poor proxies for
overlapping and amorphous cultural spheres,"410 national boundaries
and units of government do have continuing valency for much political
discourse. So long as this is the case, democracy demands local and
national centers of autonomous expression as well as the free flow of
information and ideas across political borders. Where unhindered
global trade in expressive products and the comparative advantage of
foreign copyright industries would enfeeble local media, it is thus
incumbent upon democratic states to support a sector of indigenous
expression. To the extent that protective measures are commensurate
407. See Abbott, supra note 395, at 478.
408. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the benefits of an independent sector of authors and
publishers).
409. As David Held aptly notes: "Global processes should not be exaggerated to represent
either a total eclipse of the states system or the simple emergence of an integrated world
society. States have surrendered some rights and freedoms, but in the process they have gained
and extended others." HELD, supra note 74, at 136 (citations omitted).
410. Donaldson, supra note 394, at 170.
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with the need for maintaining a tenable space for indigenous
expression and are not merely a guise for curtailing the free flow of
information or sheltering established media from healthy competition,
neither the GATT nor TRIPS should be applied or interpreted to
proscribe them.411
D. International Versus National Exhaustion
The copyright law of most countries includes an exclusive right
to distribute copies of a work to the public.4 2 Copyright laws
generally provide, however, that the public distribution right is
"exhausted" with respect to any given copy after the copy has been
sold by authority of the copyright owner.413 The owner of that copy
may further sell or otherwise dispose of it as he or she wishes,
without any need for copyright holder consent.414
411. To the extent that media industries are defined as services, the same should be true of
the GATS. See supra note 395 and accompanying text (discussing the agreement between the
United States and the European Union that negotiations regarding the E.U. Broadcast
Directive will take place in the GATS forum). It would certainly seem that the European Union
broadcast quotas are more restrictive than necessary to accomplish this aim, but a full
examination of that point is beyond the scope of this Article. However, as Frederick Abbott
notes, TRIPS, at least, should probably not apply to local content quotas in any event since
intellectual property law has historically been limited to enabling intellectual property holders
to restrict activities in which others might engage; it has not accorded positive rights in market
access. See Abbott, supra note 395, at 478.
412. Some countries, notably France and Belgium, have traditionally implied a public
distribution right, referred to as the right to control the destination of copies, as part of the
reproduction right. See EU. Information Society Directive, supra note 4, at 31. The WIPO
Copyright Treaty, adopted in December 1997 but yet to take effect, is the first multilateral
copyright treaty to contain an exclusive right of distribution applicable to copies of all types of
works. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4, art. 8 (providing for an exclusive distribution
right); Basic Proposal, supra note 383, para. 8.01 (indicating that "[authors of literary and
artistic works have not been granted a general right of distribution under any existing
international agreements").
413. See Basic Proposal, supra note 383, para. 8.02 (noting that "in many jurisdictions, the
principle is that in respect of a copy of a work the right of distribution ceases to exist, i.e. is
exhausted, after the first sale of that copy"). Notable exceptions include France and Belgium,
which, at least in theory, recognize no exhaustion of the right to control the destination of
copies. See E.U. Information Society Directive, supra note 4, at 31. But see Lucas & Plaisant,
supra note 334, at FRA-112 (noting that while authors should have an implied right under
French law to restrict rentals of copies previously sold to the public, French case law only
clearly enforces such a rental right with respect to sound recordings); Alain Strowel & Jan
Corbet, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 334, at BEL-1, BEL-43 (despite a
broad right to control destination of copies under Belgian law, the right in practice is exhausted
for most works upon first sale with the European Community). For a discussion of exhaustion
under European Community law, see Herman Cohen Jehoram & Ben Smulders, The Law of the
European Community, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 334, at EC-1, EC-30 to EC-40.
414. In the United States, that limitation to the public distribution right is called the "first
sale doctrine." It is set forth in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(1994).
322
1998] COPYRIGHT AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
The notion of exhaustion lies at the center of a highly
contentious and unresolved issue in international law: whether
copyright and other intellectual property holders should have the
right to carve up world markets by preventing imports of otherwise
noninfringing copies that have been lawfully acquired in another
country. Some countries assert a principle of "international
exhaustion," meaning that once a copy has been lawfully sold
anywhere, the copyright holder may no longer control subsequent
dispositions. 415 Other countries adhere to a principle of "national
exhaustion," meaning that a copyright holder may prevent the sale in
one country even of copies that have been lawfully acquired in
another country.416 The choice of national or international exhaustion
has significant ramifications for what are called "parallel imports,"
the lawful acquisition of multiple copies of a work in one country and
the unauthorized resale of those copies in another country.
The debate over the desirability of national versus
international exhaustion has centered on who should benefit from
price differentials in the world market for copyrighted works.417 As a
result of currency differentials, possibilities for price discrimination,
and varying transportation costs, royalty structures and local
distribution networks, copies of a work may be sold for considerably
less in one country than in another. In some instances, that price
differential is sufficient to create possibilities for arbitrage, where
copies are purchased in Country A and resold in Country B for less
than the original sales price in Country B. Proponents of
international exhaustion argue that permitting such arbitrage better
comports with a global market and benefits consumers of countries,
such as our hypothetical Country B, where copies of a work are more
415. Countries favoring international exhaustion have principally included Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and most African countries. See WIPO Memorandum,
supra note 346, para. 8.12 (enumerating countries that proposed that the Berne Protocol, which
later became the WIPO Copyright Treaty, reflect the principle of international exhaustion).
416. The United States has been the world's primary proponent of national exhaustion.
See infra note 422 (detailing U.S. efforts in that regard). A third possibility is "regional
exhaustion." For example, the proposed European Union Directive on the Harmonization of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society would require that
the copyright holder distribution rights be exhausted upon the sale of a copy anywhere within
the European Community, but not elsewhere. See E.U. Information Society Directive, supra
note 4, art. 4(2).
417. While the debate over exhaustion has focused primarily on the distribution of copies, it
has also concerned the communication of works through broadcasting and, recently, the
Internet. For a brief summary of the debate in each of these contexts, see P. Bernt Hugenholtz,
Adapting Copyright to the Information Superhighway, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A
DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 81, 95-98 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996).
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expensive than elsewhere.418 Proponents of national exhaustion
argue, on the other hand, that copyright holders should be entitled to
engage in territorial discriminatory pricing to take account of variable
consumer demand and purchasing power.419 If left unchecked, they
note, the increased arbitrage-driven demand for copies in Country A
will drive up prices in Country A, to the detriment of its consumers.
In some instances, indeed, if copyright holders are unable to prevent
parallel imports from Country A to Country B, they will either cease
distributing the work in Country A or will suffer a serious erosion of
their incentive to create cultural works at all.
In the United States the question of under what
circumstances, pursuant to the Copyright Act, the authorized sale of
copies abroad exhausts the copyright holder's public distribution right
in this country has been one of considerable uncertainty. With the
circuits split on the issue,420 the Supreme Court has heard argument
this term in a case involving this question of copyright's international
exhaustion.421 Despite this domestic law uncertainty, however, U.S.
418. See Shubba Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray
Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 376-77 (1994) (summarizing the pro-interna-
tional exhaustion position).
419. See id. at 377 (summarizing the pro-national exhaustion position); Brief of Amici
Curiae the Recording Industry Association of America, the Motion Picture Association of
America, the Association of American Publishers, American Film Marketing Association,
Business Software Alliance, the Interactive Digital Software Association, National Music
Publishers' Association, and International Intellectual Property Alliance Supporting
Respondent, Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Intl, Inc., (No. 96-1470), available
in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File [hereinafter Copyright Industry Brief]. For a general
discussion of discriminatory pricing, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 516-520 (1994).
420. The Ninth Circuit has held that a first sale abroad does not exhaust public
distribution rights in the United States. See lanza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King
Distribs., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that sale abroad by the licensee of a U.S.
copyright holder of copies of a copyrighted work manufactured in the United States does not
exhaust the U.S. distribution right), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2406 (1997); Parfums Givenchy Inc.
v. Drug Emporium, 38 F.3d 477, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that sale abroad of foreign-
manufactured copies of U.S. copyrighted work does not exhaust the U.S. distribution right).
The Third Circuit has held that a first sale abroad does exhaust U.S. distribution rights in
certain circumstances. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d
1093, 1098-99 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that where the U.S. copyright holder itself sells copies
abroad, as opposed to the case where a foreign licensee sells copies, the U.S. distribution right is
exhausted).
421. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research InVl, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2406, 2407
(1997) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). On its facts, Quality King concerns the narrower
sub-issue of whether a U.S. copyright owner may prevent the unauthorized importation and
U.S. distribution of copies of a copyrighted work that have been manufactured in the United
States, exported for sale abroad by the copyright holder, and then brought back to the United
States by the parallel importer. The parties and amici disagree on the circumstances in which
U.S. copyright owners may prevent the importation of authorized copies of copyrighted works
that have been produced abroad, and it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will reach that
issue. Briefs of the parties and amici are available in LEXIS in the Genfed library, Briefs file.
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representatives have aggressively sought to implement the principle
of national exhaustion in international trade and intellectual property
agreements. 422
With the exception of bilateral trade negotiations with
countries that have little choice but to accede to U.S. demands, U.S.
representatives have been unable to gain international support for
that position.42 In both TRIPS and WIPO Copyright Treaty
negotiations, for example, the parties were unable to resolve the issue
after bitter debate, and essentially agreed to disagree. Indeed, TRIPS
Article 6 provides explicitly that, apart from the general requirement
that member states may not discriminate against the nationals of any
other member state, "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."424
The issue may be revisited within the WTO, however,425 and it is
important that negotiators consider exhaustion's possible impact on
global democratic development, not just trade.
Although this position is somewhat counterintuitive, the
principle of national exhaustion, with its possibilities for price
discrimination, might well be more conducive to global democracy
than would a regime of international exhaustion and territorial
arbitrage. Armed with an enforceable right to prevent parallel
imports, copyright holders could distribute expressive works in
developing countries at a considerably lower rate of return than in
developed countries, potentially enabling far greater public access in
developing countries than would otherwise be the case. Seen in
422. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Quality
King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., (No. 96-1470), available in LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Briefs File [hereinafter U.S. Brief] (detailing the position of the United States in
international trade and copyright treaty negotiations); Copyright Industry Brief, supra note 419
(emphasizing the importance of a national exhaustion regime for U.S. copyright industries).
423. For a discussion of U.S. pressure on Taiwan to ban parallel imports, resulting in
Taiwan's agreement to do so under the 1989 United States-Taiwan copyright pact, see Soojin
Kim, In Pursuit of Profit Maximization by Restricting Parallel Imports: The U.S. Copyright
Owner and Taiwan Copyright Law, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 205 (1995); see also U.S. Brief,
supra note 422 (quoting provisions requiring a copyright holder right to prevent unauthorized
parallel imports in agreements with Cambodia, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Ecuador, and Sri
Lanka).
424. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 6. Similarly, the WIPO Copyright Treaty provides for a
right of public distribution, but then states that "[niothing in this Treaty shall affect the free-
dom of the Contracting Parties to determine the conditions, if any, under which the exhaustion
of [that right] applies after the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the original or a copy
of the work with the authorization of the author." WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4, art.
6(2). The draft proposal for the WIPO Copyright Treaty had contained alternative provisions,
one providing for international exhaustion and the other for national or regional exhaustion.
See Basic Proposal, supra note 383, art. 8.
425. See Abbott, supra note 395, at 478.
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distributional terms, such a regime would effectively implement a
system of developed country consumer subsidy for the distribution of
expressive works to developing countries.426  It would enable
expressive works to be sold at a higher price in developed countries
and at a lower price, and therefore in greater quantities, in developing
countries than in a regime of unrestricted arbitrage. Indeed, if
copyright holders cannot segregate developed country from developing
country markets, they will sometimes simply forgo the less profitable
developing country market, leaving developing country consumers
with sporadic, high-priced third party imports or unauthorized local
production as the only possibilities for gaining access to those foreign
works. To the extent that exposure to foreign works contributes to
the building and consolidating of democratic institutions and
democratic culture in developing countries, therefore, the democratic
paradigm would generally support national over international
exhaustion.
On the other hand, however, a number of factors may
undermine the territorial price discrimination possibilities and
benefits to which a national exhaustion regime would give rise. These
factors include transaction costs, copyright holder institutional biases,
bureaucratic inertia and risk averseness, copyright holder inability to
price discriminate among a developing country's consumers, foreign
government import barriers, and others. In addition, as a result of
higher production costs in developed countries, resulting partly from
higher wages and partly from more stringent production quality
standards, even the marginal cost of producing copies in the copyright
holder's country and transporting them to the developing country may
exceed the purchasing power of most developing country consumers.
Accordingly, the widespread distribution of expressive works in
developing countries may often require the local production of copies
(or translations) of those works. Developing country publishers
commonly complain, however, that developed country publishers
simply do not respond to requests for reprint or translation rights, or
insist on set fee schedules that are beyond the ability of developing
country publishers to pay.4 7 While fear of parallel imports might
underlie some of this resistance, it would appear that developed
country publishers would generally prefer to realize their market
power by selling fewer of their own high-priced copies than licensing
426. By enabling copyright holders to sell copies at consumers' reservation price, perfect
price discrimination would also effectively enable copyright holders to capture all consumer
surplus.
427. See Altbach, supra note 135, at 9.
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the local production of a greater number of lower-priced, lower-quality
copies.42
Given these distribution barriers, the democratic paradigm
would likely favor a hybrid system of compulsory licenses and
national exhaustion. Under such a system, a developing country
publisher would be entitled to reprint and translate a work upon
payment of a statutorily set royalty when the copyright holder has
failed to license reprint or translation rights in the developing country
for a reasonable price and within a reasonable time after the work is
available elsewhere. Significantly, however, the export of such locally
produced copies or translations of the work would be prohibited,
except to adjacent developing countries in which the copyright holder
has similarly failed voluntarily to license the pertinent reprint or
translation rights. Such a system would allow for domestic
administration and setting of royalty rates in accordance with the
standards and subject to the review of an international body, such as
the WIPO or WTO. Consistently with Part C's discussion of cultural
work import restrictions, it would also permit nascent democracies to
limit the availability of such licenses where necessary to prevent the
cheap availability of foreign works from significantly eroding the
market for domestic authors.
Such a hybrid compulsory license/national exhaustion system
would require a modification of both the Berne Convention and
TRIPS, one which, admittedly, would likely be politically infeasible at
least in the short run.429 As a general rule, both Berne and TRIPS
require that copyright holders be given exclusive rights, not subject to
a compulsory license. The Appendix to the Paris Act of the Berne
Convention, which TRIPS incorporates by reference, does provide,
however, that developing countries may institute a system of
compulsory licenses for the reproduction or translation of foreign
works. Under the Appendix, such licenses must provide for "just
compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties normally
428. See Butalia, supra note 196, at 54; cf F.T. Shut & PAG. vanBergebik, International
Price Discrimination in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 14 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 114, 146-47
(1986) (concluding that local consumer purchasing power is a major factor in drug manufacturer
price setting, but that, given manufacturer market power, real costs relative to purchasing
power remain considerably higher in developing than in developed countries).
429. The current arrangement for developing country compulsory licenses under the
treaties, which puts severe constraints on those licenses, embodies an uneasy compromise
following a lengthy battle over developing country demands for substantially greater rights to
allow for compulsory licenses, a battle which threatened to dismember the international copy-
right regime. For a detailed account of that controversy and of the resulting compromise, see
RICKETMON, supra note 51, at 590-664.
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operating on licenses freely negotiated between persons of the two
countries concerned."430 Licenses may be granted only after a
specified period in which a work is unavailable in the developing
country "at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the
country for comparable works" and, even then, only if the applicant
has first sought unsuccessfully to obtain a voluntary license.
From the democratic paradigm perspective, the Appendix is
inadequate. For one, it imposes significant delays and procedural
requirements, which, in the opinion of some commentators, have
dissuaded all but a handful of developing countries from availing
themselves of the Appendix.431 More to the point here, the Appendix
limits compulsory licenses to translations "for the purpose of teaching,
scholarship or research" 4 2 and to reproductions "for use in systematic
instructional activities."433 Given the possible democratizing impact of
widespread exposure to foreign works, including works of
entertainment and including exposure outside of formal education
institutions, such limitations are unduly restrictive. In addition, the
Appendix allows only noncommercial exports of licensed works and
even then only in very narrow circumstances. 4" In many cases,
however, local developing country production would only be feasible if
copies can be marketed to adjacent countries. For that reason, the
democratic paradigm proposal would permit commercial exports to
adjacent developing countries where the copyright holder has
similarly failed to license the work's reprinting or translation, as the
case may be. So long as exports outside of such developing country
markets were prohibited under a regime of national exhaustion,
copyright holder incentives to produce new works and to market those
works in developing countries through price discrimination where
possible would remain intact.
430. Berne Convention, supra note 12, Appendix, art. 1V(6)(aXi).
431. See Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 50, at 697 (referring to, but disagreeing with, the posi-
tion that developing country reluctance can be explained by the Appendix's complexity). But see
RICKETSON, supra note 51, at 663 (suggesting that the fact that few developing countries have
invoked the Appendix may reflect developed country copyright holder willingness to agree on li-
cense terms, perhaps under the shadow of the Appendix, and a greater concern for authors'
rights among developing countries).
432. Berne Convention, supra note 12, Appendix, art. 11(5).
433. Id. art. HI(2)(a)(ii).
434. See id. art. O(c).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The widespread, but still halting, movement towards
democratic government throughout much of the world, together with
a growing concern for the continued vitality of democratic institutions
in the West, has brought renewed interest in recent years in
identifying those factors that may contribute to the development and
enhancement of democracy. A democratic culture, supported by the
widespread dissemination of information and opinion, an independent
and pluralist media, and a belief in the efficacy of individual
contributions to public discourse, is central to that process of
democratization. In some circumstances, particularly in advanced
democracies, copyright can contribute significantly to those
constitutive factors. In others, copyright-at least a proprietary set of
rights modeled on Western copyright-would have a marginal or
negative impact on their realization. To assert the principle that
copyright should further democracy is thus not to require that all
countries adopt Western-style copyright laws. It is rather to examine
particular issues, market sectors, and local conditions with an eye
towards tailoring copyright towards furthering democratic
development.
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